Notes on Friedman’s Article
Thesis: The only responsibility of businesses is to increase its profits, without fraud or deception. (close paraphrase)
The Agency Argument: When performing her role as an executive, a businessperson is an employee of the owners of the business where she works (e.g., stockholders). Therefore, as an employee - as their agent - she is obligated to run the business in accordance with the express wishes of these business owners, for they are her employers. Now the owners’ general wish is for the business to make as much money as possible (within legal limits). Therefore, the executive is obligated to run the business in such a way that it makes as much money as possible. But if she tries to practice social responsibility as a business person, then she is acting against the interests of the business owners. For practicing such corporate social responsibility will not result in the business making as much money as possible. Therefore, if she practices corporate social responsibility, she will violate her obligation to the business owners, and would therefore be acting wrongly.
The Taxation Argument (also known as the “In Principle” Argument): If a corporate executive practices broad social responsibility, then this is tantamount to forcing the business owners to contribute to the common good against their will (by spending their investments on public causes without their consent). For all intents and purposes, the corporate executive has illegitimately taken on a function reserved solely for governmental institutions (where the members of the government are publicly elected to represent their interests when they spend some of their money): in effect, he’s engaging in taxation without representation. Historically, Americans have seen this as immoral (remember the Boston Tea Party?). Therefore, executives shouldn’t practice broad social responsibility.
The Effectiveness Argument (also known as the “In Consequences” Argument): Corporate executives aren’t trained to do the difficult work of broad social responsibility. But if not, then if they try to do it, then they make things worse, not better. As Friedman says of a hypothetical, conscientious CEO who wants to practice broad social responsibility by trying to fight inflation:
“How is he to know what action of his will contribute to that end? He is presumably an expert in running his company - in producing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his selection makes him an expert on inflation. Will his holding down the price of his product reduce inflationary pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in the hands of his customers, simply divert it elsewhere? Or, by forcing him to produce less because of the lower price, will it simply contribute to shortages?” (P. 10)
The “Undermines Freedom” Argument:
-When influential businesspeople give speeches of the need for corporate social responsibility, it re-enforces the popular belief that pursuit of profit is morally wrong, and needs to be curbed by government control. But once the government gets involved, these businessmen, and all involved in the market, will have to conform to the dictates of bureaucrats.
-The free market system is founded upon the right to private property ownership. This allows individuals to be free of external control and coercion by others – no one can manipulate a private property owner by threatening to kick them off of their property and take it away from them if they don’t do as they say, for they own the property!1 This, in turn, means that if individuals are to cooperate to receive a benefit, such cooperation is always and only voluntarily and freely entered into and sustained. One can enter and leave such a group activity whenever they please. No one can force another to conform to their will. But if the government is allowed to control the market by forcing businesses to practice social responsibility, they are, in effect, undermining the freedom derived from the right to private property ownership, and forced to conform to their dictates.
Objection #1: “The problems are too urgent to leave to the slow political process. The effect of CEOs practicing Broad Social Responsibility (BSR) is much quicker. Therefore, they should practice BSR.”
Reply: This is saying, in effect, that the advocates of this idea have failed to persuade the majority of their cause by means of the democratic political process, and now they want to override democracy and impose their views on the majority. This is obviously unethical.
Objection #2: “But it’s just good business to practice BSR. For example, “donat[ing] resources to providing amenities to [a host community of a business], or improving its government.”“2 This will attract desirable employees, lesson losses from pilferage, etc.3 But if so, then it’s in the interests of the business to practice BSR.”
Reply 1: Yes, but then such practices are justified on grounds of self-interest, and not on grounds of the supposed need to practice BSR.
Reply 2: If a CEO understands the truth of reply 1, and yet still portrays themself to the public as doing these things out of a motive to practice BSR, then they are acting like hypocrites, and are “approaching fraud”4.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
Notes on Affirmative Action: Murray vs. Dworkin
The Anti-AA Paper:
Charles Murray: “Affirmative Racism”
-the new racism: blacks are temporarily (i.e., until the benefits of AA kick in) less competent than whites
-why it’s a form of racism: like the older form, it has the key feature of treating blacks differently than whites: they aren’t treated as equals.
-the new racism is directly caused by a form of preferential treatment (PT) enacted through AA.
-therefore, AA is in this way (and others. See below) making things worse for blacks in particular and society in general; it is not making things better.
-the new racism is especially prevalent among affluent white elites.
-the new racism is focused on blacks
-the effects of the new racism can be just as bad as those of the old racism.
-the two components of the new racism:
-the belief component:
-the “global” component of their view of blacks: this aspect of their beliefs is generally ok and acceptable: blacks must be allowed and enabled to achieve full equality.
-the “local” component of their view of blacks: (the unacceptable aspect of their beliefs) in actual fact, and through no fault of their own (but through unfair treatment in the past and present, via racism and unequal opportunity), they haven’t yet reached full equality.
-they believe that the black professionals that they run into at work and in social circles aren’t “on the average, up to the white standard.” (252)
-they think of blacks as a “commodity”: “the office must have a sufficient supply of blacks, who must be treated with the utmost delicacy” (ibid.)
-the behavioral component: blacks aren’t treated as equals.
-refuse blacks an education they would’ve otherwise have gotten (must read the article to see what the author means by this – it’s not what you think).
-stick blacks in dead-end jobs (must read the article to see what the author means by this).
-a result of the new racism: “the personnel problems this creates are more difficult than most because whites barely admit to themselves what’s going on.” (ibid.)
-A key argument: AA has, in fact, led to a performance gap between blacks and non-minorities. The following is an account of how the performance gap is created. There is a hierarchy of groups of universities and colleges with respect to quality and prestige, and there is a corresponding hierarchy of groups of school applicants with respect to abilities and qualifications. Each group of schools has a set of spaces set aside for black candidates to fill each year, but there aren’t enough qualified black applicants to fill all of the spaces. So, in order to fill its spaces, the top group of schools takes students from the group of applicants that are “second best” with respect to overt qualifications. This results in a corresponding lack of qualified black applicants for the next group of schools in the hierarchy, in which case they have to select black applicants from the next best qualified pool of applicants, and so on all the way down to the “bottom” group of schools and of applicants. The result is that (i) at each level in the hierarchy of schools, black students aren’t being allowed to “compete” with their academic peers, but with those selected from a more “qualified” group of applicants (unlike, e.g., white students, who aren’t directly affected by the admission process in the way outlined above). This leads to (ii) the false and harmful impression that black students are academically inferior to (e.g.) their white peers.
The Pro-AA Papers:
Ronald Dworkin: “Affirmative Action: Does it Work?”
Summary: Dworkin spends most of his paper utilizing the results of a monumental, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities – The Shape of the River, by William Bowen and Derek Bok – to develop an argument that, as has been borne out in actual fact, AA does much more good than harm, contrary to the claims of AA’s critics. He also briefly argues that AA is not wrong as a matter of principle. For it violates no individual rights; nor does it compromise some moral principle.
Basic progression of the paper:
I. Preliminaries: the basic arguments and issues stated; pointing out the importance of the new Shape of the River study.
Two strands of the debate about AA
-An issue of principle: AA is unfair because it violates the right of every applicant to be judged solely on the basis of their individual merits.
-An issue of policy or practical consequences: AA does more harm than good. For (i) it enrolls some blacks in academic studies beyond their capacities; (ii) it stigmatizes all blacks as inferior; and (iii) it makes society more, rather than less, conscious of race.
A premise commonly accepted by proponents on both sides of the dispute: AA is fair if it does substantial good for (a) those it was originally intended to benefit or (b) the community as a whole. If not, then it is unfair. For then the damage it does to the admissions prospects of other qualified applicants would then be pointless.
A common pro-AA argument: race-sensitive policies of certain sorts are essential, in the short run, for eliminating or diminishing the impact of race in the long run.
A common reply from anti-AA proponents: AA has been (in fact) counterproductive:
-It has “sacrificed” rather than helped blacks admitted to university programs, perpetuating a sense of black inferiority.
-It promotes black separatism and a race-conscious society rather than black integration and a genuinely colorblind society.
Dworkin’s analysis of this debate: both groups (anti and pro AA) rely on a factual premise for which they give little evidence, viz., anecdotal or introspective reports of isolated incidents of racial harmony/disharmony caused by/hindered by AA.
The new study that remedies the lack of support of the factual premise: The Shape of the River: An extremely thorough, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities.
Dworkin’s key point: The Shape of the River report provides extremely strong evidence for the pro-AA position by supporting the factual premise of the pro-AA argument from policy/ practical consequences: the study shows beyond reasonable doubt that AA has substantially benefited students and society.
II. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 1:
-1. AA does not accept unqualified blacks. (contrary to Murray’s claim)
-2. Blacks do not typically waste the opportunity they are offered. They would not be better off in less demanding institutions.
III. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 2:
-3. AA has produced a substantial number successful black businessmen, professionals, and community leaders.
-4. Racial diversity in a university’s student body helps to break down stereotyping and hostility among the students. This benefit endures in post-university life.
-5. AA does not damage blacks by unduly insulting or mortifying them; nor does it destroy their self-respect, or poison the black image. (contrary to Murray’s claim)
-6. The proportion of blacks in prestigious institutions cannot be maintained if AA were abandoned and race-neutral standards were used instead.
-7. The United States is better off, judged strictly by the outcome, because its most selective universities and colleges have practiced AA over the past thirty years.
IV. Answering the anti-AA arguments that AA violates the rights of whites and other candidates who are denied admission, as well as the rights of the few blacks who feel insulted from AA.
-preliminary point: even if we granted, for the sake of argument, that this argument is correct, the damage caused by AA toward such people is extremely small. It would only increase the chances of admission for whites from 25% to 26.5%.
-what is meant by “qualifications”? 3 interpretations:
-having some physical or intellectual quality
-backward-looking qualifications: prior achievement
-forward-looking qualifications: promise of success
-the 3rd kind of qualification is the relevant one for university admissions.
-the kind of promise of future success that is relevant depends upon the goals of a given university.
-academic ability and achievement is not (nor was it ever) the sole goal or indicator that universities consider.
-universities has long recognized, and the Shape of the River study shows, that two key goals of universities are well served by including race as a qualification and indicator of meeting the goals of a university;
-the goal of diversity
-the goal of making our collective, social life in America more just and harmonious.
Charles Murray: “Affirmative Racism”
-the new racism: blacks are temporarily (i.e., until the benefits of AA kick in) less competent than whites
-why it’s a form of racism: like the older form, it has the key feature of treating blacks differently than whites: they aren’t treated as equals.
-the new racism is directly caused by a form of preferential treatment (PT) enacted through AA.
-therefore, AA is in this way (and others. See below) making things worse for blacks in particular and society in general; it is not making things better.
-the new racism is especially prevalent among affluent white elites.
-the new racism is focused on blacks
-the effects of the new racism can be just as bad as those of the old racism.
-the two components of the new racism:
-the belief component:
-the “global” component of their view of blacks: this aspect of their beliefs is generally ok and acceptable: blacks must be allowed and enabled to achieve full equality.
-the “local” component of their view of blacks: (the unacceptable aspect of their beliefs) in actual fact, and through no fault of their own (but through unfair treatment in the past and present, via racism and unequal opportunity), they haven’t yet reached full equality.
