Political Diary

Robert Scheer's Latest Article in The Nation

2008-09-25T23:24:00.001-07:00

"Financial Fascism", here.

Hooray for Golden Parachutes

2008-09-25T23:04:00.000-07:00

Here. That's awesome:

Step 1: become a CEO of a major corporation
Step 2: make fantastically wreckless gambles in the hopes of gaining short-term profits
Step 3: bail out with a 60 million dollar golden parachute, leaving a wake of financial carnage.

And what makes it even more precious is that, given massive deregulation and lax policing of the system, you can do it with impunity.

No worries, though, if the corporation goes bankrupt. Taxpayers will bail you out with a giant smile on their faces, and will never, ever, call you on it. We have no problem with corporate socialism. You're like our irresponsible teenage daughter: you run up your credit card, and mommy and daddy will pay your tab. The only time we hate to spend our tax dollars is when they're used to improve our lives. That's a waste of "our" money. Yuck. I hate health care, road repair, the fire and police departments, public transit, public parks, and all those other "commie" thingies. The only good commie thingies are giant debts caused by irresponsible CEOs that put more money in their pockets and less in mine.

And don't get me started on raising taxes. It makes much more sense to borrow money we don't have and then spend it than to gather money we do have and then spend it.

The Nation's William Greider on Paulson's Bailout Plan

2008-09-22T02:20:00.000-07:00

Here.

Must Read This

2008-09-21T22:51:00.000-07:00

(Princeton economist) Paul Krugman's latest commentary on the impending Paulson/Bernanke bailout plan, here.

The End of the Ideology of Deregulation

2008-09-20T16:51:00.000-07:00

here.

The money passage:

Along the way, they have cast aside the administration’s long-held views about regulation and government involvement in private business, even reversing decisions over the space of 24 hours and justifying them as practical solutions to dire threats.

“There are no atheists in foxholes and no ideologues in financial crises,” Mr. Bernanke told colleagues last week, according to one meeting participant.

That's right, Bernanke said that.

Recession-Plagued Nation Demands New Bubble To Invest In

2008-07-18T02:00:00.000-07:00

The Onion reports.

WASHINGTON—A panel of top business leaders testified before Congress about the worsening recession Monday, demanding the government provide Americans with a new irresponsible and largely illusory economic bubble in which to invest.

"What America needs right now is not more talk and long-term strategy, but a concrete way to create more imaginary wealth in the very immediate future," said Thomas Jenkins, CFO of the Boston-area Jenkins Financial Group, a bubble-based investment firm. "We are in a crisis, and that crisis demands an unviable short-term solution."

Privatized Profits, Socialized Costs

2008-07-16T12:51:00.000-07:00

America: the home of corporate state socialism. See the Huffington Post piece here.

The Republican dream -- privatize profits, socialize costs -- is now the norm. This will be the trend for the foreseeable future. Corporations will be backed by tax dollars. Those who reap the billions will pay little or no tax. Those who reap none of the profit will pay all of the tax. Despite all of this, these corporations are still allowed to play without any rules, and make as many reckless moves as they want, with our money, without penalty. This is now the reality with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This is also what Mussolini called 'fascism':

"Fascism should more properly be called corporatism because it is the merger of state and corporate power." - Benito Mussolini.

Informative Investigative Report on Universal Health Care

2008-07-03T00:34:00.000-07:00

at NPR, here. The interactive graphic, which allows you to compare the health care plans of various Western European countries with that of the U.S., is especially helpful.

Seymour Hersh on Covert Operations in Iran

2008-07-03T00:32:00.000-07:00

on Fresh Air with Terri Gross, here.

Why Deficits Matter

2008-07-02T03:04:00.000-07:00

A helpful piece over at Mother Jones.

A Refutatation of the Key Thesis of The Tipping Point

2008-07-02T03:00:00.000-07:00

I Feel Sorry for the Factory Workers, Etc.; Not So Much for the Execs

2008-07-02T02:56:00.000-07:00

Here. Bye-bye, stupid SUV producers, with you're lack of foresight.

Deepening Cycle of Job Loss Seen Lasting into '09

2008-07-02T02:52:00.000-07:00

See the NY Times piece Here.

Quick Summary of the Disasters and Criminal Acitivity of the Bush Admin. Over the Last Seven Weeks

2008-04-22T14:27:00.001-07:00

From Hendrik Hertzberg at the New Yorker:

"In the seven weeks since the previous Clinton-Obama debate, the death toll of American troops in Iraq had reached four thousand; the President had admitted that his "national-security team," including the Vice-President, had met regularly in the White House to approve the torture of prisoners; house repossessions topped fifty thousand per month and unemployment topped five per cent; and the poll-measured proportion of Americans who believe that "things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track" hit eighty-one per cent, a record."

-HT: Dailykos

Scientific Studies Establish a Clear Link Between Smog and Premature Death

2008-04-22T14:23:00.000-07:00

Here -- Contrary to the pronouncements of the Bush Administration, who want to deny the link for the sake of business. Yet another piece of the Bush narrative that puts profits over people.

What's Sad Is That Many Real-Live American Grownups Think This Strategy Is Reasonable.

2008-04-17T23:33:00.000-07:00

McCain's super fucktarded economic plan. Same plan, different retard. Yeah, let's lower taxes, so that we'll be in an even worse position re: balancing the budget and restoring infrastructure, paying for unemployment, healthcare, education, etc. Let's tax less, and just spend money we don't have. The last 8 years didn't convince you that this experiment doesn't work, huh? Or when Bush Sr. did it and it fucked everything up? Or when Reagan did it and it fucked everything up? Contrast that with FDR's New Deal Years, the Clinton Years, and the last 10 years in most Western European countries, where unprecedented growth and prosperity results from mixing capitalism with -- gasp -- governmental regulation and social safety nets. There just is no contest.

I'm sorry but if you're over 25 and still think like Bush and McCain re: economic policy, you're clueless.

Two Incongruities

2008-04-17T20:00:00.000-07:00

Incongruity #1: citizens are up in arms about foul play in various sports cases (e.g., players using hormones, lying about their age, etc.), to the point that they want federal court cases about them. On the other hand, the Bush Administration lies about the case for war in Iraq, about wiretapping, ignored threats of terrorist attacks before 9/11, enabled the conditions for economic crisis, etc. But nobody seems willing to do much about it.

Incongruity #2: People who doubt the consensus expert testimony of scientists that global warming is real, but who were utterly convinced by the shitty case for Iraq having WMDs.

Pentagon Records Detail Prisoner Abuse by US Military

2008-04-17T00:15:00.000-07:00

Here.

2008-04-14T20:34:00.001-07:00

2008-04-14T20:33:00.001-07:00

McCain

2008-04-14T20:32:00.001-07:00

The Price of Food Has Risen 80% Over Just 3 Years Due to Globalized Capitalism

2008-04-14T15:46:00.000-07:00

Here. Now dozens of countries are facing the prospects of violent revolt of its citizens. More virtues of the wonderful free market.

Another Blissful Consequence of Conservative Economic Policy

2008-04-12T16:25:00.000-07:00

Here.

Manufacturing Consent for a New War With Iran

2008-04-12T11:52:00.000-07:00

Here is the latest piece of propaganda added to the narrative for a case for war with Iran from the public relations arm of the White House (aka, mainstream news).

Flintstones, meet the Flintstones

2008-04-10T23:57:00.000-07:00

Meanwhile, as ALL THE OTHER industrialized nations BESIDES US are perfectly poised for the political, environmental and economic crises related to oil, with high-tech, high-speed mass transit railways, we're still trying to figure out if mass transit is a good idea.

And if that weren't enough...

2008-04-10T21:28:00.000-07:00

...here's yet another decisive reason to kick out Cheney, too.

Yet another conclusive reason to impeach

2008-04-10T21:26:00.000-07:00

Here. But of course nothing wil happen, because most citizens are impervious to facts.

Helpful Recent Discussion on Bullshit and Truth in the Contemporary World

2008-04-09T17:29:00.000-07:00

Yet Another Empirical Refutation of Conservative and Libertarian Views of Economics

2008-04-09T12:46:00.000-07:00

This is what happens when you de-regulate markets and lower taxes to the extent that conservatives like Bush Jr. has done. How many times do we have to run the experiment? It happened under Nixon, it happened under Reagan, it happened under Bush I, and now it has happened under Bush II. But of course, they're ideologues. Their views are impervious to evidence.

Back to FDR's New Deal, folks. That demonstrably worked. Or better, let's move to the economic plans demonstrated to make people better off in today's economy -- e.g., that of Germany, Switzerland, Holland, etc.

Bush Administration Injustice, take 5 billion

2008-04-08T23:08:00.000-07:00

More base-level corruption within the Bush Administration revealed:

Reposted: Notes on Globalization: Brecher and Costello's "Race to the Bottom"

2008-04-06T22:42:00.001-07:00

Notes: Brecher and Costello’s “The Race to the Bottom”

Thesis: Contrary to the claims of its proponents, globalization is not making life better for everyone around the world. In fact, globalization is making everyone (besides the relative handful of movers and shakers of the global economy) worse off.

The argument often given for the beneficial nature of globalization: As we turn the whole world into a giant free market capitalist economic system (i.e., in every country, the means of production are privately owned, governments do not interfere with the market via tariffs, regulations, etc.), market competition will lead to (a) countries specializing in the products that they can make the best, and at the cheapest rate; (b) the most efficient companies will win out. Since, by definition, the efficient companies have the best products at the lowest prices, (c) the consumers benefit as well. For (a) affordable, high-quality products and (b) a surplus of jobs created by globalization translates into a higher standard of living for everyone. Therefore, everyone benefits - both companies and consumers - from globalization.

Brecher and Costello’s basic reply: Actually, only a few benefit, and the rest of the world becomes worse off, from globalization. Although many factors contribute to this result, here are two of the main factors:

(I) The market forces of globalized free market capitalism (especially the fierce and un-policed competition among corporations) lead companies to minimize production costs. This translates into “forc[ing] workers, communities, and countries to compete for lower labor, social and environmental costs – force them to a race to the bottom.” (p. 16) The idea is that, for large multinational corporations to stay competitive in a de-regulated free market, they must reduce costs as much as possible. Ultimately, and in actual current practice, this cashes out in terms of finding (i) a work force that is both (a) cheap and (b) unable to insist on fair treatment (treating employees fairly – respecting their rights, compensating them with reasonable pay and benefits in return for hard, quality work - is costly), and (ii) cheap natural resources/materials to make products, in an area with (iii) the least amount of government-imposed (a) costs and (b) regulations of various sorts (e.g., environmental regulations) on businesses. There is little that non-corporate citizens, or even governments, can do to resist such corporate behavior in such circumstances. For corporations can (nearly) effortlessly close down factories and move plants elsewhere, where people, communities and countries are desperate enough to put up with such treatment.

(II) Large, multinational corporations aren’t the only one’s involved in this inequitable process. Unaccountable international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are also part of the problem. For they go into economically and politically struggling countries with false promises of curing their problems. In fact, the countries become worse off as a result of their “help”. For, in exchange for their intervention, such countries have to sign-on to “structural adjustment programs.” These involve such things as (a) selling off their natural resources to privately owned companies, (b) de-regulating their markets (i.e., integrating them into the global free market), and (c) taking on huge, hopelessly unmanageable interest rates from the loans they provide.

(III) Therefore, while it is clear that business owners and other high-level executives “win” in such circumstances (minimum costs, maximized profits), it is equally clear that employees, communities and even countries “lose”.

Outline of the paper:

I. Introduction and thesis

A. The popular view of globalization: everybody wins
-the argument (see above)
B. The authors’ reply and thesis: (see above) No. It leads to a “race to the bottom”
C. Examples of the manifestations of the race to the bottom:
i. The BMW case:
ii. The British Department of Trade case:
iii. The London International Group P.L.C. case:
iv. The Nike case:
v. The Johnson Tombigbee case:

II. The New World Economy (aspects of globalization)

A. The rapid change from a nation-based to a global economy
i. Companies are no longer based in, or identify with, any particular country
ii. Advanced technology (computer, communications, transportation) and low tariffs foster the globalization process
B. The bulk of the world’s wealth and natural resources are owned by a handful of multinational corporations
C. Alliances of corporations internationally: giant international conglomerates
D. The “global factory”: international division of labor for products
E. Globalization of capital and financial markets
F. The rise of international economic institutions: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
i. Have powers formerly reserved for countries
ii. Largely beyond the control of national governments
G. Disempowerment of national governments with respect to controlling multinational corporations, their own economies, etc.
H. Economic globalization as part of a wider trend: “The growth of a realm beyond the control of individual nations”.
i. Pollution
ii. Massive immigration
iii. Satellite and international media/communications
iv. Multinational corporations
I. A worry: the loss of democratic control with respect to this “realm”

III. Downward leveling

A. Benign downward leveling (BDL): The lowering of prices of goods and services via improved efficiency, as a result of free market competition. (p. 19)
B. Malignant downward leveling (MDL): “…when corporations and governments lower costs by reducing environmental protection, wages, salaries, health care, and education…” (pp. 19-20)
i. The avoidance of accountability of corporations by moving or threatening to move
1. E.g., the defeat of labor unions and the consequent inability of workers to defend themselves against unfair treatment: corporations can resist such demands by moving elsewhere to do business.
2. “Workers, communities and countries then seem to have little choice but to compete for corporate favor…” (p. 20)
ii. The negative affects also apply to higher level jobs
iii. The negative effects apply to people in all parts of the world: no one is immune
iv. A summary of some of the negative effects of MDL:
1. loss of job security in the U.S.
2. growing unemployment in Europe
3. increasing poverty in third world countries
4. decreasing standards of living in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
5. lack of human and labor rights in most of Asia
6. Quote from Princeton economist William Baumol: “It is not that foreigners are stealing our jobs, it is that we are all facing each other’s competition.” (p. 21)
C. The major symptoms of MDL
i. The race to the bottom
1. Definition: “the reduction in labor, social, and environmental conditions that results directly from global competition for jobs and investment.” (p. 22)
2. Three major driving forces of the race to the bottom:
a. Corporations: threatening to move if workers and/ or governments accept their conditions. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
b. Governments: e.g., diminishing job security regulations to make its workforce more appealing to corporations. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
c. International financial institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank): denying loans to desperate countries unless they agree to reduce minimum wages and raise food costs as a part of a “structural adjustment program””. (close paraphrase, p. 22)
3. effects in “1st-world” countries
a. decreased wages, salaries and total household incomes
b. drastic reduction in quality of medical benefit packages
c. increased individual employee labor
d. decline in job promotion opportunities
e. loss of job security
f. Slashed social benefits, such as publicly subsidized housing, transportation, education, and health care. (close paraphrase, . 23)
g. Increase in sub-contracting and “flexibility”
h. the replacement of permanent jobs with a cheap “temp” work force: with this also comes the increased likelihood of discrimination and mistreatment of the poor, immigrants, the elderly and women (i.e., the people who make up the temp workforce.)
i. even the permanent jobs that remain require a substantially increased workload for substantially decreased pay
j. mass increase of illegal employment of children under 14
k. drastically reduced health and safety conditions on the job, due to de-regulation
4. effects in “3rd-world” countries
a. 1.3 billion people live in absolute poverty (“too poor to provide the minimum diet required for full human functioning”): globalization isn’t positively helping their condition at all. Quote: “A study sponsored by the International Labor Organization found that in Indonesia – now a favorite spot for companies like Nike and Reebok – 88% of women earning the Indonesian minimum wage were malnourished.” (p. 24)
b. Objection: what about the “success stories” of 3rd-world countries that have benefited from globalization?
c. Reply: Yes. It has helped a handful of elite corporate executives. All others are being exploited, and the environment in such countries is being diminished at levels that aren’t sustainable
5. effects of the race to the bottom on the environment
a. unsustainable destruction rates
b. greenhouse gases
c. ozone depletion
d. toxic pollution
e. over-fishing
f. major source of solid waste
g. over-cutting of forests
h. destructive use of land
i. in general: “over-harvesting of natural resources”; degradation of the world’s air, land and water
j. Example: The Philippines
ii. The Downward spiral:
1. The logic of the downward spiral: downward leveling: gives rise to (a) the necessity of countries, communities, workers to become “competitive” by reducing wages and social and environmental overheads; this leads to (b) reduced public and private spending, less buying power; which leads to (c) recession, stagnation, unemployment; which leads to (d) accumulation of individual and national debt; out of the necessity to pay off such debt, we arrive back at (a). The circle from (a) through (d) and back to (a) repeats over and over without stop. A vicious circle.
2. The effects of the downward spiral are reflected in the exponential slowing of the global GNP growth.
3. A common means by which corporations stay “competitive”: corporate downsizing
a. Massive layoffs
b. This is even true of corporations that are hugely successful, and are undergoing tremendous growth
c. Examples: AT&T, Sears, B of A, GE, Xerox, Proctor and Gamble
d. “loyalty takes a back seat to survival and personal achievement”
4. More education no longer ensures permanent employment at good-paying jobs: 20% of college grads take non-college-level jobs
5. Unemployment on the rise
6. The effects of the downward spiral are global in scope
7. other manifestations of the downward spiral: especially in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa:
a. higher death rates
b. lower birth rates
c. lower living standards
d. widening inequalities
e. decreased health spending
f. decreased education spending
g. undermining of human relations, traditional life-ways, and social values
h. increased crime
i. social decay
iii. Polarization of the haves and have-nots: depressed wage growth for low-wage workers; increased wage growth for high-level executives
1. in the U.S.
2. in other parts of the world
3. “debtor countries”: make higher debt payments, yet their total debt is increasing exponentially
iv. Loss of democratic control
1. Governments and individuals can’t pursue goals of public goods, because of the threat of corporations to pick up and leave
2. Political movements aimed at furthering the Corporate Agenda: dismantling government institutions for regulating national economies. (close paraphrase, p. 24)
3. Trade agreements (NAFTA, GATT, etc.): further restrict what governments can do.
4. countries no longer have control over their own economies. In effect, they are governed by the actions of the multitude of currency traders around the world. These traders shape and control the monetary and fiscal policies of governments.
5. It’s even worse in 3rd world countries. The IMF and the World Bank “provide” them with “structural adjustment programs”. In response to seeming economic relief, these countries must strictly adhere to a huge list of policies, which amount to (i) turning their economies into capitalist free markets, (ii) allowing the corporations loved by the IMF and World Bank to buy and control all of their natural resources at “bargain basement” prices, and (iii) drastically reducing government “interference” with the market.
6. Such things add up to a near complete lack of individual and government control of their countries – a complete undermining of democratic institutions.
v. Uncontrolled global corporations
1. such corporations are now the most powerful economic forces in the world
2. no real accountability of global corporations
3. no laws or regulations apply to them (or, the few rules that do apply are virtually impossible to enforce with real consequence)
4. corporate scandals and criminal corporate activity
vi. Unaccountable global institutions
1. Growing concentration of power with the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT
2. Powerful organizations with no significant accountability
3. Their decisions have a huge impact on the global ecology
vii. Global conflict
1. trade wars and “global rivalries”
2. corporations using (e.g.) GATT to impose open markets on rivals
3. construction of regional blocs (EU, NAFTA) for corporations and conglomerates to compete against each other
4. these conflicts can easily become militarized
5. The “U.S. empire-building” example: this sort of behavior has led to world war in the past

Notes on Capitalism: Marx on Capitalism and Alienation

2008-04-06T19:17:00.000-07:00

Notes on Marx

Preliminaries:

Two different economic theories

-Capitalism: the means of production (raw materials, industries, etc.) are privately owned.

