Notes on Employee Rights:Lippke's Stuff

Notes: Lippke’s “Privacy, Work and Autonomy”

The nature of privacy: two key features:

1 – Some control over information about ourselves
2 – Some control over who can experience/observe us (Lippke, 80)

N.B.: Notice that Lippke agrees with D&D that what counts as private depends upon the kind of relationship that exists between two (or more) people. (Lippke, 80)

Why is privacy valuable?

-Because autonomy is valuable, and violation of our privacy undermines our autonomy, as well as our ability to develop our autonomy (and our ability to conceive of ourselves as autonomous) (Lippke, 80-81). Conversely, if we protect the right to privacy, then we will give people the idea that they are autonomous, thus realizing the conditions for people to actually behave/act autonomously.

-What is autonomy? It’s a kind of independence, in particular, independence from other people in making one’s own decisions. It is the ability to control certain aspects of one’s own self (e.g., one’s beliefs, thoughts, and actions). The current edition of Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines autonomy as “self-directing freedom”.

-Two degrees of autonomy: minimal autonomy and full autonomy.

-Minimal autonomy: Conceiving of oneself as autonomous: seeing oneself as someone who can, if she so wishes, control one’s thoughts, beliefs, and actions. It may also involve the actual control over some of our beliefs, thoughts and actions (Lippke, 80).

-Full autonomy: the actualized/realized ability to critically reflect on one’s deepest convictions and life plans (close paraphrase of Lippke, 81).

-Again, Lippke’s main point here is that privacy is valuable because autonomy is valuable (it’s necessary for human flourishing), and violation of privacy can undermine both our minimal and full autonomy. And providing an environment in which our privacy is respected gives us the necessary conditions to develop and utilize our minimal and full autonomy.

-Lippke’s summary: Three important connections between privacy and autonomy: Respecting people’s privacy gives them idea that


1 – they are able to act autonomously

2 – they are worthy of acting autonomously

3 – they are entitled to act autonomously (Lippke, 83)



First set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments for the right to privacy with respect to DT: (N.B.: these criticisms have to do with D&D’s responses to the Productivity Argument for DT)

-The general criticism: D&D wrongly argue against DT on the grounds that the knowledge it provides is not job relevant. From this point, they argue that since the ER/EE relationship is that of a contract, and since such a contract limits the ER’s knowledge to that which is job relevant, the requesting and demanding of DT is a violation of EE privacy rights. But arguing on the basis of job relevance is a failure.

-Support for the general criticism: Three arguments:

-A precautionary note: Lippke wants to protect this information as much as D&D do. However, he thinks that they can’t successfully defend such information on the basis of job (ir)relevance.


1 – Contrary to what D&D claim, the kind of information that they try to protect is, in fact, job relevant. But if so, then the argument for protecting such information because it is not job relevant is unsound.
2 – D&D argue that EEs are not required to perform at an optimal level. Rather, they are only required by their contracts to perform at a satisfactory level. Thus, since drug use would only rule out optimal – but not necessarily satisfactory – job performance, the information provided by DT isn’t job relevant. But this argument is very bad. For it only works so long as the EE and ER stipulate in the contract that merely satisfactory job performance is required. But there is no reason why the contract couldn’t stipulate the requirement of optimal performance. And if that happens, D&D’s argument here will no longer go through.

3 – D&D argue that knowledge of the underlying causes of poor job performance is not job relevant. Rather, only the information that the EE is performing poorly is relevant. But this argument is extremely weak. For we can easily argue that since the information gathered about an EE’s drug use will help the ER predict the performance level at which the EE will likely perform, then such knowledge is obviously job relevant.

4 – The means used by ERs to get the information (e.g., drug testing) is job relevant, contrary to what D&D claim

Second set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments: (N.B., these have to do with D&D’s responses to the Harm Argument for DT)

-Preliminary: Lippke’s concedes all of D&D’s points about restricting DT to certain job types, and to only certain individuals who occupy such jobs.

-D&D wrongly argue that the most important issue for determining whether ERs have a right to the information provided by DT is whether or not issues of safety outweigh considerations of EE privacy. But this is a shallow analysis of the problem. The deeper issue is providing social conditions in which EE’s wouldn’t even consider use drugs on the job. If EE’s were treated as autonomous agents, then drugs use on the job would be greatly reduced.


Lippke’s positive argument for EE privacy: DT, in most cases, is wrong, not because the information it provides is not job relevant, but because it undermines the EE’s minimal and full autonomy.