-they believe that the black professionals that they run into at work and in social circles aren’t “on the average, up to the white standard.” (252)
-they think of blacks as a “commodity”: “the office must have a sufficient supply of blacks, who must be treated with the utmost delicacy” (ibid.)
-the behavioral component: blacks aren’t treated as equals.
-refuse blacks an education they would’ve otherwise have gotten (must read the article to see what the author means by this – it’s not what you think).
-stick blacks in dead-end jobs (must read the article to see what the author means by this).
-a result of the new racism: “the personnel problems this creates are more difficult than most because whites barely admit to themselves what’s going on.” (ibid.)
-A key argument: AA has, in fact, led to a performance gap between blacks and non-minorities. The following is an account of how the performance gap is created. There is a hierarchy of groups of universities and colleges with respect to quality and prestige, and there is a corresponding hierarchy of groups of school applicants with respect to abilities and qualifications. Each group of schools has a set of spaces set aside for black candidates to fill each year, but there aren’t enough qualified black applicants to fill all of the spaces. So, in order to fill its spaces, the top group of schools takes students from the group of applicants that are “second best” with respect to overt qualifications. This results in a corresponding lack of qualified black applicants for the next group of schools in the hierarchy, in which case they have to select black applicants from the next best qualified pool of applicants, and so on all the way down to the “bottom” group of schools and of applicants. The result is that (i) at each level in the hierarchy of schools, black students aren’t being allowed to “compete” with their academic peers, but with those selected from a more “qualified” group of applicants (unlike, e.g., white students, who aren’t directly affected by the admission process in the way outlined above). This leads to (ii) the false and harmful impression that black students are academically inferior to (e.g.) their white peers.
The Pro-AA Papers:
Ronald Dworkin: “Affirmative Action: Does it Work?”
Summary: Dworkin spends most of his paper utilizing the results of a monumental, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities – The Shape of the River, by William Bowen and Derek Bok – to develop an argument that, as has been borne out in actual fact, AA does much more good than harm, contrary to the claims of AA’s critics. He also briefly argues that AA is not wrong as a matter of principle. For it violates no individual rights; nor does it compromise some moral principle.
Basic progression of the paper:
I. Preliminaries: the basic arguments and issues stated; pointing out the importance of the new Shape of the River study.
Two strands of the debate about AA
-An issue of principle: AA is unfair because it violates the right of every applicant to be judged solely on the basis of their individual merits.
-An issue of policy or practical consequences: AA does more harm than good. For (i) it enrolls some blacks in academic studies beyond their capacities; (ii) it stigmatizes all blacks as inferior; and (iii) it makes society more, rather than less, conscious of race.
A premise commonly accepted by proponents on both sides of the dispute: AA is fair if it does substantial good for (a) those it was originally intended to benefit or (b) the community as a whole. If not, then it is unfair. For then the damage it does to the admissions prospects of other qualified applicants would then be pointless.
A common pro-AA argument: race-sensitive policies of certain sorts are essential, in the short run, for eliminating or diminishing the impact of race in the long run.
A common reply from anti-AA proponents: AA has been (in fact) counterproductive:
-It has “sacrificed” rather than helped blacks admitted to university programs, perpetuating a sense of black inferiority.
-It promotes black separatism and a race-conscious society rather than black integration and a genuinely colorblind society.
Dworkin’s analysis of this debate: both groups (anti and pro AA) rely on a factual premise for which they give little evidence, viz., anecdotal or introspective reports of isolated incidents of racial harmony/disharmony caused by/hindered by AA.
The new study that remedies the lack of support of the factual premise: The Shape of the River: An extremely thorough, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities.
Dworkin’s key point: The Shape of the River report provides extremely strong evidence for the pro-AA position by supporting the factual premise of the pro-AA argument from policy/ practical consequences: the study shows beyond reasonable doubt that AA has substantially benefited students and society.
II. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 1:
-1. AA does not accept unqualified blacks. (contrary to Murray’s claim)
-2. Blacks do not typically waste the opportunity they are offered. They would not be better off in less demanding institutions.
III. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 2:
-3. AA has produced a substantial number successful black businessmen, professionals, and community leaders.
-4. Racial diversity in a university’s student body helps to break down stereotyping and hostility among the students. This benefit endures in post-university life.
-5. AA does not damage blacks by unduly insulting or mortifying them; nor does it destroy their self-respect, or poison the black image. (contrary to Murray’s claim)
-6. The proportion of blacks in prestigious institutions cannot be maintained if AA were abandoned and race-neutral standards were used instead.
-7. The United States is better off, judged strictly by the outcome, because its most selective universities and colleges have practiced AA over the past thirty years.
IV. Answering the anti-AA arguments that AA violates the rights of whites and other candidates who are denied admission, as well as the rights of the few blacks who feel insulted from AA.
-preliminary point: even if we granted, for the sake of argument, that this argument is correct, the damage caused by AA toward such people is extremely small. It would only increase the chances of admission for whites from 25% to 26.5%.
-what is meant by “qualifications”? 3 interpretations:
-having some physical or intellectual quality
-backward-looking qualifications: prior achievement
-forward-looking qualifications: promise of success
-the 3rd kind of qualification is the relevant one for university admissions.
-the kind of promise of future success that is relevant depends upon the goals of a given university.
-academic ability and achievement is not (nor was it ever) the sole goal or indicator that universities consider.
-universities has long recognized, and the Shape of the River study shows, that two key goals of universities are well served by including race as a qualification and indicator of meeting the goals of a university;
-the goal of diversity
-the goal of making our collective, social life in America more just and harmonious.
Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: Arrington's Stuff
Arrington: “Advertising and Behavior Control”
The main thesis and basic structure of the article: Arrington criticizes common arguments against the ethical propriety of advertising -- in particular, those that argue that ads undermine our autonomy.
Main sections of the paper: “a reader’s guide”:
-pp. 369-370: a discussion of several of the main techniques of influencing the consumer- techniques that, some have argued, undermine human autonomy in ways that are morally unacceptable.
-puffery
-indirect information transfer
-subliminal advertising
-p. 370, bottom: The central question of the paper is raised: Do such techniques undermine autonomy? (Note the implication that both the critics and Arrington accept: if ads undermine human autonomy, then it is morally wrong to use such ads to sell products).
-pp. 371-372, first column: some initial arguments - offered by others - for the moral legitimacy of each of the above-mentioned techniques in advertising (i.e., puffery, etc.), and some initial criticisms of them - again by others.
-p. 372, third and fourth full paragraphs: The preliminary diagnosis: The central question cannot be answered either way until we have a better understanding of the notion of autonomy itself. (Notice: This is one of Lippke’s main points as well. However, whereas Arrington will argue that a fuller understanding of the nature of autonomy shows that ads don’t undermine it, Lippke will reach the opposite conclusion. How did they come to such different conclusions? You will notice that it is largely because they have different notions of autonomy (Lippke’s notion of autonomy is more robust than Arrington’s). You should therefore make sure you understand exactly how their respective notions of autonomy differ. You should also decide for yourself which view of autonomy is more accurate.).
-pp. 372-376: Analyzing (i) the several different aspects of autonomy, (ii) the main arguments for the immorality of ads (each of which is based on the claim that ads undermine one of these aspects of autonomy), and (iii) Arrington’s criticisms of these arguments.
-pp. 372-373: Autonomous desire:
-pp. 373-374: rational desire and choice:
-pp. 374-375: Free choice:
-pp. 375-376: Control or manipulation:
-p. 376, 1st column, last full paragraph: conclusion: arguments rarely undermine aspects of autonomy. But if so, then they don’t intrinsically undermine autonomy.
The different aspects of autonomy, the arguments for the immorality of ads, and Arrington’s criticisms of them:
-Autonomous desire:
-Hayek: Autonomous desires aren’t just those that are not culturally induced. For if they were, then the only autonomous desires would be those for, e.g., food, shelter, sex, etc. But this is absurd (surely many of our other desires, e.g., for music of certain sorts, are autonomous, even though they are culturally induced).
But if so, then the mere fact that desires induced by ads are culturally induced doesn’t entail that they aren’t autonomous.
-Frankfurt:
-first-order desire: a desire for something that isn’t a desire (e.g., pizza, companionship, etc.)
-second-order desire: desire to have/not have a desire.
-the criterion of autonomous desire: S’s first-order desire B is autonomous iff S has a second-order desire, A, to have B.
-If we apply Frankfurt’s criterion of autonomous desire to ad-induced desires, we get the result that ads usually don’t create non-autonomous desires. For I typically don’t repudiate ad-induced desires – I don’t desire that I lose such desires. But if not, then by Frankfurt’s criterion, such desires are autonomous.
-This point also shows that most subliminal ads don’t create non-autonomous desires.
-Responding to Baybrooke: Baybrooke’s argues that if I might choose differently if I were given more information and options, then my desires about the chosen product are not autonomous. But since we would often have chosen differently given more info., it follows that our desires for many products are not autonomous. Arrington responds by saying that Baybrooke’s principle is absurd. For since it is true of virtually all of our desires, it absurdly implies that none of our desires are autonomous.
-Rational desire and choice:
-Baybrooke: Ads either (i) prevent me from following my rational will or (i) prevent me from developing into a fully rational agent. My ad-induced desires aren’t the result of my applying my rational will – I am not given all the information about a given product in an ad; nor am I apprised of all the other choices available to me. Therefore, I have been prevented from using my reason in developing such desires. But if so, then they aren’t autonomous.
-Arrington’s first reply: It implies that virtually none of our desires are autonomous. For since we never know all the facts about a product (or about all of the alternative products I could have chosen), the principle implies that none of my desires for products are the result of my rational will, in which case they aren’t autonomous – which is absurd.
-Arrington’s second reply: A choice is rational if it is based upon relevant information. Information is relevant if it shows one how to satisfy a prior desire. But ads give such information. Therefore, they don’t get me to choose something against my rational will.
-A new objection: Many ads (those containing puffery) make claims about benefits of products that are purely imaginary. But buying a product on the basis of anticipation of benefits that are purely imaginary is an irrational decision.
-Arrington’s reply: No. The benefits are subjective, yet real. Many people buy a product in anticipation of a certain subjective effect – e.g., the feeling of adventure or prestige. The products really do provide such subjective effects. Therefore, such choices are not irrational.
-Free choice:
-Objection: Ads produce desires for buying products - desires we are unable to resist. But actions that result from irresistible forces are not free, and no such unfree action is autonomous. Therefore, ads reduce our autonomy, and so are immoral.
-Arrington’s reply: An act is free iff it is done for a reason: If it’s done for a reason, then it’s free; but if an action goes against one’s reasons, then it is not free. Applying this account of freedom to the ethics of ads debate, we get the conclusion that, occasionally, ads produce unfree acts in us, but usually they don’t.
Quote: “...most of us have a benevolent subconsciousness which does not overwhelm our ego and its reason for action. And therefore most of us can respond to subliminal advertising without thereby risking our autonomy.” (P. 375)
-Control or manipulation:
-Objection: Ads manipulate and/or control those who see/hear them (by getting them to buy their product). But one is not acting autonomously when on is being manipulated or controlled. Therefore, ads undermine the autonomy of the consumer.
-Arrington’s reply: No. For if ads were manipulating or controlling consumers, they would have to control their desires. But ads don’t do this. Rather, they give information that appeal to desires that the consumer already has, if she has them at all. But if so, then ads don’t control or manipulate the consumer.