-Socialism: the means of production are owned by the workers/the collective public.

Karl Marx was a socialist. He realized that capitalism and socialism couldn’t co-exist. So, he argued against capitalism.

Marx divided the members of a capitalist society into two classes: the capital and the labor. ‘Capital’ were the wealthy business owners (i.e., those who owned the means of production), and ‘Labor’ referred to the working class.

The main ideas:

Summary: Capitalism is, by its very nature, dehumanizing and unnatural. For it alienates people in a variety of ways. First, it alienates the laborer from whatever they produce by the work of their hands. Second, it alienates them from the actual act of labor. Third, it alienates them their creative side, which is what separates them from other animals (since things like assembly line work prevent them from using their creativity in their work). Forth, it alienates them from other people (the conflict of purposes between the laborer and owner of capital (for example, the boss)).

Criticism of Locke: Didn’t account for all of the land being acquired.
-This has happened!
-But if so, then the only thing left for the laborer to “own” is their labor!

Alienation:

-From labor:
-Business owner (“capital”) controls how you work
-He controls when you work
-He controls the terms under which you work
-He controls the price/rate you receive for your work
-Your labor is turned against you: the harder you work, the more you produce (i.e., the total supply of the product increases). But in a free market capitalist economy, as the supply of a product goes up, the demand for that product goes down. And if so, then the price for the product goes down as well.

-From product of one’s labor: Owned by whoever owns the materials from which it was made

-From one’s species-kind (our humanness): The distinctively human part of people is their freedom and creativity in producing things. But (for example) assembly line work prevents the worker from expressing their freedom and creativity. Therefore, such work prevents the worker from expressing what makes them distinctively human. But if so, then they are reduced to an animal existence.

-From other people
-From other laborers: In a capitalist market, workers are in constant competition to get and keep a job.
-From the business owner: Your interests conflict with his.

Notes on Globalization: T. Friedman vs. Palast vs. Stiglitz

2008-04-06T19:15:00.001-07:00

Notes on Globalization

Globalization: Globalization has several major aspects, each having to do with the constancy (or frequency) and ease of interaction among all the regions of the globe, and the influence and consequences (positive and negative) of this interaction. The major aspects of globalization are:
-international communication and travel
-multinational corporations
-economic globalization (EG): robust interrelations between national economies
-mainly brought about by (i) the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank
-You should know the basic facts about these three organizations (i.e., a little about their history and major functions). See, especially, (i) Stiglitz=s paper, pp. 10 (bottom paragraph) - 16 (up to the 1st full paragraph); (ii) Prof. Page=s notes, Nov. 19, pp. 2-3.

The three authors we read on the topic of EG: basic, preliminary points to know:
-defenders (to varying degrees) of EG:
-Thomas Friedman
-Joseph Stiglitz (although he thinks EG needs to be radically reshaped)
-opponent of EG
-Greg Palast:

Main points of each of the authors:
-Thomas Friedman: Extreme free market capitalism is now the only viable economic system for obtaining a high standard of living. For:
-While other systems may be better at distributing income more equitably, no other system is sufficiently efficient at generating income. But since the former is useless without the latter (you need to have income, and lots of it, before you can distribute it equitably to all of your citizens) no other economic system is viable, as has now been demonstrated historically (with the collapse of other countries that utilized them).
-But once a country realizes the force of this point, and joins other countries in the global free market, this amounts to Aputting on@ Athe Golden Straightjacket@ (GS).
-Putting on the Golden Straightjacket consists in a country doing the following things (which amount to a minimization of government involvement in one=s market):

-(1) making the private sector the primary engine of economic growth, (2) maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, (3) shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, (4) maintaining as close a balanced budget as possible, (5) eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, (6) removing restrictions on foreign investment (7) removing quotas and domestic monopolies, (8) increasing exports, (9) privatizing state-owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, (10) making its currency convertible, (11) opening its industries, stock, and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment, (12) deregulating its economy to promote optimal competition, (13) eliminate government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, (14) opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership, and (15) allowing its citizens to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds. (p. 87, near verbatim quote)
-The benefits of wearing the GS: increases the average household income, and standards of living generally.
-The costs of wearing the GS: (a) It hurts many people and nations (at least in the short run), and (b) it strips much of the power of governments: politicians have to make decisions that don=t conflict with the smooth operation of the global market. For if they do, then (e.g.,) international credit rating agencies will warn multinational corporations and investors of this, and the latter, foreseeing the negative financial impact of such political decisions, will withdraw from the country.
-And this will, of course, have devastating social and economic consequences for the country.

-Joseph Stiglitz: Two main points:
-The negative point: the WTO, IMF and World Bank are, currently, greatly harming other countries, due in large measure to a number of factors
-Faulty ideology (see esp.: p. 220, 3rd full paragraph-221, 1st full paragraph; p. 222, top): roughly, the extreme free market view: an unrestricted market will solve all the problems; and even if it can=t, nothing else can.
-counter-evidence to the ideology:
-countries that are worse off after IMF, World Bank intervention (p. 209)
-countries that are better off, even though they refused to follow the extreme free market view (e.g., the Far East) (p. 221).
-The people of the Aaided@ countries are not well-represented (see esp. pp. 40-43).
-Quote 1: A But the IMF is not particularly interested in hearing the thoughts of its Aclient countries@ on such topics as development strategy or fiscal austerity. All to often, the Fund=s approach to developing countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler.@ (p. 40)
-Quote 2: AThe message conveyed was all too often clear: in the best of cases there was a member of an elite B a minister of finance or the head of a central bank B with whom the Fund might have a meaningful dialogue. Outside of this circle, there was little point in even trying to talk.@ (p. 41)
-catering to the interests of multinational organizations (see esp. pp. 206, bottom paragraph B 1st half of 208)

-The positive point: Although the WTO, IMF and World Bank are, currently, greatly harming other countries (due in large measure to their catering to the interests of multinational organizations), these organizations are capable of great good in helping other countries, if GE is reshaped in certain ways.
-Quote: AI believe that globalization can be reshaped to realize its potential for good and I believe that the international economic institutions can be reshaped in ways that will help ensure that this is accomplished.@ (p. 215, bottom)
-There is a spectrum of different versions of the market system, ranging from little government intervention to fairly substantial government intervention.
-A number of countries with market economies (e.g., Japan, Sweden, Germany) have much more governmental intervention in their markets than the U.S., and yet:
(i) they lack such problems that plague the U.S. (for the points here and following, see esp. pp. 217-218)
-they have outstanding, universal health coverage
-they have excellent unemployment insurance
-they have superior retirement benefits
(ii) they are thriving economically
(iii) Athey are every bit as successful, even in terms of the innovations associated with the ANew Economy@.@ (p. 219)
-What=s the lesson? Government should play a larger role in EG, to ensure social justice and economic prosperity.
-Quote: AI have advocated a balanced [my emphasis, F.L.] view of the role of government, one which recognizes both the limitations and failures of markets and government, but which sees the two as working together, in partnership, with the precise nature of that partnership differing among countries, depending on their stages of both political and economic development.@ (p. 219-220)

Greg Palast: EG doesn=t/won=t benefit most people. Rather, it benefits corporations, and countries like the U.S. and the rest of the G-7 (Japan, Germany, etc.), and this is no accident. The structural adjustment programs, imposed upon needy countries by the IMF and World Bank (usually by bribing a government official with a huge sum of money), are supposed to help those countries. Instead, they are used as tools to drain the cash and natural resources out of the countries and into multinational corporations and affluent countries.

Palast: the A4 step program@ of Country Assistance Strategies (pp. 50-52) :
4) Privatization, i.e., sell industrial state assets (e.g., utilities). Officials bribed to sell these industries at ridiculously low prices.
5) Capital Market Liberalization: deregulate the markets. Often leads to the money being drained out of the country.
6) Market-Based Pricing: raising the price on staple goods like food, water, and gas. Predictably leads to riots.
7) Poverty Reduction Strategy/ Free Trade: opening the country=s markets to global trade, while reducing tariffs.

Notes on Employee Rights:Lippke's Stuff

2008-04-06T19:08:00.000-07:00

Notes: Lippke’s “Privacy, Work and Autonomy”

The nature of privacy: two key features:

1 – Some control over information about ourselves
2 – Some control over who can experience/observe us (Lippke, 80)

N.B.: Notice that Lippke agrees with D&D that what counts as private depends upon the kind of relationship that exists between two (or more) people. (Lippke, 80)

Why is privacy valuable?

-Because autonomy is valuable, and violation of our privacy undermines our autonomy, as well as our ability to develop our autonomy (and our ability to conceive of ourselves as autonomous) (Lippke, 80-81). Conversely, if we protect the right to privacy, then we will give people the idea that they are autonomous, thus realizing the conditions for people to actually behave/act autonomously.

-What is autonomy? It’s a kind of independence, in particular, independence from other people in making one’s own decisions. It is the ability to control certain aspects of one’s own self (e.g., one’s beliefs, thoughts, and actions). The current edition of Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines autonomy as “self-directing freedom”.

-Two degrees of autonomy: minimal autonomy and full autonomy.

-Minimal autonomy: Conceiving of oneself as autonomous: seeing oneself as someone who can, if she so wishes, control one’s thoughts, beliefs, and actions. It may also involve the actual control over some of our beliefs, thoughts and actions (Lippke, 80).

-Full autonomy: the actualized/realized ability to critically reflect on one’s deepest convictions and life plans (close paraphrase of Lippke, 81).

-Again, Lippke’s main point here is that privacy is valuable because autonomy is valuable (it’s necessary for human flourishing), and violation of privacy can undermine both our minimal and full autonomy. And providing an environment in which our privacy is respected gives us the necessary conditions to develop and utilize our minimal and full autonomy.

-Lippke’s summary: Three important connections between privacy and autonomy: Respecting people’s privacy gives them idea that

1 – they are able to act autonomously

2 – they are worthy of acting autonomously

3 – they are entitled to act autonomously (Lippke, 83)

First set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments for the right to privacy with respect to DT: (N.B.: these criticisms have to do with D&D’s responses to the Productivity Argument for DT)

-The general criticism: D&D wrongly argue against DT on the grounds that the knowledge it provides is not job relevant. From this point, they argue that since the ER/EE relationship is that of a contract, and since such a contract limits the ER’s knowledge to that which is job relevant, the requesting and demanding of DT is a violation of EE privacy rights. But arguing on the basis of job relevance is a failure.

-Support for the general criticism: Three arguments:

-A precautionary note: Lippke wants to protect this information as much as D&D do. However, he thinks that they can’t successfully defend such information on the basis of job (ir)relevance.

1 – Contrary to what D&D claim, the kind of information that they try to protect is, in fact, job relevant. But if so, then the argument for protecting such information because it is not job relevant is unsound.
2 – D&D argue that EEs are not required to perform at an optimal level. Rather, they are only required by their contracts to perform at a satisfactory level. Thus, since drug use would only rule out optimal – but not necessarily satisfactory – job performance, the information provided by DT isn’t job relevant. But this argument is very bad. For it only works so long as the EE and ER stipulate in the contract that merely satisfactory job performance is required. But there is no reason why the contract couldn’t stipulate the requirement of optimal performance. And if that happens, D&D’s argument here will no longer go through.

3 – D&D argue that knowledge of the underlying causes of poor job performance is not job relevant. Rather, only the information that the EE is performing poorly is relevant. But this argument is extremely weak. For we can easily argue that since the information gathered about an EE’s drug use will help the ER predict the performance level at which the EE will likely perform, then such knowledge is obviously job relevant.

4 – The means used by ERs to get the information (e.g., drug testing) is job relevant, contrary to what D&D claim

Second set of criticisms of D&D’s arguments: (N.B., these have to do with D&D’s responses to the Harm Argument for DT)

-Preliminary: Lippke’s concedes all of D&D’s points about restricting DT to certain job types, and to only certain individuals who occupy such jobs.

-D&D wrongly argue that the most important issue for determining whether ERs have a right to the information provided by DT is whether or not issues of safety outweigh considerations of EE privacy. But this is a shallow analysis of the problem. The deeper issue is providing social conditions in which EE’s wouldn’t even consider use drugs on the job. If EE’s were treated as autonomous agents, then drugs use on the job would be greatly reduced.

Lippke’s positive argument for EE privacy: DT, in most cases, is wrong, not because the information it provides is not job relevant, but because it undermines the EE’s minimal and full autonomy.

Notes on Employee Rights:Maitland's Stuff

2008-04-06T19:06:00.002-07:00

Notes on Maitland’s Article

>EE= = Employee
>ER= = Employer

Preliminaries:
-Examples of EE rights:

-The right to meaningful work: the idea is that it is dehumanizing, degrading, and therefore wrong to make EEs do work that is trivial and repetitive. For example, consider EEs who work on an assembly line. The workers can=t take pride in their work, nor can they express their true creativity and talents by working on an assembly line.

-The right not to be fired at will by an employer: (without good reason or explanation). It=s claimed that it=s wrong for an employer to fire it=s employees without sufficient cause. This is supposed to be some kind of unacceptable mistreatment. So, for example, if you are a hard working and honest employee, then you invest your best efforts, indeed, you very life, in your work. This may have required things like moving to a new location and building a life with one’s wife and children in a new community, all for the sake of the company for which one works. But if so, then it doesn=t seem right for your ER to have the power to fire you for no good reason (such as poor performance), and without warning.

-The right not to have one=s place of work closed down without notice: It seems unfair for an ER to know months in advance that they will close down a plant, and yet not tell the EEs about this. For then they will not have time to look for employment elsewhere, and so they may have to endure some time of unemployment. This can lead to disastrous consequences for the former EE. For example, they may thereby be unable to pay bills, and even be thrown out of their house or apartment.

-Many people have argued that EE rights such as these should be legally enforced.

-However, Maitland is arguing AGAINST these people. He=s arguing that worker=s rights SHOULDN=T be legally enforced. This doesn’t mean that he thinks it=s OK to mistreat EEs. Indeed, he argues that the best way to treat EEs with respect is to keep these EE rights laws from being enforced. For if we REALLY respect EEs, then we will allow them the choice FORFEIT these rights if they want to.

-Why would EEs want to forfeit their rights?

-***Because they might get something they value more highly in exchange***. For example, they might forfeit their right to meaningful work in exchange for a bigger paycheck.

-But why would they need to exchange one for the other? Why can=t they be ensured of getting BOTH (say) a higher paycheck AND all meaningful work?

-Because **ensuring EE rights is expensive**. For example, it may require radically re- designing a factory in order to ensure that every employee has meaningful work. For example, what if ensuring meaningful work required eliminating human assembly lines? That would cost the company A LOT of money (costs involved in redesigning, reconstructing, re-training EEs, loss due to massive decrease in production, etc.).

-So, with the previous point, we see that there are necessarily going to be **trade-offs**: For example, trading the loss of some EE rights for higher wages, or trading the loss of some wages for more EE rights.

-But if we don=t enforce these rights by making a bunch of laws, then won=t the ERs exploit the workers, so that they won=t have any of their rights?

-No! If we don=t legally enforce EE rights, then our capitalist free market, all by itself, will ensure that EEs will get the rights they want and choose.

-We can see that this won=t happen if we consider all the possible things that could happen if an ER respected a particular EE right. It will either lead to an increase in profits, the profits staying the same, or a decrease in profits.

-If it leads to an increase in profits, then the ERs will make sure that such rights are respected, out of a motive of self-interest.

-If it leads to profits staying the same, then ERs will still be motivated to ensure these EE rights. For ERs are in competition with other ERs for good EEs. So if they don=t want to lose their good EEs to other ERs that are willing to ensure EE rights, they will ensure that their EEs get such rights.

-Finally, if it leads to a decrease in profits, then someone has to pay for it: Either (i) the ER, (ii) the EEs (by a decrease in their paycheck), or (iii) the customers (by paying for it through an increase in the price of the ER=s product).
-An ER can=t pay for it, for they will lose in the economic competition with other ERs who don=t ensure such rights. For these other, non-rights-enforcing ERs, won=t lose any of their profits that the rights-enforcing ER are losing to the costs of EE rights enforcement. But if not, then the rights-enforcing ER will go out of business.
-And the customers won=t pay for it. They are going to buy a cheaper version of the product. This, again, will lead to the ER going out of business.
-Therefore, if an EE wants a right enforced at work, then the EE is going to have to pay for it by a decrease in their paycheck.

-But different EEs want different things: Some are willing to forfeit some of their EE rights in exchange for other goods, such as a bigger paycheck. Other EEs are willing to have a smaller paycheck for the enforcement of some of their rights (e.g., meaningful work).

-But if so, then due to the competitive nature of our free market economy, these different EE preferences will ensure that there is a Amarket@ for different AEE packages@. To continue with our current example, some ERs will offer higher wages and less EE rights; other ERs will offer lower wages in exchange for more EE rights.

-And since this is so, EEs won=t be exploited in a free market capitalist system, even if their rights aren’t legally enforced. For they will be allowed to freely choose which rights they want enforced by choosing which ER to work for.

Therefore, concludes Maitland, EE rights shouldn=t be legally enforced. For (i) our free market capitalist system will ensure that no EE is overly mistreated, and (ii) EEs should be able to choose to forfeit their EE rights if they choose (for example, if they can get something that they want more in exchange, such as higher wages).

