Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: Arrington's Stuff

Arrington: “Advertising and Behavior Control”

The main thesis and basic structure of the article: Arrington criticizes common arguments against the ethical propriety of advertising -- in particular, those that argue that ads undermine our autonomy.

Main sections of the paper: “a reader’s guide”:

-pp. 369-370: a discussion of several of the main techniques of influencing the consumer- techniques that, some have argued, undermine human autonomy in ways that are morally unacceptable.
-puffery
-indirect information transfer
-subliminal advertising

-p. 370, bottom: The central question of the paper is raised: Do such techniques undermine autonomy? (Note the implication that both the critics and Arrington accept: if ads undermine human autonomy, then it is morally wrong to use such ads to sell products).

-pp. 371-372, first column: some initial arguments - offered by others - for the moral legitimacy of each of the above-mentioned techniques in advertising (i.e., puffery, etc.), and some initial criticisms of them - again by others.

-p. 372, third and fourth full paragraphs: The preliminary diagnosis: The central question cannot be answered either way until we have a better understanding of the notion of autonomy itself. (Notice: This is one of Lippke’s main points as well. However, whereas Arrington will argue that a fuller understanding of the nature of autonomy shows that ads don’t undermine it, Lippke will reach the opposite conclusion. How did they come to such different conclusions? You will notice that it is largely because they have different notions of autonomy (Lippke’s notion of autonomy is more robust than Arrington’s). You should therefore make sure you understand exactly how their respective notions of autonomy differ. You should also decide for yourself which view of autonomy is more accurate.).

-pp. 372-376: Analyzing (i) the several different aspects of autonomy, (ii) the main arguments for the immorality of ads (each of which is based on the claim that ads undermine one of these aspects of autonomy), and (iii) Arrington’s criticisms of these arguments.
-pp. 372-373: Autonomous desire:
-pp. 373-374: rational desire and choice:
-pp. 374-375: Free choice:
-pp. 375-376: Control or manipulation:

-p. 376, 1st column, last full paragraph: conclusion: arguments rarely undermine aspects of autonomy. But if so, then they don’t intrinsically undermine autonomy.

The different aspects of autonomy, the arguments for the immorality of ads, and Arrington’s criticisms of them:

-Autonomous desire:
-Hayek: Autonomous desires aren’t just those that are not culturally induced. For if they were, then the only autonomous desires would be those for, e.g., food, shelter, sex, etc. But this is absurd (surely many of our other desires, e.g., for music of certain sorts, are autonomous, even though they are culturally induced).
But if so, then the mere fact that desires induced by ads are culturally induced doesn’t entail that they aren’t autonomous.
-Frankfurt:
-first-order desire: a desire for something that isn’t a desire (e.g., pizza, companionship, etc.)
-second-order desire: desire to have/not have a desire.
-the criterion of autonomous desire: S’s first-order desire B is autonomous iff S has a second-order desire, A, to have B.
-If we apply Frankfurt’s criterion of autonomous desire to ad-induced desires, we get the result that ads usually don’t create non-autonomous desires. For I typically don’t repudiate ad-induced desires – I don’t desire that I lose such desires. But if not, then by Frankfurt’s criterion, such desires are autonomous.
-This point also shows that most subliminal ads don’t create non-autonomous desires.
-Responding to Baybrooke: Baybrooke’s argues that if I might choose differently if I were given more information and options, then my desires about the chosen product are not autonomous. But since we would often have chosen differently given more info., it follows that our desires for many products are not autonomous. Arrington responds by saying that Baybrooke’s principle is absurd. For since it is true of virtually all of our desires, it absurdly implies that none of our desires are autonomous.
-Rational desire and choice:
-Baybrooke: Ads either (i) prevent me from following my rational will or (i) prevent me from developing into a fully rational agent. My ad-induced desires aren’t the result of my applying my rational will – I am not given all the information about a given product in an ad; nor am I apprised of all the other choices available to me. Therefore, I have been prevented from using my reason in developing such desires. But if so, then they aren’t autonomous.
-Arrington’s first reply: It implies that virtually none of our desires are autonomous. For since we never know all the facts about a product (or about all of the alternative products I could have chosen), the principle implies that none of my desires for products are the result of my rational will, in which case they aren’t autonomous – which is absurd.
-Arrington’s second reply: A choice is rational if it is based upon relevant information. Information is relevant if it shows one how to satisfy a prior desire. But ads give such information. Therefore, they don’t get me to choose something against my rational will.
-A new objection: Many ads (those containing puffery) make claims about benefits of products that are purely imaginary. But buying a product on the basis of anticipation of benefits that are purely imaginary is an irrational decision.
-Arrington’s reply: No. The benefits are subjective, yet real. Many people buy a product in anticipation of a certain subjective effect – e.g., the feeling of adventure or prestige. The products really do provide such subjective effects. Therefore, such choices are not irrational.
-Free choice:
-Objection: Ads produce desires for buying products - desires we are unable to resist. But actions that result from irresistible forces are not free, and no such unfree action is autonomous. Therefore, ads reduce our autonomy, and so are immoral.
-Arrington’s reply: An act is free iff it is done for a reason: If it’s done for a reason, then it’s free; but if an action goes against one’s reasons, then it is not free. Applying this account of freedom to the ethics of ads debate, we get the conclusion that, occasionally, ads produce unfree acts in us, but usually they don’t.
Quote: “...most of us have a benevolent subconsciousness which does not overwhelm our ego and its reason for action. And therefore most of us can respond to subliminal advertising without thereby risking our autonomy.” (P. 375)
-Control or manipulation:
-Objection: Ads manipulate and/or control those who see/hear them (by getting them to buy their product). But one is not acting autonomously when on is being manipulated or controlled. Therefore, ads undermine the autonomy of the consumer.
-Arrington’s reply: No. For if ads were manipulating or controlling consumers, they would have to control their desires. But ads don’t do this. Rather, they give information that appeal to desires that the consumer already has, if she has them at all. But if so, then ads don’t control or manipulate the consumer.