The main thesis and basic structure of the article: Arrington criticizes common arguments against the ethical propriety of advertising -- in particular, those that argue that ads undermine our autonomy.
Main sections of the paper: “a reader’s guide”:
-pp. 369-370: a discussion of several of the main techniques of influencing the consumer- techniques that, some have argued, undermine human autonomy in ways that are morally unacceptable.
-puffery
-indirect information transfer
-subliminal advertising
-p. 370, bottom: The central question of the paper is raised: Do such techniques undermine autonomy? (Note the implication that both the critics and Arrington accept: if ads undermine human autonomy, then it is morally wrong to use such ads to sell products).
-pp. 371-372, first column: some initial arguments - offered by others - for the moral legitimacy of each of the above-mentioned techniques in advertising (i.e., puffery, etc.), and some initial criticisms of them - again by others.
-p. 372, third and fourth full paragraphs: The preliminary diagnosis: The central question cannot be answered either way until we have a better understanding of the notion of autonomy itself. (Notice: This is one of Lippke’s main points as well. However, whereas Arrington will argue that a fuller understanding of the nature of autonomy shows that ads don’t undermine it, Lippke will reach the opposite conclusion. How did they come to such different conclusions? You will notice that it is largely because they have different notions of autonomy (Lippke’s notion of autonomy is more robust than Arrington’s). You should therefore make sure you understand exactly how their respective notions of autonomy differ. You should also decide for yourself which view of autonomy is more accurate.).
-pp. 372-376: Analyzing (i) the several different aspects of autonomy, (ii) the main arguments for the immorality of ads (each of which is based on the claim that ads undermine one of these aspects of autonomy), and (iii) Arrington’s criticisms of these arguments.
-pp. 372-373: Autonomous desire:
-pp. 373-374: rational desire and choice:
-pp. 374-375: Free choice:
-pp. 375-376: Control or manipulation:
-p. 376, 1st column, last full paragraph: conclusion: arguments rarely undermine aspects of autonomy. But if so, then they don’t intrinsically undermine autonomy.
The different aspects of autonomy, the arguments for the immorality of ads, and Arrington’s criticisms of them:
-Autonomous desire:
-Hayek: Autonomous desires aren’t just those that are not culturally induced. For if they were, then the only autonomous desires would be those for, e.g., food, shelter, sex, etc. But this is absurd (surely many of our other desires, e.g., for music of certain sorts, are autonomous, even though they are culturally induced).
But if so, then the mere fact that desires induced by ads are culturally induced doesn’t entail that they aren’t autonomous.
-Frankfurt:
-first-order desire: a desire for something that isn’t a desire (e.g., pizza, companionship, etc.)
-second-order desire: desire to have/not have a desire.
-the criterion of autonomous desire: S’s first-order desire B is autonomous iff S has a second-order desire, A, to have B.
-If we apply Frankfurt’s criterion of autonomous desire to ad-induced desires, we get the result that ads usually don’t create non-autonomous desires. For I typically don’t repudiate ad-induced desires – I don’t desire that I lose such desires. But if not, then by Frankfurt’s criterion, such desires are autonomous.
-This point also shows that most subliminal ads don’t create non-autonomous desires.
-Responding to Baybrooke: Baybrooke’s argues that if I might choose differently if I were given more information and options, then my desires about the chosen product are not autonomous. But since we would often have chosen differently given more info., it follows that our desires for many products are not autonomous. Arrington responds by saying that Baybrooke’s principle is absurd. For since it is true of virtually all of our desires, it absurdly implies that none of our desires are autonomous.
-Rational desire and choice:
-Baybrooke: Ads either (i) prevent me from following my rational will or (i) prevent me from developing into a fully rational agent. My ad-induced desires aren’t the result of my applying my rational will – I am not given all the information about a given product in an ad; nor am I apprised of all the other choices available to me. Therefore, I have been prevented from using my reason in developing such desires. But if so, then they aren’t autonomous.
-Arrington’s first reply: It implies that virtually none of our desires are autonomous. For since we never know all the facts about a product (or about all of the alternative products I could have chosen), the principle implies that none of my desires for products are the result of my rational will, in which case they aren’t autonomous – which is absurd.
-Arrington’s second reply: A choice is rational if it is based upon relevant information. Information is relevant if it shows one how to satisfy a prior desire. But ads give such information. Therefore, they don’t get me to choose something against my rational will.
-A new objection: Many ads (those containing puffery) make claims about benefits of products that are purely imaginary. But buying a product on the basis of anticipation of benefits that are purely imaginary is an irrational decision.
-Arrington’s reply: No. The benefits are subjective, yet real. Many people buy a product in anticipation of a certain subjective effect – e.g., the feeling of adventure or prestige. The products really do provide such subjective effects. Therefore, such choices are not irrational.
-Free choice:
-Objection: Ads produce desires for buying products - desires we are unable to resist. But actions that result from irresistible forces are not free, and no such unfree action is autonomous. Therefore, ads reduce our autonomy, and so are immoral.
-Arrington’s reply: An act is free iff it is done for a reason: If it’s done for a reason, then it’s free; but if an action goes against one’s reasons, then it is not free. Applying this account of freedom to the ethics of ads debate, we get the conclusion that, occasionally, ads produce unfree acts in us, but usually they don’t.
Quote: “...most of us have a benevolent subconsciousness which does not overwhelm our ego and its reason for action. And therefore most of us can respond to subliminal advertising without thereby risking our autonomy.” (P. 375)
-Control or manipulation:
-Objection: Ads manipulate and/or control those who see/hear them (by getting them to buy their product). But one is not acting autonomously when on is being manipulated or controlled. Therefore, ads undermine the autonomy of the consumer.
-Arrington’s reply: No. For if ads were manipulating or controlling consumers, they would have to control their desires. But ads don’t do this. Rather, they give information that appeal to desires that the consumer already has, if she has them at all. But if so, then ads don’t control or manipulate the consumer.
Notes on Employee Rights: Lippke's Stuff
Notes: Lippke’s “Privacy, Work and Autonomy”
The nature of privacy: two key features:
1 – Some control over information about ourselves
2 – Some control over who can experience/observe us (Lippke, 80)
N.B.: Notice that Lippke agrees with D&D that what counts as private depends upon the kind of relationship that exists between two (or more) people. (Lippke, 80)
Why is privacy valuable?
-Because autonomy is valuable, and violation of our privacy undermines our autonomy, as well as our ability to develop our autonomy (and our ability to conceive of ourselves as autonomous) (Lippke, 80-81). Conversely, if we protect the right to privacy, then we will give people the idea that they are autonomous, thus realizing the conditions for people to actually behave/act autonomously.
-What is autonomy? It’s a kind of independence, in particular, independence from other people in making one’s own decisions. It is the ability to control certain aspects of one’s own self (e.g., one’s beliefs, thoughts, and actions). The current edition of Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines autonomy as “self-directing freedom”.
-Two degrees of autonomy: minimal autonomy and full autonomy.
-Minimal autonomy: Conceiving of oneself as autonomous: seeing oneself as someone who can, if she so wishes, control one’s thoughts, beliefs, and actions. It may also involve the actual control over some of our beliefs, thoughts and actions (Lippke, 80).
-Full autonomy: the actualized/realized ability to critically reflect on one’s deepest convictions and life plans (close paraphrase of Lippke, 81).
-Again, Lippke’s main point here is that privacy is valuable because autonomy is valuable (it’s necessary for human flourishing), and violation of privacy can undermine both our minimal and full autonomy. And providing an environment in which our privacy is respected gives us the necessary conditions to develop and utilize our minimal and full autonomy.
-Lippke’s summary: Three important connections between privacy and autonomy: Respecting people’s privacy gives them idea that
1 – they are able to act autonomously
2 – they are worthy of acting autonomously
3 – they are entitled to act autonomously (Lippke, 83)
First set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments for the right to privacy with respect to DT: (N.B.: these criticisms have to do with D&D’s responses to the Productivity Argument for DT)
-The general criticism: D&D wrongly argue against DT on the grounds that the knowledge it provides is not job relevant. From this point, they argue that since the ER/EE relationship is that of a contract, and since such a contract limits the ER’s knowledge to that which is job relevant, the requesting and demanding of DT is a violation of EE privacy rights. But arguing on the basis of job relevance is a failure.
-Support for the general criticism: Three arguments:
-A precautionary note: Lippke wants to protect this information as much as D&D do. However, he thinks that they can’t successfully defend such information on the basis of job (ir)relevance.
1 – Contrary to what D&D claim, the kind of information that they try to protect is, in fact, job relevant. But if so, then the argument for protecting such information because it is not job relevant is unsound.
2 – D&D argue that EEs are not required to perform at an optimal level. Rather, they are only required by their contracts to perform at a satisfactory level. Thus, since drug use would only rule out optimal – but not necessarily satisfactory – job performance, the information provided by DT isn’t job relevant. But this argument is very bad. For it only works so long as the EE and ER stipulate in the contract that merely satisfactory job performance is required. But there is no reason why the contract couldn’t stipulate the requirement of optimal performance. And if that happens, D&D’s argument here will no longer go through.
3 – D&D argue that knowledge of the underlying causes of poor job performance is not job relevant. Rather, only the information that the EE is performing poorly is relevant. But this argument is extremely weak. For we can easily argue that since the information gathered about an EE’s drug use will help the ER predict the performance level at which the EE will likely perform, then such knowledge is obviously job relevant.
4 – The means used by ERs to get the information (e.g., drug testing) is job relevant, contrary to what D&D claim
Second set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments: (N.B., these have to do with D&D’s responses to the Harm Argument for DT)
-Preliminary: Lippke’s concedes all of D&D’s points about restricting DT to certain job types, and to only certain individuals who occupy such jobs.
-D&D wrongly argue that the most important issue for determining whether ERs have a right to the information provided by DT is whether or not issues of safety outweigh considerations of EE privacy. But this is a shallow analysis of the problem. The deeper issue is providing social conditions in which EE’s wouldn’t even consider use drugs on the job. If EE’s were treated as autonomous agents, then drugs use on the job would be greatly reduced.
Lippke’s positive argument for EE privacy: DT, in most cases, is wrong, not because the information it provides is not job relevant, but because it undermines the EE’s minimal and full autonomy.
The nature of privacy: two key features:
1 – Some control over information about ourselves
2 – Some control over who can experience/observe us (Lippke, 80)
N.B.: Notice that Lippke agrees with D&D that what counts as private depends upon the kind of relationship that exists between two (or more) people. (Lippke, 80)
Why is privacy valuable?
-Because autonomy is valuable, and violation of our privacy undermines our autonomy, as well as our ability to develop our autonomy (and our ability to conceive of ourselves as autonomous) (Lippke, 80-81). Conversely, if we protect the right to privacy, then we will give people the idea that they are autonomous, thus realizing the conditions for people to actually behave/act autonomously.
-What is autonomy? It’s a kind of independence, in particular, independence from other people in making one’s own decisions. It is the ability to control certain aspects of one’s own self (e.g., one’s beliefs, thoughts, and actions). The current edition of Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines autonomy as “self-directing freedom”.
-Two degrees of autonomy: minimal autonomy and full autonomy.