Notes on Employee Rights:Desjardins and Duska's Stuff

2008-04-06T19:06:00.001-07:00

Notes: DesJardins and Duska

D & D’s thesis: “…it is rarely legitimate to override an employee’s or [job] applicant’s right to privacy by using such tests or procedures [i.e., drug tests].”

Preliminaries:

-‘Employee right’ defined: “a presumptive moral entitlement to receive certain goods or be protected from certain harms in the workplace.”

-Such rights provide a “prima facie obligation on the part of the employer to provide the relevant goods or refrain from the relevant treatment.”

N.B.: A prima facie obligation is an obligation that one must carry out, except under certain overriding circumstances. For example, one has a prima facie obligation to respect the right to free speech that we share with other citizens. However, if (say), that person yells “Fire!” in a crowded theater (and he or she knows that there is no fire), then, under those circumstances, we do not have an obligation to respect their right to freedom: it is permissible to stop them from shouting “Fire!”.

N.B.: Notice that D & D’s definition of rights and duties include both negative and positive duties. (Cf. Duska’s paper, “Employee Rights and Duties”, for this point, as well as for several of the following points)

-Recall that every right creates a corresponding obligation/duty: if Smith has a right to (say) free speech, then others have an obligation/duty to respect Smith’s right to free speech.

-Positive rights and duties: If Smith has a positive right to X, then someone has a duty/obligation to see to it that Smith gets X (e.g., adequate housing)

-Negative rights and duties: If Smith has a mere negative right to X, then no one has a duty/obligation to see to it that Smith gets X. Rather, they are only obliged to refrain from preventing Smith from having X.

-The role that employee rights play: prevent EE’s “from being placed in the fundamentally coercive position where they must choose between their job and other basic goods.”

-The kind of relationship that exists between two (or more) people determines the kinds of things that are impermissible, permissible, and obligatory for the people in that relationship.

-The kind of relationship that exists between EE and ER, according to D & D: a contract.

-The only kinds of obligations that apply to people in a contract are those mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the people involved in the stipulations of the contract.

-The fact that the EE/ER relationship is a contractual one implies that the EE retains the right to privacy with respect to certain kinds of information. (Is this a positive or a negative right?)

-The right to privacy defined: A three-place relation between a person A, some information X, and another person B.

-Recall the point above about how the kind of relationship between two (or more) people determines the kinds of things that are impermissible, permissible, and obligatory for the people in that relationship. Now consider the three-place relation mentioned above. With these two points in mind, we see that what counts as private information will depend upon the kind of relationship that exists between the two (or more) people.

-For example, suppose that A and B are neighbors. Then A and B have a neighbor relationship. But the neighbor relationship is not the kind of relationship that allows (say) one neighbor to enter the other’s house and look around when no one is home. That is, B has a right to privacy from A with respect to B’s house and it’s contents (B’s house and it’s contents stand for the ‘X’ in the definition of the right to privacy above), and so A has a negative duty/obligation to respect that right.

-The conditions under which an employee’s right to privacy is violated: (i) B comes to possess some information X about A, and (ii) no relationship exists between A and B that would make it right for B to come to know X about A.

-But there are certain kinds of information about the EE, such that, given the contractual nature of the relationship between ER and EE, it would not be right for the ER to request or obtain such information about the EE.

-Thus, if an ER requests or obtains information about an EE that is not job relevant, then that ER does so without right or justification..

The Master argument of D & D’s paper:

1. The ER/EE relationship is contractual.
2. A contractual ER/EE relationship (as opposed to, say, the parent/child relationship) limits the kinds of information that the ER may rightfully request or obtain about the EE to that which is job relevant.
3. Information about whether the EE uses drugs is not job relevant.
4. Therefore, the ER cannot rightfully request or obtain information about whether the EE uses drugs.

Two arguments for the right of ERs to request or demand drug testing (DT) of EEs, and D & D’s replies to them:

I. The Productivity Argument:

1. EE drug use negatively affects the EE’s job performance.
2. If EE drug use negatively affects the EE’s job performance, then this will, in turn, decrease the productivity of the ER’s business.
3. If EE drug use lowers the productivity of the ER’s business, then if requesting/demanding DTs can
stop or prevent such loss in productivity, then requesting/requiring DT of EEs is job relevant.
4. Requesting/demanding DTs can stop or prevent such loss in productivity.
5. Therefore, requesting/requiring DT of EEs is job relevant.

-D & D’s responses:

-Response 1: D & D think that premise (3) is false. That is, they think that even if drug use lowers the productivity of the ER’s business, it doesn’t follow that DT is job relevant. It would follow that DT is job relevant if (and only if) the EE were required to give the ER optimal performance. But the EE is not required to give the ER optimal performance. Rather, (s)he is only required to give satisfactory performance (i.e., (s)he must exert only as much effort as it takes to do the job in a reasonable amount of time). Thus, if drug use doesn’t affect the job performance of an EE to the point that (s)he can’t do a satisfactory job, DT is not job relevant.

-Response 2: Even in cases where drug use does affect the job performance of an EE to the point that (s)he can’t do a satisfactory job, it still doesn’t follow that DT is job relevant, although it is justifiable to discipline the employee. Notice that the basis for discipline is poor performance, not drug use. But if not, then knowledge of drug use is unnecessary/irrelevant, and so we don’t have justification for overriding the EE’s prima facie right to privacy.

-The moral: The real job-relevant information is information about an EE’s job performance, not it’s underlying causes.

Therefore, the Productivity Argument is a failure.

II. The Harm Argument:

1. EE drug use is known to be a key contributor to much avoidable harm (e.g., to other EEs, to ERs, and to consumers (imagine flying in a plane that’s just been fixed by a person on LSD!).
2. If ERs request/demand DT, then they can prevent such harm.
3. If ERs can prevent such harm by requesting/demanding DT, then DT (and the information obtained by using it) is job relevant.
4. Therefore, DT is job relevant.

-D & D’s responses:

-Some concessions to the Harm Argument:
i. ERs really do have an obligation to prevent avoidable harm. They are also responsible if any such harm occurs.
ii. ERs may even have a right to reduce unreasonable risks.
iii. Therefore, D & D concede that there is at least some justification for requesting/demanding DT, (at least in some cases. See below for an explanation), if such testing is really the best way of preventing such harms (again, see below for an explanation).

-Four criticisms of the Harm Argument:

N.B.: These four criticisms amount to pointing out the need to qualify premise (3) so that it limits the job relevance of DT to a limited number of EEs and job types.

-The basic objection behind the criticisms: just because some EEs use drugs, and just because some kinds of jobs of some such EEs can affect the safety of others, it doesn’t follow that DTs are job relevant with respect to all EEs, working at every kind of job.

-Criticism 1: Drug testing should be limited to those kinds of jobs at which there is a clear and present potential for harm (e.g., pilots, bus drivers, etc.)

-Criticism 2: Drug testing should be further limited to the EEs at the jobs just mentioned who have (say) a dubious employee record, or who show visible signs of (say) intoxication.

-Criticism 3: Even in cases where the above two qualifications apply, the EEs should be informed beforehand (i.e., at the time of the origination of the ER/EE contract) that they will be tested for drug use.

-Criticism 4: EEs should be involved in the development of EE policy on DT.

-The basis for criticisms 3 and 4: (i) Recall that an EE/ER relationship is contractual. But something is a contractual relationship only if the people who bind themselves to its demands do so via informed consent. For this is the essence of a contract. But if EEs are subjected to a DT in a way that is not fully free and informed, then such subjection is in violation of the contract. (ii) If EEs are not allowed to help create DT policy, then there is a risk that the ERs will create the policy in a way that is abusive to EEs. (iii) If a contract is to be genuine, and not a mere “pose”, then the EE and ER must treat each other as equals. But if so, then if EEs aren’t allowed to participate in developing DT policy, then the balance of power, and hence the equality of treatment, could be lost, thus violating the contractual nature of the ER/EE relationship.

-The main objection to the Harm Argument: a counter-argument:

If (a) the knowledge obtained by DT doesn’t help prevent harm, or (b) the testing doesn’t provide the relevant knowledge, or (c) other, more effective, methods of obtaining the relevant knowledge exist, then DTs aren’t justified. But clauses (a) – (c) are true. Therefore, DTs aren’t justified.

-Support for (c):

-Other tests are faster, more effective, and more reliable (e.g., dexterity tests, psychological tests of judgement, perception, memory, etc.). ERs can request that some EEs take such tests before they start the job for the day.

-Support for (b):

-Even if the DTs were fast enough, still, the information they provide isn’t relevant. The relevant information has to do with whether their job performance is hazardous or otherwise unsatisfactory. This information can be obtained by dexterity and aptitude tests. Information about the underlying causes of such behavior, on the other hand, isn’t job relevant.

-The information supplied by DTs is relevant only if it’s been shown that there is a causal link between drug use and harmful behavior, which hasn’t been clearly shown.

-Even if an employee tests positively for being on drugs, such knowledge is relevant only if the use of that drug on that occasion was really a contributor to the performance problem(s).

-Support for (a):

-DTs are too slow in getting the relevant information. The harm is often done before the DT results can be obtained.

-A final concession: DT is, to some extent at least, effective as a deterrent to EE drug use:

-Most effective way to apply the test: random and regular testing.

-If DTs are carried out in this way, then they will prevent harm by:

A. Enabling the ER to discover and fire the chronic user.
B. Deterring the occasional user.

-Even though DTs, when administered in the way just suggested, can prevent harms in the ways mentioned, still, such testing is morally unacceptable. For it violates the privacy rights that apply to the EE/ER relationship. For, by the very nature of the case, random testing is done without probable cause. But then such testing clearly violates EE privacy rights. Compare: Random searching of the homes of American citizens for drugs without probable cause. Clearly, this would violate our right to privacy. But if so, then what’s the relevant difference between random testing of citizens without probable cause on the one hand, and random testing of EEs without probable cause on the other? There is no relevant difference, and so such testing is an unjustified violation of EE privacy.

-Also, it’s not a cost-effective method of preventing harm in the workplace. Dexterity tests, as well as the other tests mentioned, are much cheaper and faster.

Notes on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evan and Freeman's Stuff

2008-04-06T19:02:00.001-07:00

Notes: Evan and Freeman’s “A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism”

Main Idea: Managerial capitalism (“stockholder” theory) is now seen to be inadequate on legal and economic grounds. We must now develop and implement a Stakeholder theory of the contemporary corporation.

Thesis: “We can revitalize the concept of managerial capitalism by replacing the notion that managers have a duty to stockholders with the concept that managers bear a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders.” (p. 77)

The article has two main parts: (i) a critique of managerial capitalism (to be explained below), and (ii) a positive development of an alternative view: Stakeholder theory (to be explained below).

But first, we should get clear on some key terms and concepts of the article.

Key terms and concepts:

-Stockholder: A person or group who own a portion of a corporation, usually for the purpose of making a profit.

-Stakeholder: Groups that have a stake or claim in the firm (quote, p. 77). That is, groups and individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions (quote, p. 80)
-Wide sense: Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by a corporation (quote, p. 80)
-Narrow sense: Those groups who are vital to the survival of the survival and success of a corporation (management, owners, employees, suppliers, customers, local community) (quote, p. 80)

-Managerial capitalism: In return for controlling the firm, management vigorously pursues the interests of the stockholders. Includes the idea that management can pursue market transactions with suppliers and customers in an unconstrained manner.(Quote, pp. 77-78) Corporations are primarily responsible to their stockholders, and therefore should be run solely in the interests of the stockholders in the firm. The concerns of other groups of people are marginal at best, and should play no important role in the decisions of a corporate manager.

Main Sections of the paper:

I. The Critique of Managerial Capitalism: pp. 77-79.

A. The Legal Argument

The “Anti-Managerial Capitalism” Part of the Argument
The corporation is a legal person. But if so, then the laws that apply to persons also apply to corporations. And if this is so, then to the extent that such laws limit what corporations can do, to that extent they are limited to what they can do to maximize the profits of stockholders. These laws have become increasingly demanding in recent years. Unfortunately, managerial capitalism requires that the corporation be able to maximize the profits of stockholders without constraint. For such constraints often lead to a loss (or at least the prevention of the maximization) of profits. For example, a corporation that manufactures a product is liable for any damage or harm caused by their products, even if they have done everything they could think of to prevent it. This has led to massive lawsuits and recalls of products, which in turn has often led to severe decrease in profits (cf. The example in the article, where a U.S. car company recalled more cars in 1980 than it produced!). Therefore, recent legislation has rendered managerial capitalism an inadequate model of the contemporary corporation.

The “Pro-Stakeholder Theory” Part of the Argument
The laws mentioned above - the ones that constrain corporations - all have something in common: they protect and give rights to the groups that directly affect, and are directly affected by, the activity of corporations (i.e., employees, the communities that host corporations, suppliers, stockholders, and management. See the article, pp. 78-79 for examples of laws that give rights to each of these groups of stakeholders). In other words, they give stakeholders of corporations some influence over the ways in which such corporations conduct their business. These groups include employees, the communities that host corporations, suppliers, stockholders, and management. But this is exactly what Stakeholder theory recommends. But if so, then current law lends some support to Stakeholder theory.

Here’s the “bare bones” of the argument (logic buffs, please forgive the imprecision!):

1. The corporation is a legal person.
2. So, the laws that apply to persons also apply to corporations.
3. But if so, then to the extent that such laws limit what corporations can do, to that extent they are limited to what they can do to maximize the profits of stockholders.
4. But managerial capitalism requires that the corporation be able to maximize the profits of stockholders without constraint, since such constraints can lead to a decrease in profits (cf. The “massive car recall” example above).
5. Therefore, managerial capitalism is an inadequate model of the contemporary corporation.
6. The corporation-constraining laws mentioned above give some power to stakeholders to influence the decisions of corporate managers (although their influence is indirect: they “influence” manager decisions in the sense that such managers, when making decisions, consider the legal repercussions of violating laws and other regulation that protect them).
7. But this is just what stakeholder theory recommends.
8. Therefore, current law gives some reason for corporations to adopt the Stakeholder Model.

B. The Economic Argument

According to managerial capitalism, the corporate manager can best pursue the wishes of stockholders (profit maximization) only if it is unconstrained. The unconstrained operation of the corporation - in other words, a totally de-regulated free market economy - is also, according to managerial capitalism, supposed to bring about the best results for society. But such real-life phenomena as the free rider problem1 and the tendency of corporations to avoid competition (by creating miniature monopolies or oligarchies) show that unconstrained corporations have unacceptable negative consequences for others outside the corporation. Therefore, corporations must have constraints placed upon them. Therefore, we see once again that managerial capitalism can’t meet it’s desiderata of satisfying the wishes of stockholders by maximizing their profits. For they are constrained from doing so in various ways.

II. The Development of an Alternative Theory: Stakeholder Theory: pp. 79-84.

Stakeholder Theory: Corporations are not just responsible - or even primarily responsible - to their stockholders. Rather, corporations are responsible to a variety of groups of people, viz., stakeholders. Each of these groups of stakeholders have in common the fact that they directly affect, or are directly affected by, the corporation (management, owners, employees, suppliers, customers, local community. Read pp. 80-82 for the role and importance of each of these groups of stakeholders). No group’s needs/wishes are to be treated as more important than those of any other. The function of the corporation is to serve as a forum for the competing needs and claims of each group of stakeholders. And the corporate manager’s primary responsibility is to look after the health of the corporation by balancing and coordinating the competing needs/claims of these groups. This responsibility requires him or her to run the corporation in such a way that it benefits each group of stakeholders. For (i) as we have seen, each group is vital to the success and existence of the corporation, and (ii) failure to meet each group’s needs will result in substantial legal consequences. The legal consequences are justified, for no group (e.g., the stockholders) of stakeholders is privileged. Just as stockholders can legally retaliate against a corporation under certain circumstances (they are mistreated by the corporation in substantial ways, e.g., misappropriation of their funds), so can any other stakeholder (e.g., the local hosting community can legally retaliate if the corporation contaminates their water supplies). No stakeholder can be treated as a mere means to corporate ends (quote, p. 79), but each person must be treated as an end in themselves. This is the justifying (Kantian) moral principle of Stakeholder theory.

Notes on Globalization: Brenkert's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:58:00.002-07:00

Notes: Brenkert’s “Marketing, the Ethics of Consumption, and Less-Developed Countries”

I. Introduction

The “missionary” analogy: just as Christian missionaries came to the “New World” and sought to persuade and coerce Native Americans to accept what they believed was the one true religion and way of life – Christianity -- so contemporary marketers go into Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to persuade and coerce them into accepting what they believe is the one true view of the world and way of life – the contemporary West’s view of “commerce and marketing, economic development, and the consumer society.”

The shallow, indequate conception of marketers with respect to their responsibilities to LDCs: they think that the only relevant ethical issues with respect to dealing with LDCs are those having to do with things like “bribery, corruption, gift-giving, entertainment, market freedom, and international human rights”

The author’s criticism of the above conception: an adequate account of the ethical responsibilities to LDCs much go much deeper than that. It must also deal with issues regarding the influence of marketers on the culture and way of life of LDCs.

Topic: The moral responsibilities of marketers toward LDCs.

Thesis: “Marketers...have a moral responsibility to market products to LDCs in a manner that is ...appropriate to their cultural, economic, and social situation, ...[and] also meet[s] other demands on behalf of the integrity of their cultures.” (532)

Broader implications of the thesis: it has implications for the more general topic of the ethics of “the transfer of marketing practices of one society to another society, when the use of such practices is to promote consumer societies in the mode of their own society and culture.”

II. Marketing, Consumer Societies, and the Ethics of Consumption

Brenkert’s coneception of ‘Marketing’ , for the purposes of this article: advertising and other promotional components of marketing, as well as product development, research, and forms of distribution.

First key point: The techniques and concepts of the above aspects of marketing are not neutral, but are “value-laden and metaphysically charged”.
Some of the values that marketing presupposes:
-consumption is good and abstention is bad
-consumption is essential to happiness, acceptance, and status
-individual freedom is just the lack of restraint
-denying oneself of satisfying one’s desires is pointless; one should engage in instant- gratification whenever one feels like it.
-one’s behavior should be guided primarily by considerations of self-interest and the satisfaction of individual wants and needs
–people are inherently acquisitive
-marketers should pursue market growth relentlessly, even if it requires undermining social conventions and boundaries, customs, and traditions

Some of the metaphysical presuppositions of marketing:
-people are defined by what they possess and consume; a person’s “sense of self comes from what that person possesses.”
-people are essentially consumers; people can’t flourish as human beings unless they live a life of acquiring consumer goods.