-Minimal autonomy: Conceiving of oneself as autonomous: seeing oneself as someone who can, if she so wishes, control one’s thoughts, beliefs, and actions. It may also involve the actual control over some of our beliefs, thoughts and actions (Lippke, 80).
-Full autonomy: the actualized/realized ability to critically reflect on one’s deepest convictions and life plans (close paraphrase of Lippke, 81).
-Again, Lippke’s main point here is that privacy is valuable because autonomy is valuable (it’s necessary for human flourishing), and violation of privacy can undermine both our minimal and full autonomy. And providing an environment in which our privacy is respected gives us the necessary conditions to develop and utilize our minimal and full autonomy.
-Lippke’s summary: Three important connections between privacy and autonomy: Respecting people’s privacy gives them idea that
1 – they are able to act autonomously
2 – they are worthy of acting autonomously
3 – they are entitled to act autonomously (Lippke, 83)
First set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments for the right to privacy with respect to DT: (N.B.: these criticisms have to do with D&D’s responses to the Productivity Argument for DT)
-The general criticism: D&D wrongly argue against DT on the grounds that the knowledge it provides is not job relevant. From this point, they argue that since the ER/EE relationship is that of a contract, and since such a contract limits the ER’s knowledge to that which is job relevant, the requesting and demanding of DT is a violation of EE privacy rights. But arguing on the basis of job relevance is a failure.
-Support for the general criticism: Three arguments:
-A precautionary note: Lippke wants to protect this information as much as D&D do. However, he thinks that they can’t successfully defend such information on the basis of job (ir)relevance.
1 – Contrary to what D&D claim, the kind of information that they try to protect is, in fact, job relevant. But if so, then the argument for protecting such information because it is not job relevant is unsound.
2 – D&D argue that EEs are not required to perform at an optimal level. Rather, they are only required by their contracts to perform at a satisfactory level. Thus, since drug use would only rule out optimal – but not necessarily satisfactory – job performance, the information provided by DT isn’t job relevant. But this argument is very bad. For it only works so long as the EE and ER stipulate in the contract that merely satisfactory job performance is required. But there is no reason why the contract couldn’t stipulate the requirement of optimal performance. And if that happens, D&D’s argument here will no longer go through.
3 – D&D argue that knowledge of the underlying causes of poor job performance is not job relevant. Rather, only the information that the EE is performing poorly is relevant. But this argument is extremely weak. For we can easily argue that since the information gathered about an EE’s drug use will help the ER predict the performance level at which the EE will likely perform, then such knowledge is obviously job relevant.
4 – The means used by ERs to get the information (e.g., drug testing) is job relevant, contrary to what D&D claim
Second set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments: (N.B., these have to do with D&D’s responses to the Harm Argument for DT)
-Preliminary: Lippke’s concedes all of D&D’s points about restricting DT to certain job types, and to only certain individuals who occupy such jobs.
-D&D wrongly argue that the most important issue for determining whether ERs have a right to the information provided by DT is whether or not issues of safety outweigh considerations of EE privacy. But this is a shallow analysis of the problem. The deeper issue is providing social conditions in which EE’s wouldn’t even consider use drugs on the job. If EE’s were treated as autonomous agents, then drugs use on the job would be greatly reduced.
Lippke’s positive argument for EE privacy: DT, in most cases, is wrong, not because the information it provides is not job relevant, but because it undermines the EE’s minimal and full autonomy.
Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: Lippke's Stuff
Notes on Lippke’s “Advertising and the Social Conditions of Autonomy”
Summary of the paper:
A number of authors have argued that deceptive advertising is immoral because it undermines human autonomy. While this is true, the reason they give for why it is true is inadequate. The following is a sketch of the manner in which they argue: First, they briefly sketch an account of the nature of human autonomy. Then, they argue that advertising often undermines human autonomy in various ways: e.g., by means of implanting desires in us, by associating their products with the satisfaction of certain desires, and by misleading us by making false claims about the features of a product or service. Finally, the instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is entirely by means of the informational content of advertisements.
The above sorts of analyses of the immorality of advertising are too shallow. First, their account of human autonomy is too shallow. The true nature of full human autonomy is much more robust than these authors maintain. Second, the real reason why normal kinds of advertising are immoral is because they suppress and stunt the development of the constitutive features of this more robust notion of autonomy, thereby making us easy to control, for the purpose of generating a society of ready and willing consumers (a thriving free market economy requires it). Finally, the real instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is be means of continually inundating us with ads that have (what the author calls) persuasive content. Advertisers should therefore stop inundating consumers with ads that have persuasive content.
One may object that it is wrong to prevent advertisers to from inundating the public with ads that have persuasive content, on the grounds that people should be free to accept or reject the vision of the consumer lifestyle that is implicit in this content. But this objection fails for a number of reasons.
Finally, several modest recommendations are given for making our culture one that provides and encourages the social conditions necessary for its members to develop full human autonomy.
Outline of the paper:
Introduction: the basic thrust of the paper discussed
-Argue that “advertising undermines autonomy, especially under the conditions that exist in advanced capitalist countries like the United States.” (484)
-The type of advertising focused on: persuasive advertising (this is a technical term defined by Lippke – it doesn’t merely mean “convincing advertising”).
-Compare and contrast: informational vs. persuasive advertising
-Informational advertising: (again, this type of advertising is not the focus of the paper)
-information about the features, prices and availability of a product or service.
-presupposes some interest in the product
-They can undermine autonomy in at least two ways:
-(i) by manipulating and deceiving the consumer by not providing nearly enough information to make an informed, rational decision to by the product.
-(ii) when one is exposed to such advertising over and over, it has the effect of preventing, stunting, or eroding of a key trait of fully autonomous agents, viz., intellectual honesty. (based on Lippke’s discussion on p. 484)
-Persuasive advertising:
-usually contains little informational content about the product
-often tries to associate one or more of the consumer’s (sometimes subconscious) desires with the product (p. 484)
-Why is it bad to undermine human autonomy? Because humans need it to reduce the likelihood that they will be dominated or controlled in some way by others. (pp. 484-85)
I. On a recent, inadequate version of the “undermines autonomy” argument against deceptive persuasive advertising: Roger Crisp
A. The argument: Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by manipulating consumers in a way that is morally impermissible. Two points:
1. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by bypassing the consumer’s faculty of reason by associating their products with the consumer’s existent or ad-created desires. The consumer therefore doesn’t decide to by the product on the basis of freely and rationally choosing the product. Rather, he or she buys the product on the basis of non-rational factors: he or she never chose to buy it.
2. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by implanting or creating new desires in the consumer, desires that the consumer doesn’t want, and therefore don’t identify with as being their desires. This one takes some explaining. First of all, people have two kinds of desires: first-order desires and second order desires. First-order desires are ordinary desires to have (or not to have) things (e.g., food, sleep, sex, company, sports…). By contrast, second-order desires are desires to have (or not to have) desires of various sorts (e.g., a desire not to desire to smoke (or eat Double-Doubles?); a desire to have the desire to study…). Now normal, healthy people have a strong second-order desire not to be manipulated by others without their consent and without good reason. But persuasive ads manipulate consumer’s in just these ways when they implant these first-order desires within them (e.g., the desire to smoke Marlboro cigarettes). Therefore, if the consumer were to reflect on the ways in which such ads manipulate them, they would repudiate the desires implanted in them by the ads. But no first-order desire that one would repudiate upon reflection is an autonomous desire: it is not a desire that the agent identifies with as their “own”. Therefore, such ads undermine autonomy by creating desires that are not autonomous (confused yet?).
B. Critique of the argument: Crisp attributes both too much and too little power to ads.
1. Preliminaries: two kinds of advertisement content: explicit and implicit
a. explicit content: message to “but x”, plus info about product features, price, where one can buy it, etc. This content is typically easy to resist.
b. implicit content: messages about “the consumer lifestyle”, which include “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, expectations, and aspirations” (p. 485) that a “normal” person has or ought to have. Such content is rarely, if ever, criticized or critically evaluated, but is implied to be the only appropriate lifestyle to adopt or aspire to. This content is in just about every commercial, and, given that commercials are constant and everywhere-present, and that most people absorb and conform to their content, they are very hard to resist.
2. Too much: Although kids can be manipulated by the explicit content of ads, most adults know what’s going on, and can resist it. The real task is to understand how ads can unduly influence adults when they know that ads are trying to manipulate them.
3. Too little: Crisp fails to account for the fact that ads have implicit content, and that this is what manipulates them.
II. Toward an adequate account of the nature of full human autonomy: Full human autonomy requires that a number of social conditions are in place; conditions that enable agents to have:
A. The ability for crisp, careful thought and evaluation of arguments and claims.
B. The knowledge of alternative belief systems and lifestyles (besides the consumer lifestyle).
C. “Venues in which agents can reasonably be expected to display these abilities and act on these motivations.” (485)
D. Freedom from coercion and manipulation, brainwashing and harassment. (485)
III. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part one:
A. by constantly barraging us with mindless, melodramatic, content.
B. By having content that portrays and recommends a simplistic approach to the problems of life, and how to solve them.
IV. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part two:
A. The main way in which ads undermine full autonomy is by suppressing it..
1. Ads discourage the emergence the skills, knowledge, attitudes and motivations that are constitutive of full autonomy. How?
2. Ads are pervasive and virtually inescapable.
3. There is an absence of presentation of views that challenge its implicit content (no public service announcements that urge us to be wary of their tactics of manipulation and seduction) (p. 486).
4. Often aimed at children, who don’t yet have the ability to critically evaluate it. They absorb the content, and its effect carry forward into their adult lives.
B. Analysis of the content of persuasive content: metamessages (i.e., “messages about how to approach claims made by others” (487))
1. They “subtly encourage the propensity to accept emotional appeals, oversimplification, and shoddy standards of proof for claims”.(487)
2. “Evidence and arguments of the most ridiculous sorts are offered in support of advertising claims.” (ibid.)
3. Ads use information selectively (they exaggerate the good features and downplay or remain silent about bad features), etc.
4. The meanings of words are routinely twisted.
5. Ads imply that the most important information about life must be communicated in a way that is entertaining, and such that it can be passively absorbed.
6. They imply that “one can’t believe or trust what other people say” (ibid.).
7. “They imply that everything (and nothing!) can be proved.” (ibid.)
8. They imply that “evidence contrary to one’s claims may be ignored.” (ibid.)
9. They imply that “success in communication is a matter of persuading others no matter how it is done.” (ibid.)
10. The point: all of these metamessages undermine “the habits and attitudes constitutive of critical competence (clarity, rigor, precision, patience, honesty, effort, etc….).” (ibid.)
11. Why do they do it? Because a thriving free market economy requires “ready and willing consumers.” (ibid.) But to ensure that they have a supply of ready and willing consumers, they must undermine social conditions that would prevent this, such as the existence of society of fully autonomous citizens.
V. An objection, several replies, and some recommendations for instituting social conditions that would encourage human autonomy.
Summary of the paper:
A number of authors have argued that deceptive advertising is immoral because it undermines human autonomy. While this is true, the reason they give for why it is true is inadequate. The following is a sketch of the manner in which they argue: First, they briefly sketch an account of the nature of human autonomy. Then, they argue that advertising often undermines human autonomy in various ways: e.g., by means of implanting desires in us, by associating their products with the satisfaction of certain desires, and by misleading us by making false claims about the features of a product or service. Finally, the instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is entirely by means of the informational content of advertisements.
The above sorts of analyses of the immorality of advertising are too shallow. First, their account of human autonomy is too shallow. The true nature of full human autonomy is much more robust than these authors maintain. Second, the real reason why normal kinds of advertising are immoral is because they suppress and stunt the development of the constitutive features of this more robust notion of autonomy, thereby making us easy to control, for the purpose of generating a society of ready and willing consumers (a thriving free market economy requires it). Finally, the real instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is be means of continually inundating us with ads that have (what the author calls) persuasive content. Advertisers should therefore stop inundating consumers with ads that have persuasive content.
One may object that it is wrong to prevent advertisers to from inundating the public with ads that have persuasive content, on the grounds that people should be free to accept or reject the vision of the consumer lifestyle that is implicit in this content. But this objection fails for a number of reasons.
Finally, several modest recommendations are given for making our culture one that provides and encourages the social conditions necessary for its members to develop full human autonomy.
Outline of the paper:
Introduction: the basic thrust of the paper discussed
-Argue that “advertising undermines autonomy, especially under the conditions that exist in advanced capitalist countries like the United States.” (484)
-The type of advertising focused on: persuasive advertising (this is a technical term defined by Lippke – it doesn’t merely mean “convincing advertising”).
-Compare and contrast: informational vs. persuasive advertising
-Informational advertising: (again, this type of advertising is not the focus of the paper)
-information about the features, prices and availability of a product or service.
-presupposes some interest in the product
-They can undermine autonomy in at least two ways:
-(i) by manipulating and deceiving the consumer by not providing nearly enough information to make an informed, rational decision to by the product.
-(ii) when one is exposed to such advertising over and over, it has the effect of preventing, stunting, or eroding of a key trait of fully autonomous agents, viz., intellectual honesty. (based on Lippke’s discussion on p. 484)
-Persuasive advertising:
-usually contains little informational content about the product
-often tries to associate one or more of the consumer’s (sometimes subconscious) desires with the product (p. 484)
-Why is it bad to undermine human autonomy? Because humans need it to reduce the likelihood that they will be dominated or controlled in some way by others. (pp. 484-85)
I. On a recent, inadequate version of the “undermines autonomy” argument against deceptive persuasive advertising: Roger Crisp
A. The argument: Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by manipulating consumers in a way that is morally impermissible. Two points:
1. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by bypassing the consumer’s faculty of reason by associating their products with the consumer’s existent or ad-created desires. The consumer therefore doesn’t decide to by the product on the basis of freely and rationally choosing the product. Rather, he or she buys the product on the basis of non-rational factors: he or she never chose to buy it.
2. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by implanting or creating new desires in the consumer, desires that the consumer doesn’t want, and therefore don’t identify with as being their desires. This one takes some explaining. First of all, people have two kinds of desires: first-order desires and second order desires. First-order desires are ordinary desires to have (or not to have) things (e.g., food, sleep, sex, company, sports…). By contrast, second-order desires are desires to have (or not to have) desires of various sorts (e.g., a desire not to desire to smoke (or eat Double-Doubles?); a desire to have the desire to study…). Now normal, healthy people have a strong second-order desire not to be manipulated by others without their consent and without good reason. But persuasive ads manipulate consumer’s in just these ways when they implant these first-order desires within them (e.g., the desire to smoke Marlboro cigarettes). Therefore, if the consumer were to reflect on the ways in which such ads manipulate them, they would repudiate the desires implanted in them by the ads. But no first-order desire that one would repudiate upon reflection is an autonomous desire: it is not a desire that the agent identifies with as their “own”. Therefore, such ads undermine autonomy by creating desires that are not autonomous (confused yet?).
B. Critique of the argument: Crisp attributes both too much and too little power to ads.
1. Preliminaries: two kinds of advertisement content: explicit and implicit
a. explicit content: message to “but x”, plus info about product features, price, where one can buy it, etc. This content is typically easy to resist.
b. implicit content: messages about “the consumer lifestyle”, which include “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, expectations, and aspirations” (p. 485) that a “normal” person has or ought to have. Such content is rarely, if ever, criticized or critically evaluated, but is implied to be the only appropriate lifestyle to adopt or aspire to. This content is in just about every commercial, and, given that commercials are constant and everywhere-present, and that most people absorb and conform to their content, they are very hard to resist.
2. Too much: Although kids can be manipulated by the explicit content of ads, most adults know what’s going on, and can resist it. The real task is to understand how ads can unduly influence adults when they know that ads are trying to manipulate them.
3. Too little: Crisp fails to account for the fact that ads have implicit content, and that this is what manipulates them.
II. Toward an adequate account of the nature of full human autonomy: Full human autonomy requires that a number of social conditions are in place; conditions that enable agents to have:
A. The ability for crisp, careful thought and evaluation of arguments and claims.
B. The knowledge of alternative belief systems and lifestyles (besides the consumer lifestyle).
C. “Venues in which agents can reasonably be expected to display these abilities and act on these motivations.” (485)
D. Freedom from coercion and manipulation, brainwashing and harassment. (485)
III. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part one:
A. by constantly barraging us with mindless, melodramatic, content.
B. By having content that portrays and recommends a simplistic approach to the problems of life, and how to solve them.
IV. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part two:
A. The main way in which ads undermine full autonomy is by suppressing it..
1. Ads discourage the emergence the skills, knowledge, attitudes and motivations that are constitutive of full autonomy. How?
2. Ads are pervasive and virtually inescapable.
3. There is an absence of presentation of views that challenge its implicit content (no public service announcements that urge us to be wary of their tactics of manipulation and seduction) (p. 486).
4. Often aimed at children, who don’t yet have the ability to critically evaluate it. They absorb the content, and its effect carry forward into their adult lives.
B. Analysis of the content of persuasive content: metamessages (i.e., “messages about how to approach claims made by others” (487))
1. They “subtly encourage the propensity to accept emotional appeals, oversimplification, and shoddy standards of proof for claims”.(487)
2. “Evidence and arguments of the most ridiculous sorts are offered in support of advertising claims.” (ibid.)
3. Ads use information selectively (they exaggerate the good features and downplay or remain silent about bad features), etc.
4. The meanings of words are routinely twisted.
5. Ads imply that the most important information about life must be communicated in a way that is entertaining, and such that it can be passively absorbed.
6. They imply that “one can’t believe or trust what other people say” (ibid.).
7. “They imply that everything (and nothing!) can be proved.” (ibid.)
8. They imply that “evidence contrary to one’s claims may be ignored.” (ibid.)
9. They imply that “success in communication is a matter of persuading others no matter how it is done.” (ibid.)
10. The point: all of these metamessages undermine “the habits and attitudes constitutive of critical competence (clarity, rigor, precision, patience, honesty, effort, etc….).” (ibid.)
11. Why do they do it? Because a thriving free market economy requires “ready and willing consumers.” (ibid.) But to ensure that they have a supply of ready and willing consumers, they must undermine social conditions that would prevent this, such as the existence of society of fully autonomous citizens.
V. An objection, several replies, and some recommendations for instituting social conditions that would encourage human autonomy.
Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: McCall's Stuff
Notes on McCall’s, “Deceptive Advertising”
Summary: Consequentialist arguments against deceptive advertising fail. However, we can see that many (most?) advertisements are immoral on non-consequentialist grounds. For advertisements regularly manipulate consumers by intentionally deceiving them, and this is morally wrong whether or not it produces bad consequences overall. Although there are several kinds of morally permissible deception, deceptive ads don’t fall into any of these kinds. Furthermore, there are some circumstances in which advertisers are morally responsible for misleading consumers, even if such deception is unintentional. This can occur in two broad classes of cases: (i) cases in which the advertisers should have foreseen that their ads would mislead consumers, and (ii) cases in which, although the advertisers couldn’t possibly have foreseen that the consumers would be misled, they don’t remove or change the misleading portion of advertisement after they later come to realize that people are being misled by them.
Basic Structure and Progression of the Piece:
The first argument against deception (and so, by implication, deceptive advertising): a consequentialist argument: The argument is that deception would make social cooperation impossible, and thus it would lead to the bad consequences of our missing out on the many great social goods to be gained only through social cooperation.
-Example: It would make a system of credit impossible
- The author ultimately rejects this argument, for it’s not true that a cooperative society can’t survive in the presence of deception. In fact, there is a lot of deception in society. The kind of deception that is destructive of cooperative society is deception that doesn’t occur in well-defined contexts -- that is, deception that occurs in contexts where we don’t expect it. However, one might think that advertising is one such well-defined context, and it is therefore morally permissible, and not destructive of a cooperative society (see the “poker” illustration, p. 358).
The second argument: Deceptive ads are instances of manipulation. Manipulation involves getting others to do what you want by overriding their ability to make rational choices. In the case of deceptive ads, the deception involves getting you to act on a false belief. As such, deceptive advertisements involve treating the intended audiences of the ads as means to an end (i.e., as things, and not as people).
The author then admits that there are three types of morally permissible deception: when (i) it is necessary in order to save one’s life, (ii) such deception gives a person no unfair advantage over the person deceived, or (iii) all of the parties involved know that deception is likely.
However, the author then points out that everyone admits that deceptive advertising isn’t necessary to save anyone’s life (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(i) morally permissible deception). He also points out that it’s obvious that deceptive advertising is often employed to gain an unfair advantage over both consumers and competing businesses (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(ii) morally permissible deception). As he says:
“More typically, deception in advertising is calculated to create an unfair advantage for the advertiser both against the consumer targeted by the ad and against the business’s competitors. It also intends some loss or harm to both of those parties. A consumer who buys one brand of product because she or he was deceived into thinking it a better value than a competitive product is harmed, as is the competitor” (quote from article)
But what about permissible deceptions of type-(iii)? Aren’t deceptive ads of this type? McCall considers this objection, which can be put as follows: Deceptive advertising is morally permissible. For the parties involved (i.e., the consumers) know that deception is likely in the context of advertisements: they’re expecting that advertisements are trying to deceive them in some way. But if so, then deceptive advertising satisfies clause (iii), and so the deception isn’t wrong. (based on discussion on p. 359)
Reply:
(A) Factual problems with the objection: In actual fact, consumers are constantly fooled
by such ads. The FTC supports these conclusions, based on their investigations. (359)
(B) Conceptual problems with the objection:
1. The very fact that we learn to become wary of particular kinds of deception (cf. the “economy size deception” example, p. 359) presupposes that you weren’t expecting deception during those times before we learned to be wary.
2. The idea that one can be deceived when one is expecting to be deceived is incoherent. For it is only possible to expect deception in well-defined contexts: expecting deception to occur in all possible places and by all possible techniques of deception is both conceptually and psychologically impossible.
(a) It’s conceptually impossible, because there are an infinite number of possible contexts and techniques for deceiving you, and a consumer logically cannot prepare for an infinite number of techniques of deception.
(b) It’s psychologically impossible, because attempting to prepare for a large number of possible means of deception would soon “result in overload and decision-making paralysis.” (p. 360)
Objection: The consumers, and the consumers alone, are to blame for being deceived. For it is a person’s responsibility to be critical of potentially deceptive claims. (Based on discussion on p. 359)
Reply: Even if that is true, that fact in no way removes the wrongness of the advertiser’s attempt to deceive the consumer. Notice that even if the consumer was critical, and didn’t fall for the deception of the ad, the advertiser would still be wrong in the intent to deceive the consumer. (based on discussion on p. 359-60)
-The implied principle of assessment of the (im)morality of deceptive advertising: If an advertisement is an attempt at intentional deception, then even if the attempt is unsuccessful, it is morally wrong. (Intention to deceive → morally wrong)
-The difficulty of applying the principle: Do we have to be “mind-readers”, or play “amateur psychologist” to apply it?