Second key point: Most non-Western cultures don’t accept the above values; nor do they accept the above metaphysical assumptions about human beings and human flourishing.

For example, many cultures accept the following values:
-human fulfillment and human nature is only discovered when one renounces one’s material possessions.
-self-denial is required for living a happy, healthy life

But if so, then engaging in West-style marketing involves undermining the underlying beliefs and values of LDCs, and replacing them with the beliefs and values of the consumer-oriented societies of the West.

Consumer societies presuppose an “ethics of consumption”, which consists in the following theses:
-Products are for individual satisfaction. More satisfaction is better than less satisfaction, and immediate gratification is better than delayed gratification.
-There is a close connection between consumerism and self-esteem. A person’s identity is bound up with the products she owns or uses. Human happiness and welfare depends in large part upon the consumption of goods.
-Individuals have a right to choose freely among all the products produced. Thus, the free market plays a central role in the ethics of consumption. This implies restricted government intervention.
-Material success is a dominant goal in a consumer society.
-Products are acquired by the exchange of money. Their price captures their interchangeability. Consumers need have little knowledge of how or where the objects they consume are produced.
-The world is a collection of resources whose primary value lies in their use for consumption according to the preceding precepts.

Therefore, marketing to LDCs involves the introduction of the ethics of consumption, and its corresponding vision of “the good life” as the consumer lifestyle to such countries. Such an ethic and vision of the good life often differs radically with that of the LDCs in which it is introduced.

Thus, marketing involves modifying societies and cultures accordingly.

But if so, then the question arises: what moral responsibilities, if any, do marketers have to the societies and cultures they affect?

III. The Contradictory Positions of Business Ethicists

-The contradictory position of philosophical business ethicists:
-philosophical business ethicists tend to be ethical universalists. That is, they believe that there are moral values and principles that apply to all people. Call this the “first dimension” of ethical principles.
-However, they also allow for some moral values and principles that only apply to individual cultures, and which other cultures might reject. Call this the “second dimension” of ethical principles. Philosophical ethicists argue that marketers should respect this second ethical dimension in LDCs.
-Brenkert argues that such ethicists ignore a “third dimension” of ethical principles, viz., the effect of Western marketing and business activities on the culture and society in which they take place.
-The problem is that such ethicists argue that it is morally permissible for marketers to engage in marketing in ways that undermine an LDCs second dimension of ethical principles: they fail to see that there is a third dimension of ethics, and that it can undermine principles of the second dimension in an LDC
-Thus, they hold to a contradictory business ethic.

-The contradictory position of marketing business ethicists:
-marketing business ethicists tend to be ethical relativists. That is, they think that ethical codes vary from culture to culture, and that a person should obey they ethical code of any given society to which they go.
-Applying this to marketers, they say that marketers should engage in behaviors and activities that are consistent with the ethical code in which they are marketing.
-However, Western marketing practices tend to undermine the undermining beliefs and values that exist in the LDCs in which they engage in marketing (recall the “ethics of consumption”, and how it often conflicts with the ethics of LDCs)
-Thus, the hold to a contradictory business ethic: one which both encourages that marketers both conform to and fail to conform to the ethical codes of LDCs.

-The underlying assumption that both types of ethicisits accept, and which generates the contradiction: ethics and economics don’t overlap. But this assumption is false, as we have just seen.

IV. Criticisms of Marketing in LDCs (The Central Section of the Paper: Brenkert’s Argument)

-Preliminaries: four points of clarification
-1: Brenkert is not arguing that changing the culture and society of an LDC is inherently wrong, or that we shouldn’t bring modern goods to such societies. Indeed, marketers have positively benefitted societies in many ways. Rather, he is concerned solely with (a) the ways in which marketers transform the cultures of LDCs, and (b) the questionable ethical character of changing them in ways that conform to the Western consumerist culture.

-2: He is not arguing that marketing to LDCs is wrong because cultures are unique, and that the mere altering of a unique culture is inherently wrong. Indeed, he thinks that certain sorts of change are often desirable, and that cultures are dynamic, not static. He is also not saying that all aspects of a culture are beyond moral criticism. Rather, his focus is on LDC cultures that already conform to basic, “international moral norms, but which differ from Western consumer cultures”.

-3: He assumes that cultures are things that may be “worthy of respect, for its own intrinsic value.” Since cultures are structures in which groups of people shape and define their humanity, sense of place, and meanings, to destroy or alter a culture is potentially to destroy or alter something of inherent value. Therfore, marketers should be concerned with respect for culture.

-4: Respect for culture requires at least the following four conditions:
-i: Understanding: one can’t respect a culture that one doesn’t understand (e.g., its values and assumptions about human flourishing)
-ii. Nondisruption: Respect for culture requires that marketers not undermine or otherwise hinder important cultural values and goals.
-iii. Consideration: Respect for culture requires that marketers include values of the culture of an LDC in marketing decisions. Also, they shouldn’t make decisions that would alter or hinder such values.
-iv. Moral bounds: Respect for culture must be consistent with behavior that conforms to international moral norms.

-The question clarified, in light of the preceding: its focus is on “those marketing activities that may impinge upon and undercut the values of distinct cultures, for these affect the self-understanding and definition of people in the other society in ways that fail to show them respect.”

-The criticisms:
-1: The “homogenization” objection: Western marketing homogenizes the moral identities of LDCs, so that they all conform the Western consumerist morality (recall the “ethics of consumption”). “When these cultures are altered such that people come to see themselves as consumers whose wants and needs require Western-style products and levels of consumption, the value of their own culture wanes.”
-Marketers foster the ethics of consumption in LDCs
-The people in that culture thereby come to desire levels that are unattainable and unsustainable in their culture.
-Also, the ethics of consumption was not originally valued by the indigenous people of the LDC
-“This approach to marketing does not take seriously the people or cultures it modifies. Instead, it treats the cultures of such societies and individuals simply as means or vehicles, which may be used, or must be overcome, to promote the economic ends of marketers.”

-2: The “unfulfillability” objection: Western marketers promote “a form of society and a set of aspirations that people in LDCs will not be able to fulfill.”
-The quantity and quality of Western-style consumer goods and services cannot be universally enjoyed, since the world lack the requisite level of natural resources.
-But if so, then marketers are cultivating desires and aspirations in the people of LDCs that will necessarily remain frustrated.
-Also, , even if we had enough natural resources for everyone to enjoy the luxuries of the West, the vast majority of people will never have the requisite income or credit to enjoy such things.
-This shows disrespect to LDC cultures by failing to promote attainable forms of economic development.
-Finally,. Marketers should show respect to LDC cultures by respecting their value of frugality, and not see it as an obstacle to be removed.

-3: The “undercutting indigenous values and replacing them with questionable values” objection: When marketers promote the ethics of consumption in LDCs. They “indercut important traditional sources of meaningfulness, while offering forms of meaning in consumption that have proven to be of questionable value in the Western countries.”

-“The consumer’s fallacy”: the claim that we do not even begin to live until we have the right or approved kind of food bought in a good store, fashionable clothing, and a cave as good as our neighbors….We live when we have as many of these and other goods as our fortune will allow or our stratagems create.”

-the faulty basis of the fallacy: the assumption that “happiness is a function of the goods we possess and the things we consume.”

-why the consumer’s fallacy really is a fallacy: ordinary observation confirms that most people who pursue life with this assumption at the center are unhappy, unfulfilled, and unsatisfied.

Conclusion: “If the preceding objections are acceptable, it follows that marketers do indeed have moral responsibilities to market products to LDCs in a manner that is not only appropriate to their cultural, economic, and social situation, but which also meet other demands on behalf of the integrity of their culture(S).”

V. Implications for Marketers

-Obligation to preserve cultural values of LDCs
-Obligation not to insist on/force entry of a marketer into a culture that resists it for reasons of cultural preservation. Also, obligated to not stand in the way/interfere if a culture attempts to adopt measures to preserve their culture.
-“Marketers require an account of the compatibility (or incompatibility) of their activities with the culture of the societies in which they are active” (533) This involves:
-“identifying the essentials of that culture” (533)
-“attempting to anticipate the consequences their activities will have on them” (533)
-Marketers have an obligation to know which features of a culture are permissible to change, and which aren’t.

Notes on Corporate Social Responsibility: Bowie's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:58:00.001-07:00

Notes: “Kantian Business Ethics”, by Norman Bowie

The basic picture: Spell out the basics of Kant’s ethical theory and apply it to business contexts. The claim is that Kantian ethics has much to contribute to business ethics.

The paper at a glance: the labels of the main sections of the paper, and the main idea covered in each such section:

-Section 1: “Background” (pp. 3-4): Discussion of some rudimentary biographical facts about Immanuel Kant, as well as the main concepts that make up the basis of his ethical theory.

-The highest good is the Good Will (i.e., acting with the sole intention (or, motive) of doing one’s duty).

-So, it is the intention, or motive, of an action, and not it’s consequences, that determine if an act is morally right or wrong.

-Preliminaries to discussion of the Categorical Imperative:

-Maxim: a principle or basis of action. Maxims have the following formal structure: “Do action A in circumstances of kind C for purpose P”. (e.g., “Make a phone call whenever you have the urge, and are not in class, for the purpose of making others think that you are usually available when they need you.” ). They therefore specify (i) an action, (ii) a set of circumstances in which the action should be performed, and (iii) a purpose or goal which your are trying to achieve by the action.

-Imperative: a command (e.g., “You ought to help elderly women cross the street.”; or, “You should not lie to people.”). There are two kinds of imperatives:

-Hypothetical imperative: a command that you should obey if doing so will help you get something you want or desire. They have the form, “If you want X, then you should do Y”. (e.g., “If you want good grades, then you should study hard”.).
-Notice that your obligation to obey a hypothetical command depends on whether or not you want the thing specified in the first part of the command: If you don’t want that thing, then you have no obligation to obey the command.

-Categorical Imperative: A command that you have to obey no matter what, even if obeying the command won’t satisfy any of your desires or wants. Categorical imperatives have the form, “Do X”: there are no ifs, ands, or buts (e.g., “don’t murder”; or “be honest when you are talking to your parents”). These are the only kinds of imperatives that apply to morality.

-The three formulations of the Categorical Imperative (‘CI’, as the teacher calls it):
-1st Formulation (“The Formulation of Universal Law” (‘FUL’)): Act only on maxims which you can will to be universal laws of nature.

-2nd Formulation (“The Formulation of Humanity” (‘FH’)): Always treat the humanity in a person as an end, and never as a means merely.

-3rd Formulation (“The Formulation of the Kingdom of Ends” (‘FKE’)): So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which you were both subject and sovereign at the same time.

-Only humans can act freely: they have free will.

-This allows them to act rationally: they can freely choose to act according to the dictates of reason.

-And this, in turn, allows them to act morally: because we are rational, we can use reason to discover true, universal moral rules; and because we are free, we can choose to follow those rules.

-Section 2: “The Self-Defeating Nature of Immoral Actions” (pp. 4-7): Discussion of the 1st formulation of the Categorical Imperative, and some of its implications for business ethics.

-Preliminaries: the idea of universalizing a maxim, and the two kinds of contradictions that can be generated from a universalized maxim:

-Universalizing a maxim: taking one of your personal maxims and conceiving of a world in which that maxim become a law that everyone knew about and had to obey.

-when universalizing a maxim generates a logical contradiction: when you attempt to universalize the maxim, the key concept in the maxim becomes incoherent/logically contradictory.

-when universalizing a maxim generates a practical contradiction: obeying the maxim wouldn’t work as a means to achieve the purpose or goal in the maxim.

-The Universalizability Test implied by the FUL: Suppose you are considering doing some action, and are wondering if it is morally permissible to do that action. To find out if it really is morally permissible, try to universalize the maxim upon which the action is based. If you can universalize that maxim without generating a logical contradiction or a practical contradiction, then the action is morally permissible. But if you can’t universalize it without generating one of the two types of contradiction, then it is not morally permissible.

-Notice that saying that an action fails the universalizability test is not to say that the action has bad consequences. ***Consequences have nothing to do with morality in Kantian ethics.***

-The 1st Formulation of CI is a principle of “fair play”.

-Sample applications of the FUL to business contexts:

-Theft of company goods by employers, customers or managers: FUL says that it’s morally impermissible, since it can’t be universalized.

-Breaking contracts: impermissible, since it can’t be universalized. Generates a practical contradiction.

-An objection from Hegel and from Bradley:

-Korsgaard’s reply:

-Another objection: contract-breaking happens all the time in the business world. Yet people still engage in making contracts. But Kant’s universalizability test would seem to imply that contract-breaking would generate a practical contradiction: if we universalized the maxim of breaking contracts, then no one would enter into contracts, since they knew that no one would honor them. Therefore, Kant’s universalizability test is shown to be false and worthless.

-reply: No. The objection fails to appreciate that a threshold level of contract-breaking frequency must be reached before the act of contract-breaking won’t work as a means of achieving certain ends. But that threshold hasn’t been crossed.

-Section 3: “Treating Stakeholders as Persons” (pp. 7-10): Discussion of the 2nd formulation of the Categorical Imperative, and some of its implications for business ethics.

-Preliminaries:

-Two kinds of value: instrumental and intrinsic.

-Instrumental value: “Instrument value”, or “tool value”: If something has mere instrumental value, then it is valuable only to the extent that you can use it (as an “instrument” or “tool”) to get something else. As soon as such a thing becomes useless, it is considered worthless. E.g., cars, doorstops, and in general, inanimate objects have mere instrumental value).

-Intrinsic value: If something has intrinsic value, then it retains its value even if it is completely useless. In other words, it doesn’t have value in virtue of its usefulness as a tool. Kant argued that people have intrinsic value, in virtue of their possessing free will and rationality (which, in turn, enables them to act rationally, and therefore, morally). Their free will and rationality gives them inherent worth and dignity.

-treating someone as a mere means to an end: this is the same thing as treating someone as though they had mere instrumental value (“tool” value). That is, treating them as a mere thing, to be used as one sees fit, and then abandoning them when your done using them.

-treating someone as an end in themselves: This is the same as treating someone as though they had intrinsic value. According to Kant, if something has intrinsic value, then you can’t treat them like an inanimate object, to be used at your disposal. A thing with intrinsic value is priceless, and can’t be used or manipulated to suit your own ends. Rather, you must respect a bearer of intrinsic value, and seek to benefit it. Again, Kant believed that all persons have intrinsic value.

-Negative freedom: freedom from deception and coercion.

-Positive freedom: freedom to develop one’s human capacities (e.g., the capacities for rationality and morality)

-The FH implies another test for moral permissibility/impermissibility: The Respect for Persons test: If an act violates a person’s positive or negative freedom, then it is morally impermissible. But if it doesn’t, then it’s morally permissible.

-violating someone’s negative freedom amounts to deceiving or coercing them.

-violating someone’s positive freedom amounts to hindering their rational or moral development.

-Sample applications of the Respect for Persons test in business contexts:

-Caveat: Doesn’t imply that commercial transactions are immoral. For even though you treat someone as a means to an end in such transactions (e.g., to increase profits), you don’t thereby treat them as a mere means. For if the transaction is consensual and voluntary by all parties involved, then although they are being used as a means, they aren’t used as a mere means. And the respect for persons test only rules out treating others as mere means.

-Application 1: Can’t coerce or deceive an employee or boss.

-Application 2: employers can’t be secretive about the company’s financial records. Leads to an unequal balance of power, which can then lead to an abuse of power against employees. Businesses need to practice open book management. Equal access to the company’s information.

-Application 3: employers need to create work for employees that is meaningful, and which makes possible and encourages the development of their human capacities. For example:

-allow the employees to exercise responsibility, power, creativity.

-some conditions of meaningful employee work:
1) is freely chosen and provides opportunities for the worker to exercise autonomy on the job
2) supports the autonomy and rationality of human beings: work that lessens autonomy or that undermines rationality is immoral.
3) provides a salary sufficient to exercise independence and provide for physical well-being and the satisfaction of some of the worker’s desires.
4) enables a worker to develop rational capacities.
5) does not interfere with a worker’s moral development.

-managers are morally required by Kant’s ethics to provide such meaningful work, based on the 2nd formulation (FH), and the Respect for Persons test it implies.

-Application 4: downsizing and massive layoffs: permissible? An open question. Depends on a number of factors.

-Section 4: “The Business Firm as a Moral Community” (pp. 10-12): Discussion of the 3rd formulation of the Categorical Imperative, and some of its implications for business ethics.

-The 3rd formulation of CI, the FKE, implies that the rules of a business must be universally endorsable by all rational agents. This follows from the dignity and respect that applies to persons (since they have intrinsic value, due to their free will and capacity for rationality)

-But if so, then the FKE implies at least 7 principles of company organization (see text, p. 10, for the statement of the principles).

-Implication 2 of the FKE for business: the imperfect duty of beneficence and corporate social responsibility: Kant argued that someone benefits you, then you have an obligation to benefit them in return. But corporations benefit greatly from society: (i) society protects businesses by providing the means to enforce their contracts; (ii) society provides the requisite infrastructure for the normal functioning of a business (roads, sanitation facilities, police and fire departments); (iii) it provides an educated workforce (that’s you guys!) that is necessary for a successful business. Therefore, since businesses benefit from society in these ways, they have an obligation to benefit society in return. This probably implies that it should stop engaging in “creative” techniques in tax evasion.

-Implication 3: management must adopt a “Theory Y” account of human nature. Employees tend to behave according to the way they are treated, so treat them as though they were responsible, active, initiative-takers.

-Implication 4: decentralize and democratize the company’s power structure. No authoritarian hierarchy of power. All stakeholders (e.g., stockholders, employees) must participate in company decisions and policies. No blind following of orders.

-Section 5: “The Purity of Motive” (pp. 12-13): Discussion of a major objection to the application of Kantian ethics to business, as well as the author’s replies to the objection.

-The objection: If Kantianism is true, then an act is considered moral only if it is purely morally motivated: if an act is tainted by partially selfish motives, then that act is immoral. But even the most morally upright CEO makes decisions that are at least partially motivated by considerations of self-interest (e.g., profitability). But if so, then Kantianism implies that no business can be conducted in a way that satisfies the demands of morality, which is absurd.
-Reply 1: That’s right. Kant was mistaken in thinking that a moral action could contain no self-interested motives. But we can revise his account by allowing for such motives. As long as the maxim behind an act meets the demands of universalizability, respect for persons, and universal endorsibility, then the act is moral. There is no need to go further and say that the agent’s motives must be “pure” in this sense.

-Reply 2: People naively think that if a business makes decisions in order to increase profits, then it is necessarily acting according to their own self-interest. But this is false. Businesses are usually making such profitable decisions out of an obligation to stockholders, to obey contracts with the public, and to abide by charters of incorporation.

-Reply 3: It’s probably in a business’s best interest to strive for purity of motive, even if we drop it as an obligation. Businesses should abandon “bottom line” thinking: “perhaps we should view profits as a consequence of good business practices instead of a goal of business.” (p. 13)

-Section 6: “Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and International Business” (pp. 13-16): An argument that Kantian ethics, if applied to international business, will lead to a universal, minimal, “market morality”, as well as contributing to world peace.

Notes on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Critique of Friedmam

2008-04-06T18:54:00.000-07:00

Part I: the nature of rights
-positive rights
-negative rights
-the reciprocity thesis

Part II: the rights-based defense of the extreme free market view, and the authors’ criticisms.
-the argument from the right to individual liberty
-the right to liberty is the right to be free from human interference in one’s pursuits.
-but this implies that humans are free to enter into any economic transactions that they desire.
-but then this implies that no one, including the government, can interfere with one’s entering into such transactions. Their role is limited to ensuring that no one interferes with this liberty, and so ensuring that the economic activities of businesses stay free of coercion and fraud.

-critique of the argument:
-There is no such thing as a general right to liberty
-obviously, I don’t have a right to swing a baseball bat when another human being is within the radius of such a swing!
-So there are limits to individual liberty.
-But, as stated, the argument for the extreme market view depends on the right to liberty being completely general and unrestricted. So it fails as stated.
-But even if we modify the argument so that it is only based on a specific right to liberties that are compatible with the extreme market view, those liberties would come into conflict with other rights.

-the argument from the right to private property
-The right to private property is the right of a property owner to do whatever they want with that property.
-the constraints of government regulations (and some moral constraints) interfere with such a right: they interfere with your right to do whatever you want with your property
-So, such moral and governmental constraints conflict with the right to private property, and so need to be eliminated.
-But this is just to say that the right to private property implies that the extreme free market view is justified.

-critique of the argument
(1) There are many ways in which the right to private property comes into conflict with other rights (or the rights of others!), and so there are many cases that show that there are limits on the right to private property.
(2) To find out what these limits are, we need to look at some key justifications for the right to private property. Three key arguments for the right are:
(I) Utility: Allowing people a right to private property motivates them to work hard and be productive. If everyone is highly productive, then this will create more jobs and more goods and services. And this, in turn, means that their overall standard of living will increase.
(II) Autonomy: if we can’t own land and other kinds of property, then we will be dependent on others for our well-being. But if so, then to that extent, we are not autonomous. But autonomy is a necessary condition for a worthwhile life. Conversely, if we can (and do) own property, then to that extent we are independent of others, autonomus and capable of human flourishing.
(III) Fairness: It is only fair to be able to receive the “return” or outcome of your labor.
(3) Now if someone exercises a right in such a way that the exercise of that right conflicts with the justifications of that right, then this is obviously unacceptable. But the exercise of the right to private property - when exercised in an extreme free market - can conflict with the justification of that very right.
-So if a business owner uses her company in a way that is unfair to others, then her justification for that right is defeated.
-And if a business owner uses her company in a way that diminishes the autonomy of others, then her justification for that right is defeated.
-Finally, if a business owner uses her company in a way that diminishes the overall utility in a society, then her justification for that right is defeated.

Notes on Corporate Social Responsibility: Milton Friedman

2008-04-06T18:49:00.001-07:00

Notes on Friedman’s Article

Thesis: The only responsibility of businesses is to increase its profits, without fraud or deception. (close paraphrase)

The Agency Argument: When performing her role as an executive, a businessperson is an employee of the owners of the business where she works (e.g., stockholders). Therefore, as an employee - as their agent - she is obligated to run the business in accordance with the express wishes of these business owners, for they are her employers. Now the owners’ general wish is for the business to make as much money as possible (within legal limits). Therefore, the executive is obligated to run the business in such a way that it makes as much money as possible. But if she tries to practice social responsibility as a business person, then she is acting against the interests of the business owners. For practicing such corporate social responsibility will not result in the business making as much money as possible. Therefore, if she practices corporate social responsibility, she will violate her obligation to the business owners, and would therefore be acting wrongly.

The Taxation Argument (also known as the “In Principle” Argument): If a corporate executive practices broad social responsibility, then this is tantamount to forcing the business owners to contribute to the common good against their will (by spending their investments on public causes without their consent). For all intents and purposes, the corporate executive has illegitimately taken on a function reserved solely for governmental institutions (where the members of the government are publicly elected to represent their interests when they spend some of their money): in effect, he’s engaging in taxation without representation. Historically, Americans have seen this as immoral (remember the Boston Tea Party?). Therefore, executives shouldn’t practice broad social responsibility.

The Effectiveness Argument (also known as the “In Consequences” Argument): Corporate executives aren’t trained to do the difficult work of broad social responsibility. But if not, then if they try to do it, then they make things worse, not better. As Friedman says of a hypothetical, conscientious CEO who wants to practice broad social responsibility by trying to fight inflation:

“How is he to know what action of his will contribute to that end? He is presumably an expert in running his company - in producing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his selection makes him an expert on inflation. Will his holding down the price of his product reduce inflationary pressure? Or, by leaving more spending power in the hands of his customers, simply divert it elsewhere? Or, by forcing him to produce less because of the lower price, will it simply contribute to shortages?” (P. 10)

The “Undermines Freedom” Argument:

-When influential businesspeople give speeches of the need for corporate social responsibility, it re-enforces the popular belief that pursuit of profit is morally wrong, and needs to be curbed by government control. But once the government gets involved, these businessmen, and all involved in the market, will have to conform to the dictates of bureaucrats.

-The free market system is founded upon the right to private property ownership. This allows individuals to be free of external control and coercion by others – no one can manipulate a private property owner by threatening to kick them off of their property and take it away from them if they don’t do as they say, for they own the property!1 This, in turn, means that if individuals are to cooperate to receive a benefit, such cooperation is always and only voluntarily and freely entered into and sustained. One can enter and leave such a group activity whenever they please. No one can force another to conform to their will. But if the government is allowed to control the market by forcing businesses to practice social responsibility, they are, in effect, undermining the freedom derived from the right to private property ownership, and forced to conform to their dictates.

Objection #1: “The problems are too urgent to leave to the slow political process. The effect of CEOs practicing Broad Social Responsibility (BSR) is much quicker. Therefore, they should practice BSR.”

Reply: This is saying, in effect, that the advocates of this idea have failed to persuade the majority of their cause by means of the democratic political process, and now they want to override democracy and impose their views on the majority. This is obviously unethical.

Objection #2: “But it’s just good business to practice BSR. For example, “donat[ing] resources to providing amenities to [a host community of a business], or improving its government.”“2 This will attract desirable employees, lesson losses from pilferage, etc.3 But if so, then it’s in the interests of the business to practice BSR.”

Reply 1: Yes, but then such practices are justified on grounds of self-interest, and not on grounds of the supposed need to practice BSR.

Reply 2: If a CEO understands the truth of reply 1, and yet still portrays themself to the public as doing these things out of a motive to practice BSR, then they are acting like hypocrites, and are “approaching fraud”4.

Notes on Affirmative Action: Murray vs. Dworkin

2008-04-06T18:45:00.000-07:00

The Anti-AA Paper:

Charles Murray: “Affirmative Racism”

-the new racism: blacks are temporarily (i.e., until the benefits of AA kick in) less competent than whites
-why it’s a form of racism: like the older form, it has the key feature of treating blacks differently than whites: they aren’t treated as equals.
-the new racism is directly caused by a form of preferential treatment (PT) enacted through AA.
-therefore, AA is in this way (and others. See below) making things worse for blacks in particular and society in general; it is not making things better.
-the new racism is especially prevalent among affluent white elites.
-the new racism is focused on blacks
-the effects of the new racism can be just as bad as those of the old racism.

-the two components of the new racism:
-the belief component:
-the “global” component of their view of blacks: this aspect of their beliefs is generally ok and acceptable: blacks must be allowed and enabled to achieve full equality.
-the “local” component of their view of blacks: (the unacceptable aspect of their beliefs) in actual fact, and through no fault of their own (but through unfair treatment in the past and present, via racism and unequal opportunity), they haven’t yet reached full equality.
-they believe that the black professionals that they run into at work and in social circles aren’t “on the average, up to the white standard.” (252)
-they think of blacks as a “commodity”: “the office must have a sufficient supply of blacks, who must be treated with the utmost delicacy” (ibid.)
-the behavioral component: blacks aren’t treated as equals.
-refuse blacks an education they would’ve otherwise have gotten (must read the article to see what the author means by this – it’s not what you think).
-stick blacks in dead-end jobs (must read the article to see what the author means by this).

-a result of the new racism: “the personnel problems this creates are more difficult than most because whites barely admit to themselves what’s going on.” (ibid.)

-A key argument: AA has, in fact, led to a performance gap between blacks and non-minorities. The following is an account of how the performance gap is created. There is a hierarchy of groups of universities and colleges with respect to quality and prestige, and there is a corresponding hierarchy of groups of school applicants with respect to abilities and qualifications. Each group of schools has a set of spaces set aside for black candidates to fill each year, but there aren’t enough qualified black applicants to fill all of the spaces. So, in order to fill its spaces, the top group of schools takes students from the group of applicants that are “second best” with respect to overt qualifications. This results in a corresponding lack of qualified black applicants for the next group of schools in the hierarchy, in which case they have to select black applicants from the next best qualified pool of applicants, and so on all the way down to the “bottom” group of schools and of applicants. The result is that (i) at each level in the hierarchy of schools, black students aren’t being allowed to “compete” with their academic peers, but with those selected from a more “qualified” group of applicants (unlike, e.g., white students, who aren’t directly affected by the admission process in the way outlined above). This leads to (ii) the false and harmful impression that black students are academically inferior to (e.g.) their white peers.

The Pro-AA Papers:

Ronald Dworkin: “Affirmative Action: Does it Work?”

Summary: Dworkin spends most of his paper utilizing the results of a monumental, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities – The Shape of the River, by William Bowen and Derek Bok – to develop an argument that, as has been borne out in actual fact, AA does much more good than harm, contrary to the claims of AA’s critics. He also briefly argues that AA is not wrong as a matter of principle. For it violates no individual rights; nor does it compromise some moral principle.

Basic progression of the paper:

I. Preliminaries: the basic arguments and issues stated; pointing out the importance of the new Shape of the River study.

Two strands of the debate about AA
-An issue of principle: AA is unfair because it violates the right of every applicant to be judged solely on the basis of their individual merits.
-An issue of policy or practical consequences: AA does more harm than good. For (i) it enrolls some blacks in academic studies beyond their capacities; (ii) it stigmatizes all blacks as inferior; and (iii) it makes society more, rather than less, conscious of race.

A premise commonly accepted by proponents on both sides of the dispute: AA is fair if it does substantial good for (a) those it was originally intended to benefit or (b) the community as a whole. If not, then it is unfair. For then the damage it does to the admissions prospects of other qualified applicants would then be pointless.

A common pro-AA argument: race-sensitive policies of certain sorts are essential, in the short run, for eliminating or diminishing the impact of race in the long run.

A common reply from anti-AA proponents: AA has been (in fact) counterproductive:
-It has “sacrificed” rather than helped blacks admitted to university programs, perpetuating a sense of black inferiority.
-It promotes black separatism and a race-conscious society rather than black integration and a genuinely colorblind society.

Dworkin’s analysis of this debate: both groups (anti and pro AA) rely on a factual premise for which they give little evidence, viz., anecdotal or introspective reports of isolated incidents of racial harmony/disharmony caused by/hindered by AA.

The new study that remedies the lack of support of the factual premise: The Shape of the River: An extremely thorough, rigorous study of the effects of AA in top universities.

Dworkin’s key point: The Shape of the River report provides extremely strong evidence for the pro-AA position by supporting the factual premise of the pro-AA argument from policy/ practical consequences: the study shows beyond reasonable doubt that AA has substantially benefited students and society.

II. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 1:

-1. AA does not accept unqualified blacks. (contrary to Murray’s claim)

-2. Blacks do not typically waste the opportunity they are offered. They would not be better off in less demanding institutions.

III. Bringing the findings of the study to bear on the argument from practical consequences, part 2:

-3. AA has produced a substantial number successful black businessmen, professionals, and community leaders.

-4. Racial diversity in a university’s student body helps to break down stereotyping and hostility among the students. This benefit endures in post-university life.

-5. AA does not damage blacks by unduly insulting or mortifying them; nor does it destroy their self-respect, or poison the black image. (contrary to Murray’s claim)

-6. The proportion of blacks in prestigious institutions cannot be maintained if AA were abandoned and race-neutral standards were used instead.

-7. The United States is better off, judged strictly by the outcome, because its most selective universities and colleges have practiced AA over the past thirty years.

IV. Answering the anti-AA arguments that AA violates the rights of whites and other candidates who are denied admission, as well as the rights of the few blacks who feel insulted from AA.

-preliminary point: even if we granted, for the sake of argument, that this argument is correct, the damage caused by AA toward such people is extremely small. It would only increase the chances of admission for whites from 25% to 26.5%.
-what is meant by “qualifications”? 3 interpretations:
-having some physical or intellectual quality
-backward-looking qualifications: prior achievement
-forward-looking qualifications: promise of success
-the 3rd kind of qualification is the relevant one for university admissions.
-the kind of promise of future success that is relevant depends upon the goals of a given university.
-academic ability and achievement is not (nor was it ever) the sole goal or indicator that universities consider.
-universities has long recognized, and the Shape of the River study shows, that two key goals of universities are well served by including race as a qualification and indicator of meeting the goals of a university;
-the goal of diversity
-the goal of making our collective, social life in America more just and harmonious.

Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: Arrington's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:41:00.000-07:00

Arrington: “Advertising and Behavior Control”

The main thesis and basic structure of the article: Arrington criticizes common arguments against the ethical propriety of advertising -- in particular, those that argue that ads undermine our autonomy.

Main sections of the paper: “a reader’s guide”:

-pp. 369-370: a discussion of several of the main techniques of influencing the consumer- techniques that, some have argued, undermine human autonomy in ways that are morally unacceptable.
-puffery
-indirect information transfer
-subliminal advertising

-p. 370, bottom: The central question of the paper is raised: Do such techniques undermine autonomy? (Note the implication that both the critics and Arrington accept: if ads undermine human autonomy, then it is morally wrong to use such ads to sell products).

-pp. 371-372, first column: some initial arguments - offered by others - for the moral legitimacy of each of the above-mentioned techniques in advertising (i.e., puffery, etc.), and some initial criticisms of them - again by others.

-p. 372, third and fourth full paragraphs: The preliminary diagnosis: The central question cannot be answered either way until we have a better understanding of the notion of autonomy itself. (Notice: This is one of Lippke’s main points as well. However, whereas Arrington will argue that a fuller understanding of the nature of autonomy shows that ads don’t undermine it, Lippke will reach the opposite conclusion. How did they come to such different conclusions? You will notice that it is largely because they have different notions of autonomy (Lippke’s notion of autonomy is more robust than Arrington’s). You should therefore make sure you understand exactly how their respective notions of autonomy differ. You should also decide for yourself which view of autonomy is more accurate.).

-pp. 372-376: Analyzing (i) the several different aspects of autonomy, (ii) the main arguments for the immorality of ads (each of which is based on the claim that ads undermine one of these aspects of autonomy), and (iii) Arrington’s criticisms of these arguments.
-pp. 372-373: Autonomous desire:
-pp. 373-374: rational desire and choice:
-pp. 374-375: Free choice:
-pp. 375-376: Control or manipulation:

-p. 376, 1st column, last full paragraph: conclusion: arguments rarely undermine aspects of autonomy. But if so, then they don’t intrinsically undermine autonomy.

The different aspects of autonomy, the arguments for the immorality of ads, and Arrington’s criticisms of them:

-Autonomous desire:
-Hayek: Autonomous desires aren’t just those that are not culturally induced. For if they were, then the only autonomous desires would be those for, e.g., food, shelter, sex, etc. But this is absurd (surely many of our other desires, e.g., for music of certain sorts, are autonomous, even though they are culturally induced).
But if so, then the mere fact that desires induced by ads are culturally induced doesn’t entail that they aren’t autonomous.
-Frankfurt:
-first-order desire: a desire for something that isn’t a desire (e.g., pizza, companionship, etc.)
-second-order desire: desire to have/not have a desire.
-the criterion of autonomous desire: S’s first-order desire B is autonomous iff S has a second-order desire, A, to have B.
-If we apply Frankfurt’s criterion of autonomous desire to ad-induced desires, we get the result that ads usually don’t create non-autonomous desires. For I typically don’t repudiate ad-induced desires – I don’t desire that I lose such desires. But if not, then by Frankfurt’s criterion, such desires are autonomous.
-This point also shows that most subliminal ads don’t create non-autonomous desires.
-Responding to Baybrooke: Baybrooke’s argues that if I might choose differently if I were given more information and options, then my desires about the chosen product are not autonomous. But since we would often have chosen differently given more info., it follows that our desires for many products are not autonomous. Arrington responds by saying that Baybrooke’s principle is absurd. For since it is true of virtually all of our desires, it absurdly implies that none of our desires are autonomous.
-Rational desire and choice:
-Baybrooke: Ads either (i) prevent me from following my rational will or (i) prevent me from developing into a fully rational agent. My ad-induced desires aren’t the result of my applying my rational will – I am not given all the information about a given product in an ad; nor am I apprised of all the other choices available to me. Therefore, I have been prevented from using my reason in developing such desires. But if so, then they aren’t autonomous.
-Arrington’s first reply: It implies that virtually none of our desires are autonomous. For since we never know all the facts about a product (or about all of the alternative products I could have chosen), the principle implies that none of my desires for products are the result of my rational will, in which case they aren’t autonomous – which is absurd.
-Arrington’s second reply: A choice is rational if it is based upon relevant information. Information is relevant if it shows one how to satisfy a prior desire. But ads give such information. Therefore, they don’t get me to choose something against my rational will.
-A new objection: Many ads (those containing puffery) make claims about benefits of products that are purely imaginary. But buying a product on the basis of anticipation of benefits that are purely imaginary is an irrational decision.
-Arrington’s reply: No. The benefits are subjective, yet real. Many people buy a product in anticipation of a certain subjective effect – e.g., the feeling of adventure or prestige. The products really do provide such subjective effects. Therefore, such choices are not irrational.
-Free choice:
-Objection: Ads produce desires for buying products - desires we are unable to resist. But actions that result from irresistible forces are not free, and no such unfree action is autonomous. Therefore, ads reduce our autonomy, and so are immoral.
-Arrington’s reply: An act is free iff it is done for a reason: If it’s done for a reason, then it’s free; but if an action goes against one’s reasons, then it is not free. Applying this account of freedom to the ethics of ads debate, we get the conclusion that, occasionally, ads produce unfree acts in us, but usually they don’t.
Quote: “...most of us have a benevolent subconsciousness which does not overwhelm our ego and its reason for action. And therefore most of us can respond to subliminal advertising without thereby risking our autonomy.” (P. 375)
-Control or manipulation:
-Objection: Ads manipulate and/or control those who see/hear them (by getting them to buy their product). But one is not acting autonomously when on is being manipulated or controlled. Therefore, ads undermine the autonomy of the consumer.
-Arrington’s reply: No. For if ads were manipulating or controlling consumers, they would have to control their desires. But ads don’t do this. Rather, they give information that appeal to desires that the consumer already has, if she has them at all. But if so, then ads don’t control or manipulate the consumer.