-Helpful criteria/reliable indicators for telling when an ad is intentionally deceptive: based on reliable clues from an ad’s (a) design and (b) content.
-Kinds of cases:
-Intentional deception by means of visual communication:
-cases in which the product is made to appear as something it is not. (p. 361)
-cases in which the ad misleads by visual images.
-Intentional deception by means of linguistic communication:
-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is implied
-Cases in which pertinent information is omitted
--Objection: It’s too hard to tell when an advertiser is acting immorally by omitting information. We can’t just say that no omissions are permitted. For then two problems immediately arise:
(i) It’s too demanding: it is virtually (if not actually) impossible to disclose everything about the product that is relevant to making a decision about buying it. (362)
(ii) It’s unreasonable: Does the advertiser (and the relevant business) really have to help out her competitors by showing how, and in what ways, the latter’s product is better than theirs? But that’s what the principle requires, if we interpret it seriously and literally. (362)
-Reply, in light of these problems:
- There are clear cases where an ad is intentionally deceptive, and this fact isn’t changed when we discover that there are unclear cases.
- Furthermore, this deceptiveness is due to the fact that an advertiser intentionally omits information that might lead the consumer to a different decision than they otherwise would have made. Yet we have seen that the principle is problematic if intended as a hard-and-fast rule. Therefore, it may be useful as a general rule of thumb. With that objection resolved, let’s get back to cases...
-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is explicitly stated
-Cases where only part of the relevant information is explicitly stated (361)
-Cases where all of the relevant information is explicitly stated, but in a way that the consumer can’t process (e.g., “small print” cases, “too much to read given the time allotted” cases) (361-2)
-Cases where the ad selectively omits important information. (p. 362)
-conclusion of section: we have outlined several broad classes of ads, whereby we can make reasonably confident judgments that the ads are intentionally deceptive. But if so, then the objection fails: we don’t have to be mind-readers to apply the principle. Rather, certain kinds of advertisement form and content are reliable indicators for when the advertisers are intentionally trying to deceive consumers.
-A final argument: Cases where an advertiser is still morally responsible if a consumer is misled, even if the advertiser didn’t intend this to happen:
(I)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, was foreseeable by the advertiser
(II)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, is not corrected, even after the advertiser realizes that consumers are buying the product on the basis of the false impression. (i.e., the false impression was unforeseeable but uncorrected after they know that consumers are being misled)
The principle: If an ad unintentionally misleads the consumer, and either (i) that fact was foreseeable by the advertiser, or (ii) was not foreseeable, yet not corrected after seeing that people are in fact misled by the ad, then the advertisers are morally responsible for the consumers being misled. (Advertisers unintentionally mislead consumers & either (i) foreseeable or (ii) unforeseeable yet not corrected afterwards → morally responsible)
Summary: Consequentialist arguments against deceptive advertising fail. However, we can see that many (most?) advertisements are immoral on non-consequentialist grounds. For advertisements regularly manipulate consumers by intentionally deceiving them, and this is morally wrong whether or not it produces bad consequences overall. Although there are several kinds of morally permissible deception, deceptive ads don’t fall into any of these kinds. Furthermore, there are some circumstances in which advertisers are morally responsible for misleading consumers, even if such deception is unintentional. This can occur in two broad classes of cases: (i) cases in which the advertisers should have foreseen that their ads would mislead consumers, and (ii) cases in which, although the advertisers couldn’t possibly have foreseen that the consumers would be misled, they don’t remove or change the misleading portion of advertisement after they later come to realize that people are being misled by them.
Basic Structure and Progression of the Piece:
The first argument against deception (and so, by implication, deceptive advertising): a consequentialist argument: The argument is that deception would make social cooperation impossible, and thus it would lead to the bad consequences of our missing out on the many great social goods to be gained only through social cooperation.
-Example: It would make a system of credit impossible
- The author ultimately rejects this argument, for it’s not true that a cooperative society can’t survive in the presence of deception. In fact, there is a lot of deception in society. The kind of deception that is destructive of cooperative society is deception that doesn’t occur in well-defined contexts -- that is, deception that occurs in contexts where we don’t expect it. However, one might think that advertising is one such well-defined context, and it is therefore morally permissible, and not destructive of a cooperative society (see the “poker” illustration, p. 358).
The second argument: Deceptive ads are instances of manipulation. Manipulation involves getting others to do what you want by overriding their ability to make rational choices. In the case of deceptive ads, the deception involves getting you to act on a false belief. As such, deceptive advertisements involve treating the intended audiences of the ads as means to an end (i.e., as things, and not as people).
The author then admits that there are three types of morally permissible deception: when (i) it is necessary in order to save one’s life, (ii) such deception gives a person no unfair advantage over the person deceived, or (iii) all of the parties involved know that deception is likely.
However, the author then points out that everyone admits that deceptive advertising isn’t necessary to save anyone’s life (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(i) morally permissible deception). He also points out that it’s obvious that deceptive advertising is often employed to gain an unfair advantage over both consumers and competing businesses (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(ii) morally permissible deception). As he says:
“More typically, deception in advertising is calculated to create an unfair advantage for the advertiser both against the consumer targeted by the ad and against the business’s competitors. It also intends some loss or harm to both of those parties. A consumer who buys one brand of product because she or he was deceived into thinking it a better value than a competitive product is harmed, as is the competitor” (quote from article)
But what about permissible deceptions of type-(iii)? Aren’t deceptive ads of this type? McCall considers this objection, which can be put as follows: Deceptive advertising is morally permissible. For the parties involved (i.e., the consumers) know that deception is likely in the context of advertisements: they’re expecting that advertisements are trying to deceive them in some way. But if so, then deceptive advertising satisfies clause (iii), and so the deception isn’t wrong. (based on discussion on p. 359)
Reply:
(A) Factual problems with the objection: In actual fact, consumers are constantly fooled
by such ads. The FTC supports these conclusions, based on their investigations. (359)
(B) Conceptual problems with the objection:
1. The very fact that we learn to become wary of particular kinds of deception (cf. the “economy size deception” example, p. 359) presupposes that you weren’t expecting deception during those times before we learned to be wary.
2. The idea that one can be deceived when one is expecting to be deceived is incoherent. For it is only possible to expect deception in well-defined contexts: expecting deception to occur in all possible places and by all possible techniques of deception is both conceptually and psychologically impossible.
(a) It’s conceptually impossible, because there are an infinite number of possible contexts and techniques for deceiving you, and a consumer logically cannot prepare for an infinite number of techniques of deception.
(b) It’s psychologically impossible, because attempting to prepare for a large number of possible means of deception would soon “result in overload and decision-making paralysis.” (p. 360)
Objection: The consumers, and the consumers alone, are to blame for being deceived. For it is a person’s responsibility to be critical of potentially deceptive claims. (Based on discussion on p. 359)
Reply: Even if that is true, that fact in no way removes the wrongness of the advertiser’s attempt to deceive the consumer. Notice that even if the consumer was critical, and didn’t fall for the deception of the ad, the advertiser would still be wrong in the intent to deceive the consumer. (based on discussion on p. 359-60)
-The implied principle of assessment of the (im)morality of deceptive advertising: If an advertisement is an attempt at intentional deception, then even if the attempt is unsuccessful, it is morally wrong. (Intention to deceive → morally wrong)
-The difficulty of applying the principle: Do we have to be “mind-readers”, or play “amateur psychologist” to apply it?
-Helpful criteria/reliable indicators for telling when an ad is intentionally deceptive: based on reliable clues from an ad’s (a) design and (b) content.
-Kinds of cases:
-Intentional deception by means of visual communication:
-cases in which the product is made to appear as something it is not. (p. 361)
-cases in which the ad misleads by visual images.
-Intentional deception by means of linguistic communication:
-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is implied
-Cases in which pertinent information is omitted
--Objection: It’s too hard to tell when an advertiser is acting immorally by omitting information. We can’t just say that no omissions are permitted. For then two problems immediately arise:
(i) It’s too demanding: it is virtually (if not actually) impossible to disclose everything about the product that is relevant to making a decision about buying it. (362)
(ii) It’s unreasonable: Does the advertiser (and the relevant business) really have to help out her competitors by showing how, and in what ways, the latter’s product is better than theirs? But that’s what the principle requires, if we interpret it seriously and literally. (362)
-Reply, in light of these problems:
- There are clear cases where an ad is intentionally deceptive, and this fact isn’t changed when we discover that there are unclear cases.
- Furthermore, this deceptiveness is due to the fact that an advertiser intentionally omits information that might lead the consumer to a different decision than they otherwise would have made. Yet we have seen that the principle is problematic if intended as a hard-and-fast rule. Therefore, it may be useful as a general rule of thumb. With that objection resolved, let’s get back to cases...
-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is explicitly stated
-Cases where only part of the relevant information is explicitly stated (361)
-Cases where all of the relevant information is explicitly stated, but in a way that the consumer can’t process (e.g., “small print” cases, “too much to read given the time allotted” cases) (361-2)
-Cases where the ad selectively omits important information. (p. 362)
-conclusion of section: we have outlined several broad classes of ads, whereby we can make reasonably confident judgments that the ads are intentionally deceptive. But if so, then the objection fails: we don’t have to be mind-readers to apply the principle. Rather, certain kinds of advertisement form and content are reliable indicators for when the advertisers are intentionally trying to deceive consumers.
-A final argument: Cases where an advertiser is still morally responsible if a consumer is misled, even if the advertiser didn’t intend this to happen:
(I)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, was foreseeable by the advertiser
(II)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, is not corrected, even after the advertiser realizes that consumers are buying the product on the basis of the false impression. (i.e., the false impression was unforeseeable but uncorrected after they know that consumers are being misled)
The principle: If an ad unintentionally misleads the consumer, and either (i) that fact was foreseeable by the advertiser, or (ii) was not foreseeable, yet not corrected after seeing that people are in fact misled by the ad, then the advertisers are morally responsible for the consumers being misled. (Advertisers unintentionally mislead consumers & either (i) foreseeable or (ii) unforeseeable yet not corrected afterwards → morally responsible)
Notes on Globalization: Brecher and Costello's "The Race to the Bottom"
Notes: Brecher and Costello’s “The Race to the Bottom”
Thesis: Contrary to the claims of its proponents, globalization is not making life better for everyone around the world. In fact, globalization is making everyone (besides the relative handful of movers and shakers of the global economy) worse off.
The argument often given for the beneficial nature of globalization: As we turn the whole world into a giant free market capitalist economic system (i.e., in every country, the means of production are privately owned, governments do not interfere with the market via tariffs, regulations, etc.), market competition will lead to (a) countries specializing in the products that they can make the best, and at the cheapest rate; (b) the most efficient companies will win out. Since, by definition, the efficient companies have the best products at the lowest prices, (c) the consumers benefit as well. For (a) affordable, high-quality products and (b) a surplus of jobs created by globalization translates into a higher standard of living for everyone. Therefore, everyone benefits - both companies and consumers - from globalization.
Brecher and Costello’s basic reply: Actually, only a few benefit, and the rest of the world becomes worse off, from globalization. Although many factors contribute to this result, here are two of the main factors:
(I) The market forces of globalized free market capitalism (especially the fierce and un-policed competition among corporations) lead companies to minimize production costs. This translates into “forc[ing] workers, communities, and countries to compete for lower labor, social and environmental costs – force them to a race to the bottom.” (p. 16) The idea is that, for large multinational corporations to stay competitive in a de-regulated free market, they must reduce costs as much as possible. Ultimately, and in actual current practice, this cashes out in terms of finding (i) a work force that is both (a) cheap and (b) unable to insist on fair treatment (treating employees fairly – respecting their rights, compensating them with reasonable pay and benefits in return for hard, quality work - is costly), and (ii) cheap natural resources/materials to make products, in an area with (iii) the least amount of government-imposed (a) costs and (b) regulations of various sorts (e.g., environmental regulations) on businesses. There is little that non-corporate citizens, or even governments, can do to resist such corporate behavior in such circumstances. For corporations can (nearly) effortlessly close down factories and move plants elsewhere, where people, communities and countries are desperate enough to put up with such treatment.
(II) Large, multinational corporations aren’t the only one’s involved in this inequitable process. Unaccountable international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are also part of the problem. For they go into economically and politically struggling countries with false promises of curing their problems. In fact, the countries become worse off as a result of their “help”. For, in exchange for their intervention, such countries have to sign-on to “structural adjustment programs.” These involve such things as (a) selling off their natural resources to privately owned companies, (b) de-regulating their markets (i.e., integrating them into the global free market), and (c) taking on huge, hopelessly unmanageable interest rates from the loans they provide.
(III) Therefore, while it is clear that business owners and other high-level executives “win” in such circumstances (minimum costs, maximized profits), it is equally clear that employees, communities and even countries “lose”.
Outline of the paper:
I. Introduction and thesis
A. The popular view of globalization: everybody wins
-the argument (see above)
B. The authors’ reply and thesis: (see above) No. It leads to a “race to the bottom”
C. Examples of the manifestations of the race to the bottom:
i. The BMW case:
ii. The British Department of Trade case:
iii. The London International Group P.L.C. case:
iv. The Nike case:
v. The Johnson Tombigbee case:
II. The New World Economy (aspects of globalization)
A. The rapid change from a nation-based to a global economy
i. Companies are no longer based in, or identify with, any particular country
ii. Advanced technology (computer, communications, transportation) and low tariffs foster the globalization process
B. The bulk of the world’s wealth and natural resources are owned by a handful of multinational corporations
C. Alliances of corporations internationally: giant international conglomerates
D. The “global factory”: international division of labor for products
E. Globalization of capital and financial markets
F. The rise of international economic institutions: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
i. Have powers formerly reserved for countries
ii. Largely beyond the control of national governments
G. Disempowerment of national governments with respect to controlling multinational corporations, their own economies, etc.
H. Economic globalization as part of a wider trend: “The growth of a realm beyond the control of individual nations”.
i. Pollution
ii. Massive immigration
iii. Satellite and international media/communications
iv. Multinational corporations
I. A worry: the loss of democratic control with respect to this “realm”
III. Downward leveling
A. Benign downward leveling (BDL): The lowering of prices of goods and services via improved efficiency, as a result of free market competition. (p. 19)
B. Malignant downward leveling (MDL): “…when corporations and governments lower costs by reducing environmental protection, wages, salaries, health care, and education…” (pp. 19-20)
i. The avoidance of accountability of corporations by moving or threatening to move
1. E.g., the defeat of labor unions and the consequent inability of workers to defend themselves against unfair treatment: corporations can resist such demands by moving elsewhere to do business.
2. “Workers, communities and countries then seem to have little choice but to compete for corporate favor…” (p. 20)
ii. The negative affects also apply to higher level jobs
iii. The negative effects apply to people in all parts of the world: no one is immune
iv. A summary of some of the negative effects of MDL:
1. loss of job security in the U.S.
2. growing unemployment in Europe
3. increasing poverty in third world countries
4. decreasing standards of living in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
5. lack of human and labor rights in most of Asia
6. Quote from Princeton economist William Baumol: “It is not that foreigners are stealing our jobs, it is that we are all facing each other’s competition.” (p. 21)
C. The major symptoms of MDL
i. The race to the bottom
1. Definition: “the reduction in labor, social, and environmental conditions that results directly from global competition for jobs and investment.” (p. 22)
2. Three major driving forces of the race to the bottom:
a. Corporations: threatening to move if workers and/ or governments accept their conditions. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
b. Governments: e.g., diminishing job security regulations to make its workforce more appealing to corporations. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
c. International financial institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank): denying loans to desperate countries unless they agree to reduce minimum wages and raise food costs as a part of a “structural adjustment program””. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
3. effects in “1st-world” countries
a. decreased wages, salaries and total household incomes
b. drastic reduction in quality of medical benefit packages
c. increased individual employee labor
d. decline in job promotion opportunities
e. loss of job security
f. Slashed social benefits, such as publicly subsidized housing, transportation, education, and health care. (close paraphrase, . 23)
g. Increase in sub-contracting and “flexibility”
h. the replacement of permanent jobs with a cheap “temp” work force: with this also comes the increased likelihood of discrimination and mistreatment of the poor, immigrants, the elderly and women (i.e., the people who make up the temp workforce.)
i. even the permanent jobs that remain require a substantially increased workload for substantially decreased pay
j. mass increase of illegal employment of children under 14
k. drastically reduced health and safety conditions on the job, due to de-regulation
4. effects in “3rd-world” countries
a. 1.3 billion people live in absolute poverty (“too poor to provide the minimum diet required for full human functioning”): globalization isn’t positively helping their condition at all. Quote: “A study sponsored by the International Labor Organization found that in Indonesia – now a favorite spot for companies like Nike and Reebok – 88% of women earning the Indonesian minimum wage were malnourished.” (p. 24)
b. Objection: what about the “success stories” of 3rd-world countries that have benefited from globalization?
c. Reply: Yes. It has helped a handful of elite corporate executives. All others are being exploited, and the environment in such countries is being diminished at levels that aren’t sustainable
5. effects of the race to the bottom on the environment
a. unsustainable destruction rates
b. greenhouse gases
c. ozone depletion
d. toxic pollution
e. over-fishing
f. major source of solid waste
g. over-cutting of forests
h. destructive use of land
i. in general: “over-harvesting of natural resources”; degradation of the world’s air, land and water
j. Example: The Philippines
ii. The Downward spiral:
1. The logic of the downward spiral: downward leveling: gives rise to (a) the necessity of countries, communities, workers to become “competitive” by reducing wages and social and environmental overheads; this leads to (b) reduced public and private spending, less buying power; which leads to (c) recession, stagnation, unemployment; which leads to (d) accumulation of individual and national debt; out of the necessity to pay off such debt, we arrive back at (a). The circle from (a) through (d) and back to (a) repeats over and over without stop. A vicious circle.
2. The effects of the downward spiral are reflected in the exponential slowing of the global GNP growth.
3. A common means by which corporations stay “competitive”: corporate downsizing
a. Massive layoffs
b. This is even true of corporations that are hugely successful, and are undergoing tremendous growth
c. Examples: AT&T, Sears, B of A, GE, Xerox, Proctor and Gamble
d. “loyalty takes a back seat to survival and personal achievement”
4. More education no longer ensures permanent employment at good-paying jobs: 20% of college grads take non-college-level jobs
5. Unemployment on the rise
6. The effects of the downward spiral are global in scope
7. other manifestations of the downward spiral: especially in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa:
a. higher death rates
b. lower birth rates
c. lower living standards
d. widening inequalities
e. decreased health spending
f. decreased education spending
g. undermining of human relations, traditional life-ways, and social values
h. increased crime
i. social decay
iii. Polarization of the haves and have-nots: depressed wage growth for low-wage workers; increased wage growth for high-level executives
1. in the U.S.
2. in other parts of the world
3. “debtor countries”: make higher debt payments, yet their total debt is increasing exponentially
iv. Loss of democratic control
1. Governments and individuals can’t pursue goals of public goods, because of the threat of corporations to pick up and leave
2. Political movements aimed at furthering the Corporate Agenda: dismantling government institutions for regulating national economies. (close paraphrase, p. 24)
3. Trade agreements (NAFTA, GATT, etc.): further restrict what governments can do.
4. countries no longer have control over their own economies. In effect, they are governed by the actions of the multitude of currency traders around the world. These traders shape and control the monetary and fiscal policies of governments.
5. It’s even worse in 3rd world countries. The IMF and the World Bank “provide” them with “structural adjustment programs”. In response to seeming economic relief, these countries must strictly adhere to a huge list of policies, which amount to (i) turning their economies into capitalist free markets, (ii) allowing the corporations loved by the IMF and World Bank to buy and control all of their natural resources at “bargain basement” prices, and (iii) drastically reducing government “interference” with the market.
6. Such things add up to a near complete lack of individual and government control of their countries – a complete undermining of democratic institutions.
v. Uncontrolled global corporations
1. such corporations are now the most powerful economic forces in the world
2. no real accountability of global corporations
3. no laws or regulations apply to them (or, the few rules that do apply are virtually impossible to enforce with real consequence)
4. corporate scandals and criminal corporate activity
vi. Unaccountable global institutions
1. Growing concentration of power with the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT
2. Powerful organizations with no significant accountability
3. Their decisions have a huge impact on the global ecology
vii. Global conflict
1. trade wars and “global rivalries”
2. corporations using (e.g.) GATT to impose open markets on rivals
3. construction of regional blocs (EU, NAFTA) for corporations and conglomerates to compete against each other
4. these conflicts can easily become militarized
5. The “U.S. empire-building” example: this sort of behavior has led to world war in the past
Thesis: Contrary to the claims of its proponents, globalization is not making life better for everyone around the world. In fact, globalization is making everyone (besides the relative handful of movers and shakers of the global economy) worse off.
The argument often given for the beneficial nature of globalization: As we turn the whole world into a giant free market capitalist economic system (i.e., in every country, the means of production are privately owned, governments do not interfere with the market via tariffs, regulations, etc.), market competition will lead to (a) countries specializing in the products that they can make the best, and at the cheapest rate; (b) the most efficient companies will win out. Since, by definition, the efficient companies have the best products at the lowest prices, (c) the consumers benefit as well. For (a) affordable, high-quality products and (b) a surplus of jobs created by globalization translates into a higher standard of living for everyone. Therefore, everyone benefits - both companies and consumers - from globalization.
Brecher and Costello’s basic reply: Actually, only a few benefit, and the rest of the world becomes worse off, from globalization. Although many factors contribute to this result, here are two of the main factors:
(I) The market forces of globalized free market capitalism (especially the fierce and un-policed competition among corporations) lead companies to minimize production costs. This translates into “forc[ing] workers, communities, and countries to compete for lower labor, social and environmental costs – force them to a race to the bottom.” (p. 16) The idea is that, for large multinational corporations to stay competitive in a de-regulated free market, they must reduce costs as much as possible. Ultimately, and in actual current practice, this cashes out in terms of finding (i) a work force that is both (a) cheap and (b) unable to insist on fair treatment (treating employees fairly – respecting their rights, compensating them with reasonable pay and benefits in return for hard, quality work - is costly), and (ii) cheap natural resources/materials to make products, in an area with (iii) the least amount of government-imposed (a) costs and (b) regulations of various sorts (e.g., environmental regulations) on businesses. There is little that non-corporate citizens, or even governments, can do to resist such corporate behavior in such circumstances. For corporations can (nearly) effortlessly close down factories and move plants elsewhere, where people, communities and countries are desperate enough to put up with such treatment.