Notes on Employee Rights: Lippke's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:36:00.001-07:00

Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: Lippke's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:35:00.000-07:00

Notes on Lippke’s “Advertising and the Social Conditions of Autonomy”

Summary of the paper:
A number of authors have argued that deceptive advertising is immoral because it undermines human autonomy. While this is true, the reason they give for why it is true is inadequate. The following is a sketch of the manner in which they argue: First, they briefly sketch an account of the nature of human autonomy. Then, they argue that advertising often undermines human autonomy in various ways: e.g., by means of implanting desires in us, by associating their products with the satisfaction of certain desires, and by misleading us by making false claims about the features of a product or service. Finally, the instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is entirely by means of the informational content of advertisements.
The above sorts of analyses of the immorality of advertising are too shallow. First, their account of human autonomy is too shallow. The true nature of full human autonomy is much more robust than these authors maintain. Second, the real reason why normal kinds of advertising are immoral is because they suppress and stunt the development of the constitutive features of this more robust notion of autonomy, thereby making us easy to control, for the purpose of generating a society of ready and willing consumers (a thriving free market economy requires it). Finally, the real instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is be means of continually inundating us with ads that have (what the author calls) persuasive content. Advertisers should therefore stop inundating consumers with ads that have persuasive content.
One may object that it is wrong to prevent advertisers to from inundating the public with ads that have persuasive content, on the grounds that people should be free to accept or reject the vision of the consumer lifestyle that is implicit in this content. But this objection fails for a number of reasons.
Finally, several modest recommendations are given for making our culture one that provides and encourages the social conditions necessary for its members to develop full human autonomy.

Outline of the paper:

Introduction: the basic thrust of the paper discussed
-Argue that “advertising undermines autonomy, especially under the conditions that exist in advanced capitalist countries like the United States.” (484)
-The type of advertising focused on: persuasive advertising (this is a technical term defined by Lippke – it doesn’t merely mean “convincing advertising”).
-Compare and contrast: informational vs. persuasive advertising
-Informational advertising: (again, this type of advertising is not the focus of the paper)
-information about the features, prices and availability of a product or service.
-presupposes some interest in the product
-They can undermine autonomy in at least two ways:
-(i) by manipulating and deceiving the consumer by not providing nearly enough information to make an informed, rational decision to by the product.
-(ii) when one is exposed to such advertising over and over, it has the effect of preventing, stunting, or eroding of a key trait of fully autonomous agents, viz., intellectual honesty. (based on Lippke’s discussion on p. 484)
-Persuasive advertising:
-usually contains little informational content about the product
-often tries to associate one or more of the consumer’s (sometimes subconscious) desires with the product (p. 484)
-Why is it bad to undermine human autonomy? Because humans need it to reduce the likelihood that they will be dominated or controlled in some way by others. (pp. 484-85)

I. On a recent, inadequate version of the “undermines autonomy” argument against deceptive persuasive advertising: Roger Crisp
A. The argument: Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by manipulating consumers in a way that is morally impermissible. Two points:
1. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by bypassing the consumer’s faculty of reason by associating their products with the consumer’s existent or ad-created desires. The consumer therefore doesn’t decide to by the product on the basis of freely and rationally choosing the product. Rather, he or she buys the product on the basis of non-rational factors: he or she never chose to buy it.
2. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by implanting or creating new desires in the consumer, desires that the consumer doesn’t want, and therefore don’t identify with as being their desires. This one takes some explaining. First of all, people have two kinds of desires: first-order desires and second order desires. First-order desires are ordinary desires to have (or not to have) things (e.g., food, sleep, sex, company, sports…). By contrast, second-order desires are desires to have (or not to have) desires of various sorts (e.g., a desire not to desire to smoke (or eat Double-Doubles?); a desire to have the desire to study…). Now normal, healthy people have a strong second-order desire not to be manipulated by others without their consent and without good reason. But persuasive ads manipulate consumer’s in just these ways when they implant these first-order desires within them (e.g., the desire to smoke Marlboro cigarettes). Therefore, if the consumer were to reflect on the ways in which such ads manipulate them, they would repudiate the desires implanted in them by the ads. But no first-order desire that one would repudiate upon reflection is an autonomous desire: it is not a desire that the agent identifies with as their “own”. Therefore, such ads undermine autonomy by creating desires that are not autonomous (confused yet?).
B. Critique of the argument: Crisp attributes both too much and too little power to ads.
1. Preliminaries: two kinds of advertisement content: explicit and implicit
a. explicit content: message to “but x”, plus info about product features, price, where one can buy it, etc. This content is typically easy to resist.
b. implicit content: messages about “the consumer lifestyle”, which include “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, expectations, and aspirations” (p. 485) that a “normal” person has or ought to have. Such content is rarely, if ever, criticized or critically evaluated, but is implied to be the only appropriate lifestyle to adopt or aspire to. This content is in just about every commercial, and, given that commercials are constant and everywhere-present, and that most people absorb and conform to their content, they are very hard to resist.
2. Too much: Although kids can be manipulated by the explicit content of ads, most adults know what’s going on, and can resist it. The real task is to understand how ads can unduly influence adults when they know that ads are trying to manipulate them.
3. Too little: Crisp fails to account for the fact that ads have implicit content, and that this is what manipulates them.

II. Toward an adequate account of the nature of full human autonomy: Full human autonomy requires that a number of social conditions are in place; conditions that enable agents to have:
A. The ability for crisp, careful thought and evaluation of arguments and claims.
B. The knowledge of alternative belief systems and lifestyles (besides the consumer lifestyle).
C. “Venues in which agents can reasonably be expected to display these abilities and act on these motivations.” (485)
D. Freedom from coercion and manipulation, brainwashing and harassment. (485)

III. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part one:
A. by constantly barraging us with mindless, melodramatic, content.
B. By having content that portrays and recommends a simplistic approach to the problems of life, and how to solve them.

IV. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part two:
A. The main way in which ads undermine full autonomy is by suppressing it..
1. Ads discourage the emergence the skills, knowledge, attitudes and motivations that are constitutive of full autonomy. How?
2. Ads are pervasive and virtually inescapable.
3. There is an absence of presentation of views that challenge its implicit content (no public service announcements that urge us to be wary of their tactics of manipulation and seduction) (p. 486).
4. Often aimed at children, who don’t yet have the ability to critically evaluate it. They absorb the content, and its effect carry forward into their adult lives.
B. Analysis of the content of persuasive content: metamessages (i.e., “messages about how to approach claims made by others” (487))
1. They “subtly encourage the propensity to accept emotional appeals, oversimplification, and shoddy standards of proof for claims”.(487)
2. “Evidence and arguments of the most ridiculous sorts are offered in support of advertising claims.” (ibid.)
3. Ads use information selectively (they exaggerate the good features and downplay or remain silent about bad features), etc.
4. The meanings of words are routinely twisted.
5. Ads imply that the most important information about life must be communicated in a way that is entertaining, and such that it can be passively absorbed.
6. They imply that “one can’t believe or trust what other people say” (ibid.).
7. “They imply that everything (and nothing!) can be proved.” (ibid.)
8. They imply that “evidence contrary to one’s claims may be ignored.” (ibid.)
9. They imply that “success in communication is a matter of persuading others no matter how it is done.” (ibid.)
10. The point: all of these metamessages undermine “the habits and attitudes constitutive of critical competence (clarity, rigor, precision, patience, honesty, effort, etc….).” (ibid.)
11. Why do they do it? Because a thriving free market economy requires “ready and willing consumers.” (ibid.) But to ensure that they have a supply of ready and willing consumers, they must undermine social conditions that would prevent this, such as the existence of society of fully autonomous citizens.

V. An objection, several replies, and some recommendations for instituting social conditions that would encourage human autonomy.

Notes on the Ethics of Advertising: McCall's Stuff

2008-04-06T18:33:00.000-07:00

Notes on McCall’s, “Deceptive Advertising”

Summary: Consequentialist arguments against deceptive advertising fail. However, we can see that many (most?) advertisements are immoral on non-consequentialist grounds. For advertisements regularly manipulate consumers by intentionally deceiving them, and this is morally wrong whether or not it produces bad consequences overall. Although there are several kinds of morally permissible deception, deceptive ads don’t fall into any of these kinds. Furthermore, there are some circumstances in which advertisers are morally responsible for misleading consumers, even if such deception is unintentional. This can occur in two broad classes of cases: (i) cases in which the advertisers should have foreseen that their ads would mislead consumers, and (ii) cases in which, although the advertisers couldn’t possibly have foreseen that the consumers would be misled, they don’t remove or change the misleading portion of advertisement after they later come to realize that people are being misled by them.

Basic Structure and Progression of the Piece:

The first argument against deception (and so, by implication, deceptive advertising): a consequentialist argument: The argument is that deception would make social cooperation impossible, and thus it would lead to the bad consequences of our missing out on the many great social goods to be gained only through social cooperation.
-Example: It would make a system of credit impossible
- The author ultimately rejects this argument, for it’s not true that a cooperative society can’t survive in the presence of deception. In fact, there is a lot of deception in society. The kind of deception that is destructive of cooperative society is deception that doesn’t occur in well-defined contexts -- that is, deception that occurs in contexts where we don’t expect it. However, one might think that advertising is one such well-defined context, and it is therefore morally permissible, and not destructive of a cooperative society (see the “poker” illustration, p. 358).

The second argument: Deceptive ads are instances of manipulation. Manipulation involves getting others to do what you want by overriding their ability to make rational choices. In the case of deceptive ads, the deception involves getting you to act on a false belief. As such, deceptive advertisements involve treating the intended audiences of the ads as means to an end (i.e., as things, and not as people).

The author then admits that there are three types of morally permissible deception: when (i) it is necessary in order to save one’s life, (ii) such deception gives a person no unfair advantage over the person deceived, or (iii) all of the parties involved know that deception is likely.

However, the author then points out that everyone admits that deceptive advertising isn’t necessary to save anyone’s life (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(i) morally permissible deception). He also points out that it’s obvious that deceptive advertising is often employed to gain an unfair advantage over both consumers and competing businesses (and so, it’s not an instance of type-(ii) morally permissible deception). As he says:

“More typically, deception in advertising is calculated to create an unfair advantage for the advertiser both against the consumer targeted by the ad and against the business’s competitors. It also intends some loss or harm to both of those parties. A consumer who buys one brand of product because she or he was deceived into thinking it a better value than a competitive product is harmed, as is the competitor” (quote from article)

But what about permissible deceptions of type-(iii)? Aren’t deceptive ads of this type? McCall considers this objection, which can be put as follows: Deceptive advertising is morally permissible. For the parties involved (i.e., the consumers) know that deception is likely in the context of advertisements: they’re expecting that advertisements are trying to deceive them in some way. But if so, then deceptive advertising satisfies clause (iii), and so the deception isn’t wrong. (based on discussion on p. 359)

Reply:

(A) Factual problems with the objection: In actual fact, consumers are constantly fooled
by such ads. The FTC supports these conclusions, based on their investigations. (359)

(B) Conceptual problems with the objection:
1. The very fact that we learn to become wary of particular kinds of deception (cf. the “economy size deception” example, p. 359) presupposes that you weren’t expecting deception during those times before we learned to be wary.
2. The idea that one can be deceived when one is expecting to be deceived is incoherent. For it is only possible to expect deception in well-defined contexts: expecting deception to occur in all possible places and by all possible techniques of deception is both conceptually and psychologically impossible.
(a) It’s conceptually impossible, because there are an infinite number of possible contexts and techniques for deceiving you, and a consumer logically cannot prepare for an infinite number of techniques of deception.

(b) It’s psychologically impossible, because attempting to prepare for a large number of possible means of deception would soon “result in overload and decision-making paralysis.” (p. 360)

Objection: The consumers, and the consumers alone, are to blame for being deceived. For it is a person’s responsibility to be critical of potentially deceptive claims. (Based on discussion on p. 359)

Reply: Even if that is true, that fact in no way removes the wrongness of the advertiser’s attempt to deceive the consumer. Notice that even if the consumer was critical, and didn’t fall for the deception of the ad, the advertiser would still be wrong in the intent to deceive the consumer. (based on discussion on p. 359-60)

-The implied principle of assessment of the (im)morality of deceptive advertising: If an advertisement is an attempt at intentional deception, then even if the attempt is unsuccessful, it is morally wrong. (Intention to deceive → morally wrong)

-The difficulty of applying the principle: Do we have to be “mind-readers”, or play “amateur psychologist” to apply it?

-Helpful criteria/reliable indicators for telling when an ad is intentionally deceptive: based on reliable clues from an ad’s (a) design and (b) content.

-Kinds of cases:
-Intentional deception by means of visual communication:
-cases in which the product is made to appear as something it is not. (p. 361)
-cases in which the ad misleads by visual images.

-Intentional deception by means of linguistic communication:
-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is implied
-Cases in which pertinent information is omitted
--Objection: It’s too hard to tell when an advertiser is acting immorally by omitting information. We can’t just say that no omissions are permitted. For then two problems immediately arise:
(i) It’s too demanding: it is virtually (if not actually) impossible to disclose everything about the product that is relevant to making a decision about buying it. (362)
(ii) It’s unreasonable: Does the advertiser (and the relevant business) really have to help out her competitors by showing how, and in what ways, the latter’s product is better than theirs? But that’s what the principle requires, if we interpret it seriously and literally. (362)

-Reply, in light of these problems:

- There are clear cases where an ad is intentionally deceptive, and this fact isn’t changed when we discover that there are unclear cases.

- Furthermore, this deceptiveness is due to the fact that an advertiser intentionally omits information that might lead the consumer to a different decision than they otherwise would have made. Yet we have seen that the principle is problematic if intended as a hard-and-fast rule. Therefore, it may be useful as a general rule of thumb. With that objection resolved, let’s get back to cases...

-Cases in which the ad deceives by what is explicitly stated
-Cases where only part of the relevant information is explicitly stated (361)
-Cases where all of the relevant information is explicitly stated, but in a way that the consumer can’t process (e.g., “small print” cases, “too much to read given the time allotted” cases) (361-2)
-Cases where the ad selectively omits important information. (p. 362)

-conclusion of section: we have outlined several broad classes of ads, whereby we can make reasonably confident judgments that the ads are intentionally deceptive. But if so, then the objection fails: we don’t have to be mind-readers to apply the principle. Rather, certain kinds of advertisement form and content are reliable indicators for when the advertisers are intentionally trying to deceive consumers.

-A final argument: Cases where an advertiser is still morally responsible if a consumer is misled, even if the advertiser didn’t intend this to happen:

(I)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, was foreseeable by the advertiser

(II)When the false impression created by the ad, though unintended, is not corrected, even after the advertiser realizes that consumers are buying the product on the basis of the false impression. (i.e., the false impression was unforeseeable but uncorrected after they know that consumers are being misled)

The principle: If an ad unintentionally misleads the consumer, and either (i) that fact was foreseeable by the advertiser, or (ii) was not foreseeable, yet not corrected after seeing that people are in fact misled by the ad, then the advertisers are morally responsible for the consumers being misled. (Advertisers unintentionally mislead consumers & either (i) foreseeable or (ii) unforeseeable yet not corrected afterwards → morally responsible)

Notes on Globalization: Brecher and Costello's "The Race to the Bottom"

2008-04-06T18:30:00.000-07:00

Germany and the United States: Compare and Contrast

2008-04-06T03:08:00.000-07:00

Personal observations, but nonetheless very illuminating. Here is the link.

The Mortgage Bust Goes Global

2008-04-06T02:54:00.001-07:00

Here.

Great Little Post at the Daily Kos

2008-04-06T02:52:00.001-07:00

"Your Media at Work"

In the past two weeks, the following events transpired. A Department of Justice memo, authored by John Yoo, was released which authorized torture and presidential lawbreaking. It was revealed that the Bush administration declared the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights to be inapplicable to "domestic military operations" within the U.S. The U.S. Attorney General appears to have fabricated a key event leading to the 9/11 attacks and made patently false statements about surveillance laws and related lawsuits. Barack Obama went bowling in Pennsylvania and had a low score.

Here are the number of times, according to NEXIS, that various topics have been mentioned in the media over the past thirty days:

"Yoo and torture" - 102

"Mukasey and 9/11" -- 73

"Yoo and Fourth Amendment" -- 16

"Obama and bowling" -- 1,043

"Obama and Wright" -- More than 3,000 (too many to be counted)

"Obama and patriotism" - 1,607

"Clinton and Lewinsky" -- 1,079

More stories about a decade-old scandal and a presidential candidate's night at the bowling alley than about the White House declaring the Fourth Amendment null and void.

Yup, that's about right.

A Critique of Free Market Fundamentalism

2008-04-06T02:48:00.000-07:00

Can be found here.

Who Owns What? A Media Ownership Chart

2008-04-06T02:42:00.000-07:00

Here.

Nice Short Overview of Parecon

2008-04-06T02:26:00.001-07:00

At Wikipedia, here.

Krugman on McCain on Health Care

2008-04-06T02:15:00.000-07:00

Here.