(II) Large, multinational corporations aren’t the only one’s involved in this inequitable process. Unaccountable international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are also part of the problem. For they go into economically and politically struggling countries with false promises of curing their problems. In fact, the countries become worse off as a result of their “help”. For, in exchange for their intervention, such countries have to sign-on to “structural adjustment programs.” These involve such things as (a) selling off their natural resources to privately owned companies, (b) de-regulating their markets (i.e., integrating them into the global free market), and (c) taking on huge, hopelessly unmanageable interest rates from the loans they provide.
(III) Therefore, while it is clear that business owners and other high-level executives “win” in such circumstances (minimum costs, maximized profits), it is equally clear that employees, communities and even countries “lose”.
Outline of the paper:
I. Introduction and thesis
A. The popular view of globalization: everybody wins
-the argument (see above)
B. The authors’ reply and thesis: (see above) No. It leads to a “race to the bottom”
C. Examples of the manifestations of the race to the bottom:
i. The BMW case:
ii. The British Department of Trade case:
iii. The London International Group P.L.C. case:
iv. The Nike case:
v. The Johnson Tombigbee case:
II. The New World Economy (aspects of globalization)
A. The rapid change from a nation-based to a global economy
i. Companies are no longer based in, or identify with, any particular country
ii. Advanced technology (computer, communications, transportation) and low tariffs foster the globalization process
B. The bulk of the world’s wealth and natural resources are owned by a handful of multinational corporations
C. Alliances of corporations internationally: giant international conglomerates
D. The “global factory”: international division of labor for products
E. Globalization of capital and financial markets
F. The rise of international economic institutions: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
i. Have powers formerly reserved for countries
ii. Largely beyond the control of national governments
G. Disempowerment of national governments with respect to controlling multinational corporations, their own economies, etc.
H. Economic globalization as part of a wider trend: “The growth of a realm beyond the control of individual nations”.
i. Pollution
ii. Massive immigration
iii. Satellite and international media/communications
iv. Multinational corporations
I. A worry: the loss of democratic control with respect to this “realm”
III. Downward leveling
A. Benign downward leveling (BDL): The lowering of prices of goods and services via improved efficiency, as a result of free market competition. (p. 19)
B. Malignant downward leveling (MDL): “…when corporations and governments lower costs by reducing environmental protection, wages, salaries, health care, and education…” (pp. 19-20)
i. The avoidance of accountability of corporations by moving or threatening to move
1. E.g., the defeat of labor unions and the consequent inability of workers to defend themselves against unfair treatment: corporations can resist such demands by moving elsewhere to do business.
2. “Workers, communities and countries then seem to have little choice but to compete for corporate favor…” (p. 20)
ii. The negative affects also apply to higher level jobs
iii. The negative effects apply to people in all parts of the world: no one is immune
iv. A summary of some of the negative effects of MDL:
1. loss of job security in the U.S.
2. growing unemployment in Europe
3. increasing poverty in third world countries
4. decreasing standards of living in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
5. lack of human and labor rights in most of Asia
6. Quote from Princeton economist William Baumol: “It is not that foreigners are stealing our jobs, it is that we are all facing each other’s competition.” (p. 21)
C. The major symptoms of MDL
i. The race to the bottom
1. Definition: “the reduction in labor, social, and environmental conditions that results directly from global competition for jobs and investment.” (p. 22)
2. Three major driving forces of the race to the bottom:
a. Corporations: threatening to move if workers and/ or governments accept their conditions. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
b. Governments: e.g., diminishing job security regulations to make its workforce more appealing to corporations. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
c. International financial institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank): denying loans to desperate countries unless they agree to reduce minimum wages and raise food costs as a part of a “structural adjustment program””. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
3. effects in “1st-world” countries
a. decreased wages, salaries and total household incomes
b. drastic reduction in quality of medical benefit packages
c. increased individual employee labor
d. decline in job promotion opportunities
e. loss of job security
f. Slashed social benefits, such as publicly subsidized housing, transportation, education, and health care. (close paraphrase, . 23)
g. Increase in sub-contracting and “flexibility”
h. the replacement of permanent jobs with a cheap “temp” work force: with this also comes the increased likelihood of discrimination and mistreatment of the poor, immigrants, the elderly and women (i.e., the people who make up the temp workforce.)
i. even the permanent jobs that remain require a substantially increased workload for substantially decreased pay
j. mass increase of illegal employment of children under 14
k. drastically reduced health and safety conditions on the job, due to de-regulation
4. effects in “3rd-world” countries
a. 1.3 billion people live in absolute poverty (“too poor to provide the minimum diet required for full human functioning”): globalization isn’t positively helping their condition at all. Quote: “A study sponsored by the International Labor Organization found that in Indonesia – now a favorite spot for companies like Nike and Reebok – 88% of women earning the Indonesian minimum wage were malnourished.” (p. 24)
b. Objection: what about the “success stories” of 3rd-world countries that have benefited from globalization?
c. Reply: Yes. It has helped a handful of elite corporate executives. All others are being exploited, and the environment in such countries is being diminished at levels that aren’t sustainable
5. effects of the race to the bottom on the environment
a. unsustainable destruction rates
b. greenhouse gases
c. ozone depletion
d. toxic pollution
e. over-fishing
f. major source of solid waste
g. over-cutting of forests
h. destructive use of land
i. in general: “over-harvesting of natural resources”; degradation of the world’s air, land and water
j. Example: The Philippines
ii. The Downward spiral:
1. The logic of the downward spiral: downward leveling: gives rise to (a) the necessity of countries, communities, workers to become “competitive” by reducing wages and social and environmental overheads; this leads to (b) reduced public and private spending, less buying power; which leads to (c) recession, stagnation, unemployment; which leads to (d) accumulation of individual and national debt; out of the necessity to pay off such debt, we arrive back at (a). The circle from (a) through (d) and back to (a) repeats over and over without stop. A vicious circle.
2. The effects of the downward spiral are reflected in the exponential slowing of the global GNP growth.
3. A common means by which corporations stay “competitive”: corporate downsizing
a. Massive layoffs
b. This is even true of corporations that are hugely successful, and are undergoing tremendous growth
c. Examples: AT&T, Sears, B of A, GE, Xerox, Proctor and Gamble
d. “loyalty takes a back seat to survival and personal achievement”
4. More education no longer ensures permanent employment at good-paying jobs: 20% of college grads take non-college-level jobs
5. Unemployment on the rise
6. The effects of the downward spiral are global in scope
7. other manifestations of the downward spiral: especially in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa:
a. higher death rates
b. lower birth rates
c. lower living standards
d. widening inequalities
e. decreased health spending
f. decreased education spending
g. undermining of human relations, traditional life-ways, and social values
h. increased crime
i. social decay
iii. Polarization of the haves and have-nots: depressed wage growth for low-wage workers; increased wage growth for high-level executives
1. in the U.S.
2. in other parts of the world
3. “debtor countries”: make higher debt payments, yet their total debt is increasing exponentially
iv. Loss of democratic control
1. Governments and individuals can’t pursue goals of public goods, because of the threat of corporations to pick up and leave
2. Political movements aimed at furthering the Corporate Agenda: dismantling government institutions for regulating national economies. (close paraphrase, p. 24)
3. Trade agreements (NAFTA, GATT, etc.): further restrict what governments can do.
4. countries no longer have control over their own economies. In effect, they are governed by the actions of the multitude of currency traders around the world. These traders shape and control the monetary and fiscal policies of governments.
5. It’s even worse in 3rd world countries. The IMF and the World Bank “provide” them with “structural adjustment programs”. In response to seeming economic relief, these countries must strictly adhere to a huge list of policies, which amount to (i) turning their economies into capitalist free markets, (ii) allowing the corporations loved by the IMF and World Bank to buy and control all of their natural resources at “bargain basement” prices, and (iii) drastically reducing government “interference” with the market.
6. Such things add up to a near complete lack of individual and government control of their countries – a complete undermining of democratic institutions.
v. Uncontrolled global corporations
1. such corporations are now the most powerful economic forces in the world
2. no real accountability of global corporations
3. no laws or regulations apply to them (or, the few rules that do apply are virtually impossible to enforce with real consequence)
4. corporate scandals and criminal corporate activity
vi. Unaccountable global institutions
1. Growing concentration of power with the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT
2. Powerful organizations with no significant accountability
3. Their decisions have a huge impact on the global ecology
vii. Global conflict
1. trade wars and “global rivalries”
2. corporations using (e.g.) GATT to impose open markets on rivals
3. construction of regional blocs (EU, NAFTA) for corporations and conglomerates to compete against each other
4. these conflicts can easily become militarized
5. The “U.S. empire-building” example: this sort of behavior has led to world war in the past
Germany and the United States: Compare and Contrast
Personal observations, but nonetheless very illuminating. Here is the link.
Great Little Post at the Daily Kos
"Your Media at Work"
In the past two weeks, the following events transpired. A Department of Justice memo, authored by John Yoo, was released which authorized torture and presidential lawbreaking. It was revealed that the Bush administration declared the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights to be inapplicable to "domestic military operations" within the U.S. The U.S. Attorney General appears to have fabricated a key event leading to the 9/11 attacks and made patently false statements about surveillance laws and related lawsuits. Barack Obama went bowling in Pennsylvania and had a low score.
Here are the number of times, according to NEXIS, that various topics have been mentioned in the media over the past thirty days:
"Yoo and torture" - 102
"Mukasey and 9/11" -- 73
"Yoo and Fourth Amendment" -- 16
"Obama and bowling" -- 1,043
"Obama and Wright" -- More than 3,000 (too many to be counted)
"Obama and patriotism" - 1,607
"Clinton and Lewinsky" -- 1,079
More stories about a decade-old scandal and a presidential candidate's night at the bowling alley than about the White House declaring the Fourth Amendment null and void.
Yup, that's about right.
In the past two weeks, the following events transpired. A Department of Justice memo, authored by John Yoo, was released which authorized torture and presidential lawbreaking. It was revealed that the Bush administration declared the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights to be inapplicable to "domestic military operations" within the U.S. The U.S. Attorney General appears to have fabricated a key event leading to the 9/11 attacks and made patently false statements about surveillance laws and related lawsuits. Barack Obama went bowling in Pennsylvania and had a low score.
Here are the number of times, according to NEXIS, that various topics have been mentioned in the media over the past thirty days:
"Yoo and torture" - 102
"Mukasey and 9/11" -- 73
"Yoo and Fourth Amendment" -- 16
"Obama and bowling" -- 1,043
"Obama and Wright" -- More than 3,000 (too many to be counted)
"Obama and patriotism" - 1,607
"Clinton and Lewinsky" -- 1,079
More stories about a decade-old scandal and a presidential candidate's night at the bowling alley than about the White House declaring the Fourth Amendment null and void.
Yup, that's about right.
Thursday, April 3, 2008
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