THE CORPORATION [20/23] Hostile Takeover

2008-04-03T21:23:00.005-07:00

THE CORPORATION [19/23] Taking The Right Side

2008-04-03T21:23:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [18/23] Expansion Plan

2008-04-03T21:23:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [17/23] Unsettling Accounts

2008-04-03T21:22:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [16/23] Advancing the Front

2008-04-03T21:22:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [15/23] Triumph of the Shill

2008-04-03T21:21:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [14/23] A Private Celebration

2008-04-03T21:21:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [13/23] Like a Good Neighbour

2008-04-03T21:20:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [12/23] Perception Managment

2008-04-03T21:20:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [11/23] Basic Training

2008-04-03T21:19:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [10/23] Boundry Issues

2008-04-03T21:19:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [9/23] Trading on 9/11

2008-04-03T21:18:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [8/23] Mindset

2008-04-03T21:17:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [7/23] Monstrous Obligations

2008-04-03T21:14:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [6/23] The Pathology of Commerce

2008-04-03T21:13:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [5/23] Case Histories

2008-04-03T21:13:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [4/23] Externalities

2008-04-03T21:12:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [3/23] A Legal

2008-04-03T21:11:00.003-07:00

THE CORPORATION [2/23] Birth

2008-04-03T21:11:00.001-07:00

PBS Frontline Special: "Bush's War"

2008-04-03T02:53:00.000-07:00

Here.

Bush's Wiretapping

2008-04-03T02:49:00.001-07:00

Here.

A Recent Dirty Move by the Bush Administration

2008-04-03T02:43:00.000-07:00

Terri Gross Interview with David Brock on The Republican Noise Machine

2008-04-03T02:39:00.001-07:00

Here.

The Shock Doctrine by Alfonso Cuarón and Naomi Klein

2008-04-03T02:33:00.001-07:00

THE CORPORATION [1/23] What is a Corporation?

2008-04-03T02:30:00.001-07:00

Outfoxed (8-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:29:00.005-07:00

Outfoxed (7-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:29:00.003-07:00

Outfoxed (6-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:29:00.001-07:00

Outfoxed (5-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:28:00.005-07:00

Outfoxed (4-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:28:00.003-07:00

Outfoxed (3-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:28:00.001-07:00

Outfoxed (2-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:27:00.001-07:00

Outfoxed (1-8) Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism

2008-04-03T02:26:00.001-07:00

Toxic Sludge is Good For You

2008-04-03T02:24:00.001-07:00

Hales on Why the U.S. is Not the Best Country in the World

2008-04-03T02:03:00.000-07:00

Here.

Anthropocentrist Environmental Ethics: Notes on Baxter's "People or Penguins? The Case for Optimal Pollution"

2008-04-03T01:46:00.001-07:00

Notes: Baxter: “People or Penguins? The Case for Optimal Pollution”

Preliminaries: Instrumental value (means to an end) vs. Intrinsic value (end-in-itself)

-Instrumental value: If something only has instrumental value, then it is valuable only to the extent that it helps you get something else that you value. If and when it stops performing this function, it is worthless. For example, suppose you recently bought a Porsche. It is valuable to you only so long as (i) it makes you popular, (ii) the engine works or can at least be repaired, (iii) it looks nice, (iv) it gets you where you need to go, etc. However, once it loses all these features (it no longer runs, nor can it be repaired, it’s rusty, etc.), it becomes worthless to you. We would therefore say that the Porsche has mere instrumental value. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that it is a mere means to an end (i.e., it is a mere thing that is valuable to you only to the extent that it gets you other things that you value for their own sake, such as pleasure, friendship, sex, happiness, etc.). Most non-living things are commonly considered to have mere instrumental value (rocks, computers, doorstops, lumber, etc.)

-Intrinsic value (end in itself): If something retains its value even if you can’t use it to get other things that you want, then it is intrinsically valuable. So, for example, human beings are almost universally considered to be intrinsically valuable. For even if a person is paralyzed, blind, deaf, and mute – that is, even if they aren’t useful to anyone for anything – they still retain their value. We don’t, for example, think that it is permissible to kill them, torture them, or use them as doorstops. Their value remains even if they are useless to us, unlike, e.g., cars and computers. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that people are ends-in-themselves. Other examples of intrinsically valuable things include pleasure, friendship, beauty, and truth. As we will see, the differing views about environmental ethics are usually based on differing views about what kinds of things the authors think are intrinsically valuable.

Main points in Baxter’s article:

-Baxter’s argument is utilitarian.

-Baxter’s article is an anthropocentric account of limited environmentalism. That is, Baxter thinks that neither non-human living beings (plant and animal life), nor the non-living environment, have intrinsic value. Rather, they have instrumental value. They are valuable only to the extent that humans value them. If humans didn’t value (for example) cats, they would literally be worthless, and it would be permissible to destroy them at will.

-Baxter therefore thinks that such causes as environmentalism and animal rights are unjustified without further argument. For Baxter, it isn’t enough of a reason (for example) for stopping the destruction of the rain forests if one just points out that they are being destroyed. One must give a further reason for thinking that this is a bad thing. And the further reason had better include the claim that it will somehow be bad for human beings that the rain forests are being destroyed.

-In arguing for his particular account of limited environmentalism, Baxter takes as his starting point the plausible view that any such account must be justified by broad principles that almost everyone accepts. He lists four:

(1) Every person should be free to do whatever he wishes to in contexts where his actions do not interfere with the interests of other human beings.
(2) Resources are limited and extremely scarce: even if we used the world’s resources in such a way that we got the most out of them, there would not be enough for every person to have all of their desires met. Therefore, the world’s resources should not be wasted.
(3) Every human being should be treated as an end in themself, and never as a mere means to an end. So, everyone should be treated equally, and be eligible for an equal share to the world’s goods.
(4) Each person’s incentive and opportunity for improving their share of satisfaction should be preserved.

-From these four principles, Baxter thinks it follows that the non-living environment and the realm of non-human organisms should be treated as having mere instrumental value. That is, he thinks it justifies his anthropocentric, limited environmentalism mentioned above.

-Notice the implication of the last point: If nature doesn’t have intrinsic value, then we have no absolute obligation to restore nature to a clean, pristine state. Nor do we have an absolute obligation to protect other animal species. The only justification that can possibly be given for protecting nature is that it is in our best interests to do so (i.e., we have to get something beneficial from being “environmentally conscious”).1

-Baxter’s main idea is that we need to strive for an optimal balance of consumer goods and clean environment. To find out how much pollution is acceptable (and how much environmental protection is reasonable) we must see the world as consisting of an extremely limited set of resources that can be turned into human goods and services. All goods and services are aimed at satisfying our desires. Now imagine that our desires can be satisfied by using the world’s resources to create two basic kinds of goods and services: consumer goods (cars, washing machines, etc.), and a clean environment. Since the world’s resources are scarce, we don’t have enough resources to create all the goods and services of both kinds to satisfy our desires. Therefore, if we want to satisfy one kind of desire (e.g., the kind that can be satisfied by consumer goods), then we will have to sacrifice some degree of our ability to satisfy the other kind of desire (the desire for a clean environment). But if this is how things are, then our goal will be to have an optimal balance of the two kinds of goods, where both kinds of desires are satisfied as much as possible for the most amount of people, given a limited amount of resources. This optimal balance will amount to (i) an environment that has some pollution, but not so much that life is generally unpleasant; and (ii) a supply of consumer goods that satisfy as many people as possible (even though we desire an even greater quantity and variety of consumer goods).2 .

-Baxter considers the objection that his account is very selfish: it only counts human beings as having real (i.e., intrinsic) value. But this is supposed to be a consequence of his view that makes it implausible. (Does the strategy of this attack sound familiar? Remember the two main strategies of attacking a conclusion? Which one is this? A reductio ad absurdum? The G.E. Moore shift?)

-In response to this objection, he offers six replies. I leave it as a homework exercise to learn what these replies amount to.

Non-Anthropocentrist Environmental Ethics: Notes on Singer's "All Animals Are Equal"

2008-04-03T01:44:00.002-07:00

Notes on Peter Singer’s “All Animals are Equal”

Preliminary stuff: Peter Singer is a NAP (non-anthropocentrist). Therefore, he believes that other things besides humans are also worthy of direct moral consideration. In Singer’s case, these other things are (all) sentient creatures.

Brief summary: An exploration of the proper basis of equality among humans leads to the conclusion that animals, as well as humans, are deserving of “equal consideration of interests”.

Basic progression of the paper:

Historically popular reasons given for why women, and members of all races in general, should be treated equally to men, but animals should not:

-Reason 1: They all share at least one or more (putatively significant) trait that animals do not (e.g., they are all capable of making rational decisions). Therefore, men and women should be treated equally, while animals should not.
-Notice the key underlying principle: **equal possession of a relevant trait merits equal treatment.**

-Criticism 1: Granted, men and women have many traits in common, and that animals do not share some of these traits that are shared between men and women. It is also granted that this is a legitimate basis for some differences in treatment (except for some special cases. More on that later). However, this doesn’t support a basis for not treating animals and humans equally.
-There are also differences between men and women. This provides reason to think that these differences should ground differences in (some) rights between men and women. (E.g., women can bear children, while men cannot. So, women will have rights pertaining to reproduction that don’t apply to men).
-Therefore, the equal sharing of a trait doesn’t ground (i) equal treatment in every respect; nor does it ground (ii) equal rights.
-But if not, then it can’t justify the proposal that men and women should be treated equally, but animals should not.

-By the way, what does the equal sharing of a trait justify?
-Answer: equal consideration of interests.
-But “equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.” (. 475)

Criticism 2: There is no trait by which every individual human is equal to every other (e.g., intellectual ability, moral capacities, capacity to experience pleasure or pain, etc.). But if not, then if we follow this particular argument for equality, we should conclude that humans aren’t deserving of equal consideration, which is absurd.

Reason 2: (Revision of reason 1) While each individual member of the human species does not equally share a relevant trait, each race and sex does equally share such traits. That is, there is no race or sex, taken as a whole, that has a relevant trait that the others lack, or otherwise fail to share to an equal degree (say that the underlying racial and sexual equality of traits has an underlying genetic basis)

Criticism 1: This reason doesn’t answer the opponent of equality who argues, say, that all and only those who have an IQ greater or equal to 100 should be given equal treatment.

Criticism 2: This is an empirical claim that could turn out to be false. Now suppose that, after careful investigation, it turns out that there isn’t an equal statistical distribution of degree of trait possession across races and sexes. Suppose, further, that this inequality has a genetic basis in the differing races and sexes. By reason 2, we should conclude that the races and sexes aren’t relevantly equal, and are therefore not worthy of equal consideration. But this consequence is absurd.

Criticism 3:
-Preliminaries: normative vs. descriptive facts:

-Descriptive facts are facts about how things are (or are not). E.g., the fact that it is sunny today in Riverside is a descriptive fact about how things are today in Riverside.

By contrast,

-Normative facts are facts about how things should be (or should not be), whether or not they are that way. E.g., the fact that people shouldn’t torture babies for fun is a normative fact about how babies should (or in this case, shouldn’t) be treated. It is not a fact about how babies are treated, nor does it depend upon such facts.

-The “is/ought” fallacy (or the naturalistic fallacy ): This fallacy occurs when someone makes an inference from a descriptive fact to a normative fact. Or, in other words, they make an inference from the way things are to the way things ought to be. E.g., the claim that it’s morally permissible to be unduly selfish (the normative claim) because it’s in our nature to be selfish (the descriptive claim) is an instance of the “is/ought” fallacy.

-Back to the criticism: The principle of equality is a moral fact about how certain beings should be treated, and all moral facts are normative facts. Furthermore, the claim in reason 2, about genetic equality, is a descriptive fact about how certain beings are. But then the argument for equal consideration based on genetic equality is an instance of the “is/ought” fallacy.

From the preceding point, we see that statements about equality are normative statements about how certain beings should be given equal consideration, and as such, they can’t be grounded in descriptive facts about the abilities of various beings (or kinds/species of beings).
-**So we may now define the principle of equal consideration with precision: “The interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.” (p. 476)**

**We have seen, then, that facts about the lack of certain sorts of abilities in a being cannot be the basis for not giving equal consideration to the interests of that being.**

**But if not, then we have no justification for ignoring the interests of animals.**

A key implication of the preceding: Speciesism is morally wrong.
-Speciesism is “a prejudice or attitude or bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” (p. 276)
-The basis of the wrongness of Speciesism is the same as that of racism and sexism, viz., excluding members of a biological group on the basis of the lack of some trait. For we have seen that all such trait-based prejudices are untenable.

Currently (and throughout most of history), most people are speciesists. This is immoral, and must therefore stop!

Jeremy Bentham saw that the principle of equal consideration of interests entailed that all animals are worthy of equal consideration. He also saw the true basis of determining whether a being should be given such consideration. The basis is this: **having the capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment.**

So, a being is worthy of equal consideration of interests if, and only if, it has the capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment.

Why this criterion isn’t arbitrary and unjustified, like the other criteria of trait-possession: Because
-(i) the principle of equal consideration is about fairly considering the interests of certain sorts of beings.
-(ii) But the capacity for suffering and/or pleasure is a necessary prerequisite for having interests at all.
-It doesn’t make sense to say that non-sentient beings (like dirt and rocks) have “interests”.
-By the very nature of the case, it is in the interest of every sentient being that it experience enjoyment and avoid suffering.
-To be capable of suffering and/or enjoyment just is to have interests; or at least that is the most basic level of having interests. It’s the “threshold” for having interests.

An objection from speciesists: Animals are not sentient (i.e., they aren’t conscious). Rather, they are unconscious automata. Therefore, they are incapable of experiencing suffering and/or enjoyment. But if so, then they aren’t worthy of equal consideration of interests. We may therefore treat them as we wish.

Reply 1: Common sense tells us that animals suffer. Obviously, if I “stick a sharp knife into the stomach of a dog, the dog will feel pain.” (p. 478)

Reply 2: The basis for our belief that animals can experience pain is the same as the basis for our belief that other people experience pain: we infer it from their behavior.
-Of course, it’s logically possible that they don’t feel pain, since it’s an inference from behavior to pain states (we can’t “look inside their heads”, as it were, and “see” what they’re experiencing, after all!).

-But so what!! This is equally true of other humans. We can’t look inside their minds to see what they’re experiencing . Rather, we have to infer the existence and nature of their experiences, based on observation of their behavior. So if we deny that animals have pain (because we can’t see what they’re experiencing directly), despite certain sorts of (putative) pain behavior (howling, wincing, increased heart rate, etc.), then we have to deny that other people have experiences on the same basis.

Reply 3: The physiology of animals is remarkably similar to that of humans. So, since the latter provides the underlying physical basis for human pain, it is highly probable that the former provides the underlying physical basis for animal pain.

Objection: human brains are much more complex than animal brains. Perhaps this increase in complexity is required for conscious experience. If this is right, then since animals don’t have similarly complex brains, we might conclude that they aren’t conscious, and so they can’t experience pain and/or pleasure.

Reply: No. The underlying physical basis for “impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well-developed in many other species of animals, especially mammals and birds.” (p. 478). The extra complexity of human brains provides the underlying physical basis for higher forms of thought and reason, not pleasure and pain.

Reply 4: Denying conscious experience violates Ockham’s Razor (i.e., illegitimately postulating more entities than are strictly required to explain the relevant phenomena). For we already know that our own conscious experience is the basis of our own behavior. So, if we say that the (putative) pain behavior of animals is caused by something else besides their conscious experience, then we are multiplying explanations beyond what is strictly required to explain the phenomena of animal behavior.

Objection: Only language-users can experience pain. However, animals can’t use language. Therefore, animals can’t feel pain. There are two versions of this objection:
-1) Ludwig Wittgenstein: one can’t meaningfully attribute conscious states to beings that can’t use language.
-Reply: Maybe language is required for “higher” levels of consciousness (e.g., abstract reasoning and thought), but it’s not necessary in order to feel pain.

-2) The best evidence we can have that a being is in pain is if they tell us. But animals can’t tell us anything, since they can’t use language.
-Reply: (i) the expression of emotion and feeling doesn’t require the capacity for language. All animals and humans best express feeling through certain characteristic bodily behaviors. This is true, for example, for expressing joy, sadness, fear, anger, and so on. (iii) If this objection is taken seriously, then we would have to deny that we have sufficient evidence that human infants can experience pain(!), since they can’t use language, either. But this is absurd.

Sub-conclusion: Therefore, we have no good reason to deny that animals can feel pain. But if not, then the principle of equal consideration applies to them, and so we must give their interests equal consideration.

Note: this does not mean that the interests of humans aren’t normally more important than those of animals. They usually are.
-Normal, healthy adult humans have a much higher capacity for suffering and enjoyment. For example, humans can anticipate when something horrible is about to happen to them. This can lead them to experience intense dread, which is a form of suffering. They can also delight in things by just thinking about them, without being overtly stimulated in any way. Thus, humans frequently experience suffering and enjoyment without being physically harmed or stimulated – and much more frequently than any animal. So, while both the interests of animals and humans always deserve equal consideration, the interests of humans often win out. For the intensity and depth of normal human experience of suffering and enjoyment often surpasses that of animals.

-On the other hand, sometimes the lack of more sophisticated levels of consciousness (which id true of animals)makes suffering worse for them. For example, animals often experience intense dread when they are physically constrained by humans. For they usually can’t tell the difference between being constrained for harmless reasons (say, a wild animal being placed in a traveling container for the purpose of taking it on board an airplane), and being constrained for the purpose of being killed by a predator. But if so, then being constrained can cause them to experience intense dread as well. Since humans can tell the difference between different purposes for constraint, they usually don’t feel such dread when constrained.

Key implication #1 of Singer’s view: From the principle of equal consideration of interests, and from the fact that animals experience suffering (and therefore have interests), it follows that, at least in some cases, the interests of animals will take precedence over the interests of humans.
-E.g., in some cases, where a baby is born with severe mental defects, so that their capacity for suffering and enjoyment are less than, say, a gorilla, the interests of the latter will take precedence over the former.

Key implication # 2 of Singer’s view: On the morality and immorality of killing humans and animals: If we are to avoid being speciesists, then we must abandon the sanctity of life view of humans.
-The sanctity of life view: The view that it is always wrong to take an innocent human life.
-The argument that the sanctity of life view entails Speciesism: Suppose a couple have a child that is born severely retarded, and whose capacity for the conscious experience of suffering and enjoyment is less than, say, a healthy pig (e.g., the infant lacks self-awareness, it is unable to recognize people, etc.). Suppose further that the couple hold to the sanctity of life view, and are therefore unwilling to terminate the infant’s life (suppose that such a thing is legally permissible in such extreme circumstances). Finally, suppose that such people have no hesitation about killing the healthy pig mentioned earlier. Now, again, the pig has a more robust conscious life of suffering and enjoyment than the infant. So, since the only reason why the couple thinks it permissible to kill the pig, but impermissible to kill the infant, is because the latter is a member of the species Homo sapiens, it follows that they are speciesists. So, the sanctity of life view entails Speciesism.

Non-Anthropocentrist Environmental Ethics: Notes on Taylor's "An Ethics of Respect for Nature"

2008-04-03T01:44:00.001-07:00

Notes: Taylor’s “An Ethics of Respect for Nature”

Summary of the article: The most rationally acceptable of the two competing types of environmental ethics is the non-anthropocentric one. It is justified by being supported by a world view that is internally coherent and consistent with scientific knowledge. The arguments for the view that only humans have inherent worth (or have the most inherent worth) are either question-begging or based on implausible assumptions, or both.

Outline: Major Divisions of the Paper

I. Human-Centered and Life-Centered Systems of Environmental Ethics (Introduction: the two competing types of views)
A. Anthropocentrism: Only humans have inherent worth, and so, only humans are worthy of being treated as having intrinsic value.
B. Non-anthropocentrism: Other life forms have intrinsic value as well (a variety of views, though Taylor doesn’t make this last point)

II. The Good of a Being and the Concept of Inherent Worth
A. Preliminaries: defining some terms
1. The good of a thing: whatever enhances or preserves the life and well-being of a kind of thing. Organisms are “teleological centers of life”. That is, each species has a set of capacities, a characteristic pattern of growth and development (life-cycle), and a set of activities that are characteristic of that species. To enhance or preserve the capacities or set of activities or pattern of development of a member of a species is to benefit that species, and to do the opposite is to harm it.
a. Doesn’t require that the organism has interests.
b. Doesn’t require that the organism take an interest in its well-being.
c. Doesn’t require that the organism is conscious, or capable of pleasure or pain.
d. Open-ended whether machines can have a good of their own.
2. Inherent worth:
a. Implies two principles:
i. Principle of moral consideration: x is deserving of concern and consideration simply in virtue of being a member of a species (or even for being a member of Earth’s living community/ having its own good). The good of each is to be accorded some value and so acknowledged as having some weight in the deliberation of all rational agents.
ii. Principle of intrinsic value: regardless of what kind of entity it is in other respects, if it is a member of Earth’s community of life, the realization of its good is something that is intrinsically valuable. Therefore, its good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. Can’t be treated as a mere means to an end.
b. Definition: x possesses inherent worth: x’s good is deserving of the concern and consideration of all moral agents, and that the realization of its good has intrinsic value, to be pursued as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is.
c. Implication/application: Inherent worth of living things grounds the duties owed to living things. When agents so consider living things in this way, they place intrinsic value on them, and place themselves under obligations to help and not to harm them.

III. The Attitude of Respect for Nature
A. Parallel to the respect for persons
1. Seeing a thing as having inherent worth. Leads to:
2.. Commitment to live a certain kind of life in relation to the thing(s) with inherent worth, This implies:
3. Taking on rules and duties to help and not harm the thing(s) with inherent worth.
4. It gives rise to 3 sets of steady, permanent dispositions:
a. To seek certain ends
b. To carry out one’s practical reasoning in a certain way.
c. To have certain feelings.
B. Attitude of respect for nature has three main components (see p. 55 for details)
G. Connection between this attitude and the duties:
1. Anyone with the attitude will be disposed to comply with the rules/duties/standards of character.
2. Acting that way is a means of manifesting the attitude of respect.

IV. The Justifiability of the Attitude of Respect for Nature:
A. The argument: (justified by being implied by a justified world view).
1. The attitude of respect for nature is implied by a certain world view (“the biocentric outlook on nature”)
2. The world view is justified by being logically consistent and coherent, as well as being consistent with current scientific knowledge.
3. Therefore, the attitude implied by the justified world view is itself justified.
B. Three elements of a world view
1. A belief system
2. An ultimate moral attitude
3. A set of rules of duty and standards of character
C. (1) justifies (2) (in that it makes the attitude seem the suitable one to adopt).; and (2) justifies (3) (once the attitude is adopted, one makes the moral commitment, because one considers those rules to be binding on all moral agents.
D. The account is neutral with respect to Kantian or Consequentialist ethics.

V. The Biocentric Outlook on Nature; The World view: 4 Components
A. Humans are conceived as members of Earth’s community of life, and such membership and its terms applies equally to all human and non-human members.
B. The Earth’s ecosystem: interconnected and interdependent for each member’s proper function on all of the other individuals.
C. Each organism is conceived as a teleological center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way.
D. Humans are not superior to any other life form. Such a belief is irrational.

VI. The Denial of Human Superiority:

Arguments for human superiority based on merit
A. Argument 1:
1. The arg: Humans are superior because we have capacities that other species lack.
2. Objection: This doesn’t show we’re superior and so are more valuable. Every species has capacities that others lack.
B. Argument 2:
1. The arg.: Humans are superior because we have capacities that are more valuable than any other, no matter what species.
2. Objection: question-begging: valuable to whom? Obviously, to humans. But why privilege what humans value as objectively valuable?
a. Such capacities aren’t valued by other species, for they don’t contribute to excellence with respect to their proper function.
b. Other species have superior capacities to humans, from the standpoint of that species (cheetahs’ running speed).
C. Argument 3:
1. The arg: Humans are morally superior beings because they possess (while all other species lack), the conditions necessary to be morally good or bad (free will, rationality, autonomy, etc.)
2. Objection: the objection is incoherent. Only beings with capacities for moral agency can be judged to be either moral or immoral. So its incoherent to say that plants, for example, are morally inferior to humans, for they don’t have the capacities required for moral agency at all (they can’t be called immoral if they can’t do things that moral agents do. Compare: you can’t call a rock a bad dancer, for a rock doesn’t even have the capacities required to dance (legs, etc.))

Arguments for human superiority based on inherent worth

D. Argument 4:
1. The arg: Humans, simply by being members of the species Homo Sapiens, have a higher degree of intrinsic worth than any other species.
2. Objection:
a. The idea of degrees of inherent worth is based on an obsolete, morally repugnant idea of a strict hierarchy of social classes. According to the picture, members of higher classes were more valuable and important than members of lower classes. As such, just by being born into a rich family automatically made you more valuable than poorer people, no matter what you do. Now, we live in a democracy, and the class system seems morally absurd. No person is more valuable than any other, no matter how rich or poor you are. So, since the idea only gets justification from the false view of classes, the idea is faulty as well.
b. Today, unknowingly, we still hold to the basic idea of classism, but at the level of species, not wealth. This idea is just as morally repugnant as the classist idea. We’re not more valuable than other life forms just because we were born into the “prestigious” human race.
E. Final critique of the idea that humans are superior: There are three views of human beings that people use to justify human superiority: Greek humanism, Cartesian dualism, and the Judeo-Christian view of the world.
1. Greek humanism says humans are more valuable because we possess rationality. This makes us live on a higher plane and endows us with nobility. But this justification is question-begging. Rationality is valuable only to humans.
2. Cartesian dualism says humans are more valuable because humans have souls and animals don’t. This makes us more like divinity, since we are spiritual beings. But why think having a soul makes things more valuable than things that don’t have souls? Why is soul-stuff more valuable than physical matter?
3. The Judeo-Christian world view says that humans have more value because we are at one of the highest levels of the Great Chain of Being. Only God and angels are higher than humans, and everything else is lower in the chain. Also, we alone (besides the angels) are made in God’s image. This makes us extremely valuable, certainly more valuable than things that don’t bear God’s image. The problem with this justification is that it’s only plausible if you accept the Judeo-Christian world view. If you don’t think that you’re made in God’s image, then you can’t use the “I’m made in God’s image” justification for saying that humans are superior.
G. Now, the biocentric outlook says that all forms of life have equal inherent worth. So, each life form is worthy of being treated as though it has intrinsic value. Therefore, all humans are obligated to treat them as ends in themselves. Humans aren’t more valuable than any other life form.

VI. Moral Rights and the Matter of Competing Claims:
A. If all life forms are equally valuable, how do we decide between competing claims of consideration?
B. Doesn’t answer in detail, but says that if the account is true, then humans don’t automatically get direct consideration over any other species merely because they are human.

Notes on Lippke's "Advertising and the Social Conditions of Autonomy"

2008-04-03T01:42:00.001-07:00

Notes on Lippke’s “Advertising and the Social Conditions of Autonomy”

Summary of the paper:
A number of authors have argued that deceptive advertising is immoral because it undermines human autonomy. While this is true, the reason they give for why it is true is inadequate. The following is a sketch of the manner in which they argue: First, they briefly sketch an account of the nature of human autonomy. Then, they argue that advertising often undermines human autonomy in various ways: e.g., by means of implanting desires in us, by associating their products with the satisfaction of certain desires, and by misleading us by making false claims about the features of a product or service. Finally, the instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is entirely by means of the informational content of advertisements.
The above sorts of analyses of the immorality of advertising are too shallow. First, their account of human autonomy is too shallow. The true nature of full human autonomy is much more robust than these authors maintain. Second, the real reason why normal kinds of advertising are immoral is because they suppress and stunt the development of the constitutive features of this more robust notion of autonomy, thereby making us easy to control, for the purpose of generating a society of ready and willing consumers (a thriving free market economy requires it). Finally, the real instrument by which this undermining of autonomy is accomplished is by means of continually inundating us with ads that have (what the author calls) the “implicit content” of “persuasive advertising”. Advertisers should therefore stop inundating consumers with such autonomy-suppressing advertsing.
One may object that it is wrong to prevent advertisers to from inundating the public with ads that have persuasive content, on the grounds that people should be free to accept or reject the vision of the consumer lifestyle that is implicit in this content. But this objection fails for a number of reasons.
Finally, several modest recommendations are given for making our culture one that provides and encourages the social conditions necessary for its members to develop full human autonomy.

Outline of the paper:

Introduction: the basic thrust of the paper discussed
-Argue that “advertising undermines autonomy, especially under the conditions that exist in advanced capitalist countries like the United States.” (484)
-The type of advertising focused on: persuasive advertising (this is a technical term defined by Lippke – it doesn’t merely mean “convincing advertising”).
-Compare and contrast: informational vs. persuasive advertising
-Informational advertising: (again, this type of advertising is not the focus of the paper)
-information about the features, prices and availability of a product or service.
-presupposes some interest in the product
-They can undermine autonomy in at least two ways:
-(i) by manipulating and deceiving the consumer by not providing nearly enough information to make an informed, rational decision to by the product.
-(ii) when one is exposed to such advertising over and over, it has the effect of preventing, stunting, or eroding of a key trait of fully autonomous agents, viz., intellectual honesty. (based on Lippke’s discussion on p. 484)
-Persuasive advertising:
-usually contains little informational content about the product
-often tries to associate one or more of the consumer’s (sometimes subconscious) desires with the product (p. 484)
-Why is it bad to undermine human autonomy? Because humans need it to reduce the likelihood that they will be dominated or controlled in some way by others. (pp. 484-85)

I. On a recent, inadequate version of the “undermines autonomy” argument against deceptive persuasive advertising: Roger Crisp
A. The argument: Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by manipulating consumers in a way that is morally impermissible. Two points:
1. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by bypassing the consumer’s faculty of reason by associating their products with the consumer’s existent or ad-created desires. The consumer therefore doesn’t decide to by the product on the basis of freely and rationally choosing the product. Rather, he or she buys the product on the basis of non-rational factors: he or she never chose to buy it.
2. Persuasive ads undermine autonomy by implanting or creating new desires in the consumer, desires that the consumer doesn’t want, and therefore don’t identify with as being their desires. This one takes some explaining. First of all, people have two kinds of desires: first-order desires and second order desires. First-order desires are ordinary desires to have (or not to have) things (e.g., food, sleep, sex, company, sports…). By contrast, second-order desires are desires to have (or not to have) desires of various sorts (e.g., a desire not to desire to smoke (or eat Double-Doubles?); a desire to have the desire to study…). Now normal, healthy people have a strong second-order desire not to be manipulated by others without their consent and without good reason. But persuasive ads manipulate consumer’s in just these ways when they implant these first-order desires within them (e.g., the desire to smoke Marlboro cigarettes). Therefore, if the consumer were to reflect on the ways in which such ads manipulate them, they would repudiate the desires implanted in them by the ads. But no first-order desire that one would repudiate upon reflection is an autonomous desire: it is not a desire that the agent identifies with as their “own”. Therefore, such ads undermine autonomy by creating desires that are not autonomous.
B. Critique of the argument: Crisp attributes both too much and too little power to ads.
1. Preliminaries: two kinds of advertisement content: explicit and implicit
a. explicit content: message to “but x”, plus info about product features, price, where one can buy it, etc. This content is typically easy to resist.
b. implicit content: messages about “the consumer lifestyle”, which include “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, expectations, and aspirations” (p. 485) that a “normal” person has or ought to have. Such content is rarely, if ever, criticized or critically evaluated, but is implied to be the only appropriate lifestyle to adopt or aspire to. This content is in just about every commercial, and, given that commercials are constant and everywhere-present, and that most people absorb and conform to their content, they are very hard to resist.
2. Too much: Although kids can be manipulated by the explicit content of ads, most adults know what’s going on, and can resist it. The real task is to understand how ads can unduly influence adults when they know that ads are trying to manipulate them.
3. Too little: Crisp fails to account for the fact that ads have implicit content, and that this is what manipulates them.

II. Toward an adequate account of the nature of full human autonomy: Full human autonomy requires that a number of social conditions are in place; conditions that enable agents to have:
A. The ability for crisp, careful thought and evaluation of arguments and claims.
B. The knowledge of alternative belief systems and lifestyles (besides the consumer lifestyle).
C. “Venues in which agents can reasonably be expected to display these abilities and act on these motivations.” (485)
D. Freedom from coercion and manipulation, brainwashing and harassment. (485)

III. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part one:
A. by constantly barraging us with mindless, melodramatic, content.
B. By having content that portrays and recommends a simplistic approach to the problems of life, and how to solve them.

IV. How advertisements undermine autonomy, part two:
A. The main way in which ads undermine full autonomy is by suppressing it..
1. Ads discourage the emergence the skills, knowledge, attitudes and motivations that are constitutive of full autonomy. How?
2. Ads are pervasive and virtually inescapable.
3. There is an absence of presentation of views that challenge its implicit content (no public service announcements that urge us to be wary of their tactics of manipulation and seduction) (p. 486).
4. Often aimed at children, who don’t yet have the ability to critically evaluate it. They absorb the content, and its effect carry forward into their adult lives.
B. Analysis of the content of persuasive content: metamessages (i.e., “messages about how to approach claims made by others” (487))
1. They “subtly encourage the propensity to accept emotional appeals, oversimplification, and shoddy standards of proof for claims”.(487)
2. “Evidence and arguments of the most ridiculous sorts are offered in support of advertising claims.” (ibid.)
3. Ads use information selectively (they exaggerate the good features and downplay or remain silent about bad features), etc.
4. The meanings of words are routinely twisted.
5. Ads imply that the most important information about life must be communicated in a way that is entertaining, and such that it can be passively absorbed.
6. They imply that “one can’t believe or trust what other people say” (ibid.).
7. “They imply that everything (and nothing!) can be proved.” (ibid.)
8. They imply that “evidence contrary to one’s claims may be ignored.” (ibid.)
9. They imply that “success in communication is a matter of persuading others no matter how it is done.” (ibid.)
10. The point: all of these metamessages undermine “the habits and attitudes constitutive of critical competence (clarity, rigor, precision, patience, honesty, effort, etc….).” (ibid.)
11. Why do they do it? Because a thriving free market economy requires “ready and willing consumers.” (ibid.) But to ensure that they have a supply of ready and willing consumers, they must undermine social conditions that would prevent this, such as the existence of society of fully autonomous citizens.

V. An objection, several replies, and some recommendations for instituting social conditions that would encourage human autonomy.

Wikipedia Entry Critiquing Capitalism

2008-04-03T01:24:00.000-07:00

Worth a look.

Sadly, The Old Trick Still Works on Many

2008-04-03T01:22:00.001-07:00

"Why, of course the people don't want war...But...the people can always
be brought to do the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you
have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the
pacificists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger."

--Hermann Goering, Nazi leader, at the Nuremburg Trials after WWII

Nobel Prize-Winning Economist Joseph Stiglitz on the Cost of the Iraq War, Bush's Skewed Priorities

2008-04-03T01:20:00.000-07:00

A juicy quote in an interview with Joseph Stiglitz:

MJ: You predicted that the total cost of the Iraq war
would top a trillion dollars. Can you put a number
like that into perspective?

JS: That was last year. I think it is clear from what
has happened since then that a trillion dollars was a
vast underestimate. We are talking at least between
one and two trillion dollars now. To put that into
perspective, President Bush went to the American
people at the beginning of his second term, saying
that we have a major crisis with our Social Security
system. For somewhere between a half and quarter of
the cost of the war in Iraq you could have fixed all
the problems associated with Social Security for the
next 75 years and still have had a lot left over. Put
in another way: We are now spending something like $10
billion a month—$120 billion dollars a year—on Iraq.
The amount the entire world gives in foreign aid, on
an annual basis, is about half that.

How the Rich Get Richer

2008-04-03T01:18:00.000-07:00

Here.

Are We Safer? A Report Card

2008-04-03T01:13:00.000-07:00

Here.

We're Getting Hosed, Folks

2008-04-03T01:12:00.001-07:00

Here's a list of the world's top 10 military spenders and the approximate amounts each country currently budgets for its military establishment:

1. United States (FY08 budget), $623 billion
2. China (2004), $65 billion
3. Russia, $50 billion
4. France (2005), $45 billion
5. Japan (2007), $41.75 billion
6. Germany (2003), $35.1 billion
7. Italy (2003), $28.2 billion
8. South Korea (2003), $21.1 billion
9. India (2005 est.), $19 billion
10. Saudi Arabia (2005 est.), $18 billion

We spend about ten times as much on military expenditures than our closest competitor in this regard, and we spend more than the nine other leaders in military spending *combined* -- by a long shot. This, of course, is utterly fucking ridiculous. Folks, we don't need to spend this much. Did you know that we could solve *all* our financial problems in this country with that money, including health care, social security, education, etc., by a long shot, if we chose to spend the money now allocated to military spending on the former tasks instead? We're getting hosed, folks. The only people profiting are the weapons-building corporations who lobby their asses of for our tax money to pay for their "products".